

A
T R E A T I S E
O N
V I R T U E
A N D
H A P P I N E S S.
B Y

WILLIAM NETTLETON, M.D. F.R.S.

The FIFTH EDITION.

————— *Rectius hoc est*
Hoc faciens vitam melius, sic dulcis amicit
Occurram —————

Hoc.

Printed in the Year MDCCLXIX.

THE EAST



V. 1. U. E.

A. D.

H. A. P. I. N. E. S.

D. Y.

WILLIAM HENRY LESTER, M.D. F.R.S.

The First Edition.

—Nelson's

Has been often written, in this country.

—O. C. M.

Hos.

Printed in the Year M D C C X L I I.

P R E F A C E.

THE substance of what is contained in this book was published some years ago; and the favourable reception it met with, from some persons, whose judgment ought to be valued, has occasioned its being offered to the public a little more at large; and as it now exceeds the bound of a *Letter*, the title is altered to that of a *TREATISE*.

It contains only a few observations on human nature, with some obvious reasonings thereupon. Whether the observations are true, and the reasonings just, must be left to the judgment of every candid and impartial reader: It appeals only to common sense; and as it is copied from nature, and from the greatest masters, it pretends to no more than to serve as a key or introduction to what has been written by the most celebrated authors on this subject.

P R E F A C E.

THE matter itself is certainly of some importance; and whoever will bestow a little pains and attention upon it, will find that his labour is not lost.

*Aequè pauperibus prodest, locupletibus, aequè
Aequè neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit.* HOR.

THERE are none but who would desire to pass through the world as easily as they can, and to give themselves and others as little trouble as is possible: And how we may learn to do this, and also obtain the greatest and most lasting pleasure, is the subject of the following enquiry. I do not presume to give instruction, but only to consider how every man may instruct himself; if he is willing to be at the pains. But as the method proposed is attended with some trouble, and requires some degree of self-denial, it is not to be expected that it will universally take: yet surely it were to be wished, that every man, instead of amassing himself with matters of less moment, would remember that the chief business in life is to promote his own happiness, and that of others. This is all I contend for; and this, I affirm, would be most for the advantage of every individual, as well as that of the public; and if it could be accomplished, which is certainly a possible thing, it would

P R E F A C E.

would have a happy influence in general. There would then be no cause to complain of bribery and corruption; but it would reform all abuses, and work a wonderful change in all orders and degrees of men.

BUT not to dwell upon a thought so visionary and romantic: Though we are not to expect that all men should be absolutely good and virtuous, yet they might perhaps approach nearer to it, if they could be convinced that it is their interest, and not only so, but their highest privilege. That to be virtuous is the only way to be happy and free; whereas the contrary course leads to certain misery and slavery; and it will avail but little to employ so much artifice and address to obtain things of small value, while the chief enjoyments, which are those of the mind, are neglected: nor can we with any tolerable grace boast of our excellent constitution, and that we enjoy civil liberty in so great perfection, if at the same time we are really enslaved in a moral sense, and can submit to undergo a servitude more wretched and ignominious than is endured under the most absolute rulers.

II
would have a happy influence in general. There would then be no cause to complain of bribery and corruption; but the world reform all abuses, and would a wonderful change in all orders and degrees of men.

But not to dwell upon a thought so visionary and romantic: Though we are not to expect that all men should be absolutely good and virtuous, yet they might perhaps approach nearer to it, if they could be convinced that it is their interest, and not only so, but their highest privilege. That to be virtuous is the only way to be happy another; whereas the contrary course leads to certain misery and slavery; and it will avail but little to employ so much wisdom and address to obtain things of small value, while the chief enjoyments, which are those of the mind, are neglected: nor can we win any tolerable grace here, or our excellent constitution, and that we enjoy civil liberty in so great perfection, is at the same time we are really enslaved in a moral sense, and can pretend to no other service more watched and oppressive than is exacted under the most absolute masters.

THE CONTENTS.

PART I.

SECT. I.

O *F human affection and motion in general.*

SECT. II.

That happiness is the end of all our actions; with some considerations concerning happiness and good.

SECT. III.

How we may err and deviate from our true happiness.

SECT. IV.

How these errors are to be prevented.

The CONTENTS,

SECT. V.

How reason cannot always govern our motion; with some remarks concerning the imperfection of human nature.

PART II.

SECT. I.

An enquiry into the various powers of affection we are endowed with; and first, of the pleasures and pains of the external senses.

SECT. II.

Of sympathy and social affection.

SECT. III.

Of the moral sense, which makes us pleased with a very representation of virtue, and offended with the contrary.

SECT. IV.

Of several abilities, which when joined with a good disposition, do also appear amiable.

SECT.

SECT.

The CONTENTS.

S E C T. V.

*Of the sense of honour and reputation; as also of
mirth and ridicule.*

S E C T. VI.

Of the sense of beauty in natural subjects.

S E C T. VII.

*How all these determinations are implanted in our na-
ture, and others may be acquired by custom.*

S E C T. VIII.

*A comparison of all these various affections, in order
to discover which are of the greatest importance.*

P A R T III.

S E C T. I.

*How our several passions ought to be managed; and first,
in general, that all ought to be moderated and kept
in subjection.*

S E C T. II.

The CONTENTS.

S E C T. II.

How the sensual appetites are to be restrained; also of self-interest, or the love of money.

S E C T. III.

How the pleasures of the understanding and of the imagination are to be regulated.

S E C T. IV.

Of the management of the social affections.

S E C T. V.

Of the sense of right and wrong, how it ought to be governed.

S E C T. VI.

How the sense of honour and reputation ought to be moderated

Recapitulation and conclusion.

A
T R E A T I S E
O N
V I R T U E and H A P P I N E S S.

P A R T I.

Sect. I. *Of human affection and motion in general.*

BY reflecting on what passes within ourselves, we know that we not only *perceive* those ideas which are in our minds, so as to discern the various appearances, and distinguish the several qualities and relations of things, but, which to us is of the greatest importance, we are also variously *affected* by them, as they give us joy and satisfaction, pleasure and delight; and thereby promote our *happiness*, or else occasion grief and disturbance, uneasiness and pain, and so far contribute to our *misery*.

To perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, and thereby to discover truth, and to improve in *knowledge*, is the province of the *understanding*;

but

but the *power* to be thus affected, or to feel *pleasure* and *pain*, is what we call by the general name of *sense*, which all animals are possessed of in some degree; and mankind, in particular, are endowed with great variety of senses, or *powers of affection*; not only such as are common to inferiour creatures, but also with others of a higher and more refined nature, through which the proper objects differently affect us with *pleasure* and *pain*: and the several modes of grief and joy, excited in us by these objects, acting upon our senses, are called *affections* or *passions*.

PLEASURE is called *good*, and pain *evil*; but these terms are commonly applied to *objects*: for whatever is apt to raise or excite pleasure in us, is in itself, and *immediately good*, as that which may procure us objects of pleasure, is called *mediately good*: on the contrary, we name that *evil*, which gives us pain and disturbance; and that is *mediately* or *consequentially evil*, which will procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good.

THOUGH numberless images of things, with all their different relations and proportions, were perceived by the mind, yet if they were not attended with *delight*, or *uneasiness*, they would scarce have any effect upon us, but rather pass away like a dream: they would leave no more impression than shadows which fly over the fields; but all ideas received into our minds from the various objects which have any influence or effect upon us, by striking upon some of our *senses*, or *powers of affection*, do give us either *pleasure* or *pain*: for whatever it is that produces either of these, is

not



Sect. I. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS.

not in itself either *good* or *evil*, but perfectly indifferent, and of no moment or concern.

As the sensations of pleasure and pain are annexed to the impressions which objects make upon our senses, when *present*; so also when they are *absent*, their images and representations, as they pass before our view, are attended with an idea or appearance, a fancy or opinion, of *good* or *evil*, arising from the remembrance of what effect they have had, or the imagination of what they will have upon us, by producing in us either pleasure or pain.

WHEN the ideas of absent objects are brought into our view, we are apt to consider them with relation to ourselves, and what operation they will have upon us when *present*. If we know from experience that any thing has given us joy and delight, the species, or appearance of good, will attend the idea of that object, when it is *absent*; and it will be the same, if from any cause we are persuaded, or if we fancy, or imagine it will give us pleasure, mediately, or immediately: whereas, on the contrary, if we remember that any thing has given us pain and disturbance, or if we are possessed with an opinion, that it will either mediately or immediately contribute to our misery, the appearance of evil will be united with that object.

WITHOUT entering into a nice disquisition concerning the powers and operations of the human mind, we know by experience, that we are not only capable of receiving a *sensation*, but also some sort of an idea or conception of that sensation may be retained in the memory, when the object is not present to the sense: and as objects by acting up-

on

on our senses do excite pleasing or disagreeable perceptions, so the ideas of these sensations, and also every fancy or opinion of *good* and *evil*, by striking upon the imagination, do also affect us with *pleasure* and *pain*; but then the *affections* produced by these reflected appearances, like inverted images, are of the opposite *kind*.

FOR whatever causes either grief or joy, when present, has, when absent, a quite contrary effect. Thus present evil affects us with pain; but the remembrance of it, when removed, affords us pleasure; also every representation of calamity, from which we are secure, yields a secret delight. And as present good gives us joy and delight, so the loss, the want or absence of good, causes grief and uneasiness, whenever its idea is presented to the mind: we also feel joy and satisfaction from the appearance of approaching good, or departing evil, which is called *hope*, as the disturbance we receive from the view of departing good, or approaching evil, is called *fear*: for we do not only regard what we are at this present moment, but are apt to suppose we shall be existing hereafter, and consequently are concerned for our future state, as well as the present.

THE prospect of being happy in the time to come, gives us *present* delight, as the view of any future misery necessarily occasions *immediate* disturbance.

THUS there are two different conditions, or modifications of *affection*, which we are conscious that we feel alternately; one is that of *joy* and *delight*, which we industriously seek after, judge it to be
our

our right state, and when obtained, we endeavour to preserve it by all the means within our power ; and the other is a state of *uneasiness* and *pain*, which we take to be our wrong state, and consequently fly from it, so far as we are able ; one determines us to continue as we are, and the other puts us upon altering our present posture, and incites us to better our condition by a change.

WHEN a man is free from all *uneasiness*, and has no perception of any thing but what is pleasing and agreeable, he is then perfectly content with his present state, and has no *inclination* nor endeavour but to continue it ; but when these objects of *good*, or *evil*, begin to act upon us, so as to affect us with *uneasiness*, it is then we are put into *action*, being necessarily determined to shun and escape, so far as we are able, every painful and uneasy sensation, as well as to retain or continue that which is pleasing and delightful.

THESE different affections of pleasure and pain, which we receive from objects applied to our senses, or from the representations of things in the mind, are properly called *passions* ; yet they are at the same time motives or principles of action, as they determine the mind to exert its powers, either to continue its present state, or else to change its situation.

THOUGH this exertion of its powers and faculties is the proper action of the mind, yet these *affections* are the motives and inducements to it, and without such affection there could be no *motion* ; but if ever it happens, from any cause, that a man is rendered wholly insensible, so as to feel
neither

neither pleasure or pain, he is then entirely inactive, and without motion, as much as any inanimate body whatsoever.

So far as we can learn from experience and observation, without being affected we are never moved : sense is antecedent to motion ; and though there may be sense without motion, as when the organs are not at our command, yet without sense there can be no motion, at least none that is voluntary, or which can properly be called our own.

BUT we are very certain that we are endowed both with sense, and a power of self-motion ; the first informs us of our right and wrong state, as the latter enables us to pursue the one, and to avoid the other.

ALL present or approaching evil excites *aversion*, which implies not only the affection of pain and disturbance, but an endeavour to fly from, and avoid it ; as absent or departing good occasions *desire*, which implies not only grief and uneasiness in the want of it, but an inclination to obtain and preserve it.

DESIRE, or *aversion*, is the *vis impressa*, or the moving force, in all voluntary agents ; the one being an *impulse*, whereby we are driven away from whatever appears to be evil, as the other is an *attraction*, whereby we are drawn towards that which we take to be good : yet these may be reduced to one and the same, by a different view of their objects ; if we consider the absence of good as an evil, and the removal of evil as a good, they may be made convertible terms : Thus desire of good may be termed aversion to the want of it ;
and

Sect. I. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 17

and aversion to evil may be called a desire of its removal.

THIS force of *attraction*, or *repulsion*, proceeds from the sensation of good or evil which is present, or from the appearance of it when absent; for every *idea* of absent pleasure, which we want, and are not possessed of, is a *negative pleasure*, or, in other words, it is a *real pain*; and the greater the appearance or opinion of the pleasure, the greater will be our uneasiness in the want of it, and our *desire* to obtain it. And as *aversion* to present evil is equal to the sense of pain that we feel; so *fear*, or aversion to future evil, that is likely to befall us, will be proportionable to our idea of the misery which we imagine it will bring upon us.

HENCE we may perceive, that we are not only influenced by objects which are present, and applied to the *sense*, but also that the fancy, and opinion of them, when absent, or the bare imagination of what has possibly no real *existence*, may affect us in the most sensible manner; and many of our passions are actually excited by these ideas and representations of things in the mind, when our outward senses are no ways employed; and it may perhaps be found, that some of the main springs of motion, the most exquisite of our joys and griefs, our hopes and fears, do proceed from this original, and that affection does very much depend upon opinion.

EVERY *desire* and *aversion* is attended with uneasiness, which serves as an *impulse* to put us into motion, and without which we should scarce move at all, but rather remain in perpetual inaction. When we are in a state of indifference, the least un-

easiness will put us into motion ; and when we enjoy some great degree of pleasure, yet that may not so wholly possess our thoughts, but it may be sometimes interrupted for a few moments, by appearances of absent things, which will be intruding : yet, before we can be moved out of our present situation, it is necessary that the *force* should be sufficient to overcome the *resistance*, or that the desire of some absent good, or fear of some approaching evil, should prevail over the satisfaction of our present condition.

THOUGH the satisfaction of our present condition be not very great, and the *desire* of some absent good be very strong ; yet, if that desire be balanced by some *aversion* to the means of obtaining it, or fear of some evil that may follow, we shall not be put into motion, but be determined to *forbear* the pursuit of that good ; nay, though our present estate be exceedingly painful and uneasy, yet if our aversion to the means of freeing ourselves from it be greater than our aversion to the present evil, we shall be determined to *endure* it.

IN all cases where opposite *affections* shall at the same time urge us to do, and to forbear any action, if equal, they destroy one another, and we remain in the same estate as before, otherwise the most powerful will determine us to change or continue it ; yet these contrary incitements will not fail to occasion some struggle ; and which way soever our choice may be fixed, it will at first be with some reluctance, and not without a mixture of regret.

BUT notwithstanding, we commonly find, that where various *inclinations* and *affections* do strive to
move

Sect. I. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 19

move us different ways, or excite us to different or contrary actions, the strongest will prevail, and the *force or eagerness*, with which we pursue any good, or fly from any evil, will, in some measure, be proportionable to the *prevailing* desire or aversion wherewith we are possessed; for though different appearances may alternately present themselves, so as to cause a momentary conflict, and keep the mind for some time in suspense; yet most commonly the dispute is soon decided, and the principal uneasiness that is felt, silences after a short time, and suppresses every other passion.

FROM all which it will most plainly appear, that though the actions of mankind are intricate and various, and it may sometimes be difficult to trace out all the particular motives that influence us; yet thus much in general we are most certain of, that how surprizing soever these actions may appear, their original is most simple and uniform: it is only some *uneasiness* arising in the mind, from the action of present evil, or from the representation of absent good, or approaching evil; this is the secret spring which puts all into motion, rouses men from indolence and inactivity, and gives rise to the most renowned exploits, as well as to all others that are less regarded. The common labourer would not toil for his daily bread, if he was not prompted by hunger, or the fear of want; neither would the lover pursue his mistress with so much ardour, if the passion which glows within his breast would let him be at ease. DECIUS would not have devoted himself to destruction, if he had not been stimulated by a generous love to his country; he could not be

easy in all events ; the publick happiness was what he earnestly wished for, and the ruin of his country was an evil which he dreaded more than death.

NOR would ALEXANDER have taken so much pains to conquer the world, if he had not been animated by another, no less powerful, passion, which was the love of FAME : honour and applause affected him with inexpressible delight, and this he thought was to be obtained by conquest. It was glory which the young hero most ardently desired ; nor would he have pursued it through so much toil and hazard, if he could have been easy without it.

BUT though the appearance of absent good strikes the mind with a sudden *uneasiness*, which moves us to seek after, and obtain it ; yet it is not requisite that the painful sensation should always accompany the idea : For assurance of obtaining what we desire, soon removes the uneasiness, and converts it into pleasure, though the motion at the same time may still persevere : or if there is only a probability of gaining what we have in view, that inspires us with *hope*, which is a most pleasing affection, and takes off very much from the uneasiness of desire ; but if we apprehend a greater probability of being disappointed in what we aim at, this fills us with anxious fears, and very much increases our disturbance.

IN like manner, all present evil affects us with pain, and every view of approaching evil necessarily gives us uneasiness, which moves us to fly from, and avoid it ; yet both the suffering, and apprehension may be alleviated by a joyful *hope* that we may escape it, or be shortly delivered from it.

BUT

Sect. I. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 21

BUT if the good is judged to be wholly *unattainable* or lost so as not to be retrieved, or the evil is wholly *unavoidable*, without any possibility of being delivered from it, this brings us to absolute *despair*; which puts an end to all our endeavours, as it extinguishes the last glimpse of expectation, affording nothing but continual grief and sorrow while the idea remains in the mind.

WHEN we are in pursuit of any good, or when we fly from any evil, which we apprehend to be coming upon us, it is not necessary that the *idea* of pleasure, or apprehension of evil, should be always present in the mind; because when we are once put in motion, we shall continue in the same state, till some new impression produce a change; and while the idea is absent, the uneasiness which it occasions must of consequence cease.

FROM whence it is evident, that though the *impulse of desire*, or *aversion*, consists in *uneasiness*; yet this may be greater or less, of longer or shorter duration, according to the impression that is made, as the idea of good or evil is more or less in the mind, or as it is attended more or less with *hope* or *fear*.

ALL this is advanced upon a supposition that the *sense* is always the same; but it may perhaps be found, that in the same person, at different seasons, this power of affection will vary, and in different persons, the degrees of sensibility will be different: they whose organs are of a more delicate texture, who have a great quickness of thought, and a ready understanding, have generally a more lively and exquisite sense of pleasure and pain: they are sooner

made uneasy, and consequently more readily put into motion than others ; but then their motion is more apt to be controuled by opposite impressions ; and persons of that temperament are most subject to *levity*, and prone to be fickle and unsteady ; while others, more slow and heavy, do not so quickly yield to every *impulse* ; they are not so readily put into action, but then they have more firmness and constancy, and their motion is more persevering, not so easily stopped or diverted into another course. It may also depend upon some difference in the constitution, that some are, in all their actions, gentle, and deliberate ; while others are fiery and impetuous. Some are always in high courage, and exceeding confident of success ; others naturally timorous, and are apt to be diffident and dejected.

YET that we may be effectually put into motion, and that our endeavours may prove successful, it is necessary that the application of the agent, and the condition of the patient, should be such, as that the *impression* may not be too faint ; and it is no less necessary that the *idea* should not be too much out of our thought ; and also that *hope* should be intermixed with *fear*, to make us vigilant and cautious, and to quicken our activity in the pursuit ; otherwise the desire will be apt to languish, and we shall grow remiss, negligent, and secure ; or else be dispirited, and throw up all in despair : as on the other hand, when the idea of pleasure is too great, or too often presented to our view, the *impatience* of desire will be increased beyond a just degree, and our motion *accelerated*, so as sometimes to be over-hasty, and by leading us into rash measures, may occasion *disappointment* ;

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 23

pointment; and when we fly from any evil which is apprehended, if the *frightful idea* is always present to the fancy, our *fear* and *consternation* will be too much increased, which will make our flight too hasty and precipitate, and disable us from taking the most proper methods to avoid it.

Sect. II. *That happiness is the end of all our actions; with some considerations concerning happiness and good.*

AS nature has furnished us with these powers of *affection*, and given us strong *desires*, which determine us to pursue what has the appearance of good; and also powerful *aversions*, which make us fly from what we feel, or imagine to be evil; and as our aim in every particular action is to escape the one and obtain the other, so the scope and end of all our motions, the general aim of our whole conduct is, or at least ought to be, *happiness*; which is commonly supposed to consist in being delivered from all evil, so far as is possible, and in obtaining the best and greatest good; or, which is the same thing, in ease and relief from *pain*, and in the enjoyment of the greatest, and most lasting *pleasure*.

WE are by nature so constituted as to receive many real pleasures, and pains, both from our external and internal senses; but, besides these, the removal, or lessening of a pain, operates as a pleasure; and the loss, or diminution of a pleasure, is to be accounted as a pain: as in all computations, the subtraction of a negative quantity, is the addition

of a positive ; and the subduction of a positive, the addition of a negative.

MANY *pleasures* when they cease, are succeeded by uneasiness and pain ; as violent *pains* when removed, do for a time, by bare cessation, occasion the highest pleasure.

WHEN we are in possession of good, if that be taken from us, and evil is allotted to our share, this causes a more bitter sensation of *misery*, than if we had been in a state of indifference ; because it not only gives us pain, but deprives us of the foregoing pleasure. But when we are oppressed with evil, if that be removed, and at the same time we receive the addition of a good, this produces a more lively sense of *delight*, than if we had before been in a state of indolence ; because it not only gives us pleasure, but relieves us from the preceding *anguish*.

FROM whence it appears, that in order to be happy, it is not necessary that we should enjoy only the good, and be wholly exempt from the evil. *Happiness* does not consist in the constant enjoyment of pleasure, without ever feeling any pain ; but in a due *mixture*, and alternate succession of each : a state of uninterrupted joy and delight, without any allay of sorrow, is a perfect *chimera* ; and to expect all the sweet, without ever tasting of the bitter, would be most unreasonable : neither ought we to desire it, because without a mixture of the latter, the former would have no relish.

SUCH is the state of *human life*, that even misery itself seems a necessary ingredient to our happiness, since many of our pleasures are only alleviations of pain ; and even those which are the most real,
and

I. Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 23

and natural, are very much enhanced and recommended by some antecedent uneasiness : inasmuch that if all pain could be taken away, the pleasures remaining would be but few, and those too so very dull and insipid, as to afford but small enjoyment : and we should then be reduced to a state of perfect *indolence*, and *inactivity*. But the wise author of our beings having endowed men with a power of self-motion, and designed them for action and employment, has, in order to put us into motion, subjected us to many unavoidable *pains*, and *uneasinesses* ; and such is our make and constitution, that whenever we feel any uneasy sensation, we are immediately determined to get quit of it, as soon as we are able.

PAIN is the secret spring which puts all into motion, and if that were away, all action would immediately languish, and at length entirely cease : it is also a seasoning in life which is absolutely necessary, because without it all our enjoyments would be insipid, and pleasure would quickly be no more. The more violent our *desires* or *aversions* are, the swifter, and more eager will our motions be ; and when we obtain what we aim at, the more intense will be the subsequent delight, which results from the removal of a more grievous, and tormenting pain.

BUT though to get free from *uneasiness* be the first step towards being happy, yet that seems to be no absolute gain ; it is only retrieving what we had lost, and all pleasure of that kind can only balance the *misery* that went before : But when, besides relief from a pain, we obtain the enjoyment of a real pleasure,

pleasure, this is a double *acquisition*, and adds something to our stock of solid happiness.

WHEN both these do come united, they very much increase the value of any satisfaction, and we may observe in common life, that whatever is obtained with difficulty and danger, is generally very much prized, while another good of equal moment, which is too easily acquired, like a conquest gained without resistance, is often slighted and undervalued.

BUT though it seems necessary that pain should come before pleasure, to introduce it with greater advantage ; yet it is highly requisite the pain should not be of too long continuance ; for *miser*y of itself can never be the object of desire ; on the contrary, we fly from and avoid it, as much as lies in our power ; and though we cannot always escape it, we strive at least to get rid of it as soon as possible.

TO be at *ease* from *pain* is always our first and most necessary care : as it is the first degree of pleasure, this will always demand our first and principal attention ; and indeed, without this there can be no satisfaction, because while we labour under any painful disorder of body, or any considerable disturbance of mind, we are rendered almost incapable of relishing the pleasure of any enjoyment.

AFTER relief from pain, *happiness* consists in the enjoyment of real pleasure ; yet it is not the obtaining the first satisfaction which offers itself, which is always sufficient ; but as the *pains* should be made as short as possible, so the *pleasures* should be of a *lasting*, and durable nature, and not only so, but the *best*, and greatest we are fitted to enjoy.

FOR,

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 27

FOR, the various *delights* human nature is capable of receiving, are not all of equal importance; some are of an inferior nature, which we enjoy in common with other animals; others are more exalted, and becoming the dignity of human nature; some are faint and languid, others more lively and transporting; some transient and momentary, yielding no *after-satisfaction* in reflection and remembrance; while others are permanent and lasting, not only pleasing in their immediate operation, but in the consciousness and memory they leave behind them, which yields a most durable *satisfaction*. Such is our frame and constitution, that few pleasures are lasting in their direct and immediate exercise, nor can our senses bear the application of the same objects for any long time together, but they must be relieved with something new, and repeated after some intervals of abstinence, else they grow insipid, dull, and tiresome; so that to heighten the enjoyment, there is required not only a mixture of *pain*, but also a variety of *pleasures* succeeding each other in their proper seasons. Yet it will certainly very much conduce to our happiness, to enjoy as great a share of the nobler pleasures, as our condition will admit of, and that the inferior kinds should not encroach upon those of a higher nature.

THOUGH what is apt to produce pleasure in us be called *good*, and that which gives us pain, in any degree, be termed *evil*, yet when we come to estimate good and evil, we shall find the value lies much in *comparison*: for, a lesser good that deprives us of a greater, is not really and absolutely a good,
but

but is rather to be counted an evil; as a lesser evil which prevents a greater, is to be esteemed as a good.

NEITHER is that to be accounted as a *good*, which, though it yields immediate pleasure, yet is sure to be followed by more lasting grief and sorrow; as on the contrary, that ought by no means to be esteemed as an *evil*, which though it causes present pain and disturbance, will in its consequence procure us greater pleasure.

THERE are many objects which will afford us real pleasure, and so far may seem to contribute to our happiness; yet if they hinder us from enjoying greater, or will in consequence bring upon us greater misery, it is evident, upon the balance, the loss will exceed the gain; and consequently, whatever appearance of *good* such things may have, they will at last be found to be really *evil*.

AND as all worldly enjoyments do contain a mixture of good and evil, there are many things which at present may give us pain and disturbance, and so far may tend to make us miserable; yet if they may be a means to save us from enduring greater pain, or if they will in consequence procure us greater pleasure, it is plain that in this case we gain more than we lose; and therefore however such things may at first appear to be *evil*, yet they will prove in the main to be really *good*. We ought not to be affected only with what is present, neither indeed can we avoid looking forward; and though the removal of *evil*, and the acquisition of *good*, are two great sources of *happiness*, as the loss of good, and the presence of evil, are two bitter fountains of *misery*,

I.
vil
a
ch,
to
as
be
ent
ro-
real
our
ing
eat-
lofs
ver
will
n a
ngs
nce,
et if
ring
ture
we
uch
will
not
in-
the
two
and
s of
fery,

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 29

misery, yet it is not from these alone that our delights and disquiets do take their rise; but as we are likely to be concerned in what shall happen to us *hereafter*, as well as in our present condition, the prospect of *future* advantage affords us present satisfaction, as the view of approaching disaster creates *immediate* disturbance.

THE pleasure we receive from the prospect of future good may sometimes be so great, as to make us regardless of any present evil; as the apprehension of future evil, whether real or imaginary, may sometimes occasion so much disturbance, as to destroy all enjoyment of present good. HOPE is a main ingredient towards happiness, without which it would be but poorly supported; for present good could never furnish out a constant succession of delight, but would soon grow dull and tasteless, and a great part of our lives would be void of all entertainment, if *hope* of future good did not come in to supply the defect: It is this which fills the mind with pleasing prospects, gay illusions, and delightful visions, which yield anticipating transports, and suspend for a time all *uneasiness* arising from *present* evil.

ON the other hand it must be owned, that men are no less ingenious to disturb their present satisfaction, and the ease and tranquillity of their lives, with the fear of *approaching* evil: It is this which sometimes gives to things a more frightful appearance than they ought to have, raising such dismal apprehensions, and imaginary terrors, as do utterly destroy all enjoyment of *present* good, and create real and most exquisite misery.

IT will hereafter appear how necessary it is, for
the

the sake of a man's own happiness, that his *desires* and *aversions*, his *hopes* and *fears*, should be regulated, and applied to their proper objects; but at present, it will be sufficient to observe, with regard to things which are not in our power, that what cannot be *obtained*, can never reasonably be accounted as a good, because being placed beyond our reach, it can never contribute to our happiness; but on the contrary, the *desire* which cannot be *gratified*, will occasion continual grief and disturbance; or if *hope* should come in to our relief, and we indulge the flattering prospect, it will prove at last no better than a fool's paradise, and all the visionary joy will end in disappointment: or if it cannot be acquired without a difficult and tedious chase, the uneasiness may be so much prolonged, that the capture will be scarce worth the toil; neither ought we to join too great an opinion of good to what we may possibly be possessed of, but yet is not in our power to retain, and which we may soon be deprived of, because in that case the enjoyment is precarious, and we shall be always in danger of losing it, and the loss of good is what occasions a most grievous disquiet. As that which can never be *obtained* is not our *good*, we ought also to withdraw as much as possible the opinion of *evil* from that which must be *endured*, and which it is not in our power to escape. It is the condition of human life to labour under many imperfections, and be subject to many unavoidable calamities, which when we find that our utmost precaution to guard against them, is but vain, we ought to submit to, and patiently receive as part of our portion, without repining, or thinking them to be
evil;

evil; otherwise the dread and apprehension will im-
bitter our lives, while yet the aversion is vain and
unprofitable, because that which it so earnestly shuns,
will be sure to overtake us. Whoever entertains
too high and florid ideas of happiness, will find
himself much mistaken; for many of our *pleasures*,
as has been already mentioned, are only *alleviations*
of *pain*, or at least are very much heightened by a
due mixture of it; and besides, it must also be re-
membred, that a patient endurance of some degree
of evil is highly requisite, because in our present cir-
cumstances some degree of evil is absolutely neces-
sary and unavoidable.

A STATE of *uninterrupted* felicity, without any mix-
ture of disturbance, is not to be expected: While
we are surrounded by so many objects which must
be avoided, or else they may soon prove destructive
to our weak and tender frame, and while others are
so necessary to be sought after, as conducing to our
welfare and support, it is not for us to be indolent
and unconcerned. If we felt no *pain* from present
evil, or could view approaching danger without any
disturbance, we could not long preserve our beings,
but should be every moment exposed to inevitable
destruction, neither could we provide what is neces-
sary for our well-being, if *absent* good gave us no *un-
easiness*.

THE condition of human nature does absolutely
require, that men should be *susceptible* of many *pains*
and disquiets, even for their own *preservation*, during
the short time they are appointed to continue here;
and as we are at best but weak and imperfect crea-
tures, and not designed to be of any long *duration*,

we

we are exposed to many disasters, which with our utmost endeavours we cannot always escape, and are subject to diseases, and at last to death and dissolution.

So that if we take a survey of human happiness in its greatest elevation, and view it in the fairest light, we shall find, it will admit of many *abatements*; every man must receive evil, as well as good; and his sweetest enjoyments will be dashed with the bitterness of some trouble and distress.

If we could suppose a person possessed of every thing his heart could desire, to render him completely happy; yet, as a man, he must be imperfect; he must feel the natural uneasinesses of hunger and thirst, or else he will have little pleasure in eating and drinking. The inclemency of the seasons will often incommode him, and he must endure labour and weariness, else his rest will scarce be sweet and refreshing: He will sometimes want what cannot easily be obtained, and must consequently suffer under the *uneasiness* of *desire*, else his enjoyments would grow dull for want of difficulty; and he must frequently deny himself such pleasures as he might enjoy, lest they prove injurious through excess: many evils he must endure that are not to be avoided; crosses and disappointments, losses and misfortunes of one kind or other, he must often meet with, while he lives in this world, arising from the uncertainty of all human affairs, or from the malice of his enemies, or ingratitude of his friends, which will not fail to administer grief and vexation. If he lives to old age, he must labour under infirmity and disease; and to close all, he must

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 33

must die, and his material part return to dust, of which all things are originally composed. Yet notwithstanding all these untoward articles, the *good* is thought sufficient to outweigh the *evil*; and we make no scruple to pronounce that man happy, who enjoys the greatest pleasure that his particular genius and capacity, and his rank and station in the world will admit of, intermixed with no more pain than is absolutely necessary; for some he must be content to endure, because it will give a greater relish to his pleasures; it will often in its consequence procure him greater advantage, and in his present circumstances, it is both requisite and unavoidable.

THIS indeed is the highest felicity we can possibly aspire after, in this life, and it is more than every one can attain; for upon a strict enquiry, it will be found that the greatest part of mankind are to be accounted in some respects *miserable*, as they endure a greater share of trouble and anxiety, than is necessary in their present condition; or at least are not so happy as they might be, inasmuch as they take up with inferior satisfactions, and by that means fail of obtaining the highest and best they are capable of receiving.

THERE is no man but who, at some certain seasons, is free from all *uneasiness*, and enjoys so much satisfaction, as makes him content with his present condition, without any desire of change; yet that cannot always continue; joy and grief will affect his mind interchangeably; and if his pleasures are mean and low, or but of short duration, and his uneasy moments more than they need to be, so as

to fill up a great part of his life, we always judge him to be so far *unhappy*. If we carefully reflect upon our own condition, or look round about us into the lives of others, we shall find that this will hold true, more or less, of all persons, and it is owing in part to evil accidents and misfortunes from without, which we cannot prevent; but it also proceeds in some measure from want of wisdom within, to guide and direct our motion to the best advantage.

Sect. III. *How we may err and deviate from our true happiness.*

FOR when we do not shun and avoid that which is really *evil*, or when we do not pursue our best and chiefest *good*; as also when we fly from what is not necessarily, and absolutely evil, or when we pursue that which upon the whole is not really our *good*: These must be manifest *errors* in our *conduct*, as they do not lead us towards *happiness*, which is the ultimate end of all our actions, and the center to which all our motions ought to tend.

IN all these cases we shall either be indolent and unactive, when we ought to be in *motion*, or we shall be restless and eager for change, when we ought to have remained *quiet* in our present condition, or else our motion will be wrong directed, and we shall aim at improper objects, the consequence of which will be, that we shall suffer under misfortunes we might have avoided, shall run into troubles

Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 35

troubles which would not otherwise have come upon us, or by aiming wrong shall miss the mark, and fail of obtaining the greatest pleasure we are capable of enjoying.

YET we must unavoidably be subject to such errors, because our motion is guided by *affection*, and affection is influenced by *opinion*, and we know from too certain experience, that opinions are frequently wrong. Our *desires* and *aversions* do very much depend on the fancies and *appearances* which strike upon the mind, and it may often happen, from many causes, that the *apparent* good or evil may be different from the *real*.

Good and evil, when present, may be estimated according as they are felt, and here we may be less subject to *mistake*, though even this will admit of some variation. False opinion, confirmed by wrong practice, may by degrees vitiate our taste, and dispose us to take delight in things that are not *naturally* adapted to give us pleasure; and may also make us apt to be offended with many others, which might be endured without any *necessary* abhorrence, which will not fail to lead us astray, and cause us to pursue that which is not our good, and fly from that which is not really evil. But when these objects are *absent*, and at a distance, we are much more liable to be imposed upon by false representations. In many cases that which is really evil may not appear so to us, nor move us to fly from and avoid it; as what is really our good, may not have united with it an idea of pleasure, so as to make us pursue it; nay, it may sometimes happen that good shall have an appearance of evil, and evil shall be re-

presented as good, which will make us desire that which ought to be our aversion, and fly from that which we ought to have pursued.

THE ideas of such sensations of pleasure and pain, as we receive from objects applied to our *senses*, we commonly retain pretty justly; and when the objects are presented to our thoughts, these *appearances* seldom fail to accompany them. The child who has been burned by the flame, will retain an idea of the *pain*, so as to make him dread the approach of it afterward: and he who has experienced the taste of some delicious fruit, whenever he sees or thinks of it afterwards, the idea of *pleasure* will recur, so as to make him desire it: but in many cases, these appearances do not *depend* on what we have felt and experienced, but on ideas in the mind, which are often *fantastical* and groundless, arising from false representations of things from without, or else formed by the imagination, without any real foundation in nature. The miser thinks he shall be completely happy, if he can but fill his bags with shining metal. The warrior desires no more, but that victory should crown him with a wreath of laurel: and the youth who hearkens to ambition, has his fancy stuck with ribbons, titles, badges of honour, and marks of power and grandeur.

WE are liable many ways to be betrayed into *wrong* notions, and *false* opinions of what relates to our *happiness* or *misery*. In our tender years, before we are capable of forming a judgment of our own, we are influenced by the opinion and example of others; while we are not able to discern the real nature of things, we must of necessity take them
upon

Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 37

upon trust, according as they are represented by those whose wisdom we confide in: This is indeed most reasonable and fitting, and yet this way are men often led into wrong judgments, and the opinions they imbibe so *early*, they commonly retain in their *riper years*. How easily men learn to *associate* the *ideas* of good, and evil, to things of which they have no just knowlege, merely because they see others do it; and how ready they are to do violence to their own sense and reason, rather than to be singular, and forfeit the good opinion of those they converse with, is very easy to observe.

MOST men are apt to assent to the truth of many propositions, not from any evidence they perceive, but merely because they are the *received opinions*; they comply with them, as others have done before them, because they are fashionable; but when they have been long accustomed to believe them, they then become established axioms, which must not be examined, nor so much as called in question.

WE also this way acquire principles of action, and take up opinions of good and evil, purely by *imitation*, without much enquiry into the truth of them; and these prejudices and prepossessions, when they come to be rivetted by custom, and strengthened by habitual practice, are ever after very firmly adhered to, insomuch as we may almost venture to affirm, that the chief distinctions that are to be met with amongst men, both with respect to sentiment and manners, allowing for some small difference in the natural temper, are mostly owing to *education, fashion, and prepossession*.

HENCE

HENCE proceeds that great variety of opinions, relishes, and measures of life, in different nations; and in the same nation amongst those who have been accustomed to a different way of living. Those who first sailed to the *West Indies*, did there discover a people in their manners and customs, quite different from the *Europeans*; yet these were rational creatures, and perhaps had no less virtue and real happiness than their unjust invaders: they knew not how to value gold; and though the *Spaniards* might despise the simplicity of the naked *Indians*, yet these with more justice detested the cruelty, and insatiable avarice of the *Spaniards*.

THE *modes* of faith and religious worship, which are held so sacred at *Rome*, do not prevail at *Geneva*; and those maxims of government, which custom has established in *France* and *Spain*, will not be endured in *England* and *Holland*. He who has lived at court has a different taste from another who has been bred up in the country; and the frugal industrious citizen varies in his notion of happiness, from the gallant soldier, who has been trained up in a camp.

So true it is that men are apt to receive a tincture from those they converse with; and there is something singular to be observed in people of the same nation, party, or profession, with regard to their opinions and relishes, of what relates to the public good, and also to the happiness of private life.

WHICH way soever we come to entertain an opinion, or begin any practice, yet these never fail of being strengthened, and improved, by *use* and *custom*;

stom; and when we have been long accustomed to assent to propositions, which perhaps we never carefully examined, but whose truth we are frequently assured of, by those who are wiser than ourselves, we at length most firmly believe them, become exceeding zealous to propagate the truth, and are apt to be offended with all who are not of the same opinion. And if in compliance with the fashion, or through a desire to please those we live amongst, or from any other motive whatsoever, we chuse to do what at first we may possibly have no great relish for; yet there is that force in custom, which is a *second nature*, that by long practice, we are insensibly drawn in to like it, and to chuse it for its own sake, as a thing that is good in *itself*.

It is plain to observation, that many of those pleasures which men are so fond of, are not founded upon reason, nor do they yield any real and natural entertainment; but are only amusements begun by imitation, and confirmed by habit, till at length we grow uneasy in the want of them; and consequently, hanker after and desire them, when the first inducement we had to chuse them does no longer subsist.

So great a force there is in long use and practice to vitiate our taste, and bring us to entertain wrong opinions of good and evil, and consequently to desire and eagerly pursue what is not conducing to our happiness.

BUT where education and evil custom have no such influence, we are often betrayed into wrong judgments, from the *narrow capacity* of our minds, which will not allow us to see all the *relations* and

consequences of things at once, or at least from *haste* or *negligence*, in taking up with short and partial views.

GOOD and evil is often of a *complicated* nature; and that which yields immediate satisfaction, may in consequence prove highly prejudicial; as what gives us present disturbance, may yet hereafter procure us much greater advantage: There is scarce any thing in nature pure and unmixed, but may be good in some respects, and evil in others; and it is possible the idea of pleasure, which any object will afford, may be displayed to the utmost advantage, while at the same time the pain that must follow after, or the greater good it will deprive us of, may be hid from our eyes, or at least may not be viewed in so fair a light; and also in other cases, the frightful idea of pain or hardship, which must be undergone, may be placed full in our view, while the greater good which it will procure, or the greater evil which it will prevent, shall be shaded and obscured, so as scarcely to be perceived: in all which instances, it is plain the appearances will be *inadequate*, *false* and *deceitful*; and if they must pass uncorrected, will most certainly lead us astray in our pursuit after happiness, and we shall often be in danger to be imposed upon by partial and narrow views; nay, to so small a compass may our sight be contracted, that when the affections are *intense*, one single object may take up the whole attention of the mind, and render a man entirely regardless of every thing else.

Thus a person who is fired with resentment, can think of nothing but *revenge*; it is the only good

he

I. Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 41

he has in his view, to compass which he will sacrifice every thing, and blinded by his rage, he sees not the fatal mischiefs that will ensue. Also the passion of *love*, though its motions are less impetuous, yet its influence is no less prevailing, when the charming object takes up all our thoughts, and employs all the faculties of the mind, so as to exclude every thing else, and render us forgetful of every other good.

To the imperfection of the understanding it is also owing, that such objects as are *near* appear large, and the perception is lively and distinct, while those which are *distant* are very much diminished, and their appearance is *faint* and obscure. And with respect to time, that which is to *come*, but viewed at a great distance, loses its just proportion, and appears less than it ought, as that which is long since *past*, is in some measure effaced and worn out, while what has been lately imprinted on the mind, is presented by the memory fresh and entire: hence it happens that *inferior* satisfactions, when often repeated at just intervals, (yet not so as to satiate and cloy) may sometimes leave behind them a more lively idea of absent pleasure, than much *greater* and more valuable delights, that are but little experienced. We have but an imperfect knowledge of good and evil, being mostly taken up with what chance presents to us, and which falls within the compass of our small experience; and we shall often through ignorance make a wrong choice, and prefer a *lesser* good which is known, to a *greater* which has not been sufficiently tried; nay, though we may have a right notion

tion of the greater good, and our reason be thoroughly convinced of its importance; yet if that notion is only general, and if it has not united with it a lively idea of pleasure to strike upon the fancy, and make us *uneasy* in the want of it, it will not move us to pursue it.

AND hence we must account for what is plain to observation, that men do often prefer trifling and momentary pleasures to the joys of *heaven*, and some inconsiderable evils which are present or approaching near, are more dreaded than the pains of *hell*. Though the judgment may be convinced, upon full proof, of the importance of any good; yet this may not be sufficient always to influence our conduct. Cool and deliberate reasoning, and the ideas it is employed about, may be too general and abstracted to strike upon the imagination, and thereby raise *desire*; and as our motion depends upon *affection*, if a lesser good has united with it a more lively and distinct idea of pleasure to affect us with uneasiness in the want of it, the *inclination* will infallibly turn that way.

As our motion is governed by affection, so is affection influenced by *opinion*: but here we would be understood to mean somewhat more than a bare conviction of reason, because it implies an idea or appearance of good or evil to *strike* upon the fancy, else it can scarce affect us with *uneasiness*, or excite either *desire* or *aversion*.

AND how unaccountable soever it may seem, yet these do not always go together, in equal proportion, but a lesser good or evil, even that which in our cooler hours is acknowledged to be such,

shall

shall sometimes bring along with it an idea of pleasure or pain more lively and affecting than another, which our deliberate judgment confesses to be greater.

NAY, though the greater good or evil may have united with it a just appearance, yet the lesser may prevail over it, by being more in our thoughts, and oftner presented to the sense.

THOSE objects of pleasure or pain which are placed near, and frequently act upon our senses, will upon a double account have a greater effect, both as the ideas which they excite are more lively and distinct; and especially as they are more in the mind, and oftner brought into our thoughts; for the *force* of desire or aversion excited in us by any idea or sensation of pleasure or pain, is in a proportion *compounded* of the *greatness* of the *impression*, and its duration, or the time of its continuance in the mind.

THOUGH these do mutually tend to strengthen and support each other; for the greater the appearance, the more it will force its way into the mind, and recur so much the oftner to our thoughts; and the more any idea is brought into our view and contemplation, the more lively and distinct it will grow, and its impression on the fancy will be so much the stronger.

It may often happen from our different *situation*, and the position of objects, that things of *lesser* moment may be brought *near*, and frequently presented to our senses, so as at some certain seasons, to be almost continually in our thoughts; while other objects of the same kind, of much greater importance,

portance, may be cast at a *distance*, and seldom thought of or regarded; the necessary consequence of which will be, that the former will have a greater appearance of good or evil united with them, and affect us more powerfully than the latter.

THOUGH they may be of the greatest moment, owned and acknowledged as such, whenever they are taken into consideration; yet while they are out of our thoughts, they can have no effect; or if they are but rarely brought into sight, their influence will but be weak, easily overcome by other appearances which are almost constantly in our view.

ALL this may in some measure account for the wonderful power of *custom*, and that great difficulty which all men find within themselves, to forbear such enjoyments, however mean and unworthy, trifling and fantastical, they may be, which yet habitual practice has rendered in some sort necessary; and it also gives a solution to that difficulty, why the *greatest good* or *evil*, even that which is apparently such, and in our cooler hours, known and confessed to be so, does not always *determine the will*; nor the desire of the one, or the apprehension of the other, when *absent*, is at all times sufficient to overcome the satisfaction of some inferior *present* enjoyment: And a *lesser evil* which is *present*, and constantly felt, shall by its continual action prevail over all opposite impressions from the *greatest absent good*, or *future evil*, whose ideas are but *seldom* brought into our view; and the *sensual appetites*, which besides the ideas of absent pleasure, are also attended with a present uneasy *sensation* of body, will sometimes by their constant sollicitation,

solicitation, have a greater influence than objects of the last *importance*, which are not *always* kept in the mind.

So frail is our nature, and so fallible our judgment, that we shall often be in danger of running into errors : and whether we are led by education and fashion, or drawn aside by bad example and evil custom, biassed by prejudice, or blinded by passion ; or whether we are deceived by the shortness of our views and the undue position of objects, we must unavoidably, upon many occasions, receive false representations of good and evil ; our consequent affections will be disproportionate and irregular ; and we shall frequently make that the object of our desire, which upon the whole is not our good, and that our aversion, which is not truly and absolutely evil.

IF we have no certain aim to direct our course, nor any rule whereby to form our judgment, but every thing must pass for good or evil, which fancy represents to be such ; and some ideas must be suffered wholly to possess our thoughts, so as to exclude all others, we shall be led astray from our chief end, and wander far from our true felicity ; and what adds to the absurdity, our motion will frequently alter its direction, and our conduct will be apt to vary.

THOUGH some may be found who will be obstinate in their errors, and steady in wrong pursuits, yet that is what will not frequently happen ; for *opinions* which are not founded upon *truth*, will not often be constant and lasting ; but as we discover our mistakes, which we shall inevitably do upon many

many occasions, before they are confirmed by habitual practice, or as objects do change their position, and are accidentally brought near, or removed far from us, *appearances* will alter, and our *affections* will change, so that our pursuits will rarely be uniform and steady : and if all ideas which present themselves must be admitted without examination, those that succeed and take possession of the mind, in their turn, may be as far from truth, as those that went before : from whence it will necessarily follow, that opinions will still be shifting, and our passions always veering ; we shall fondly imagine that to be our good this day, which to-morrow we find to be evil ; make that our aversion, which was once the object of our desire, and pursue that at one time, which we most earnestly fly from at another.

AND that which contributes still more to render our motion unsteady, is the *inconstancy* of our *temper* ; for the objects may remain the same, yet if our humour is changed, they will not affect us in the same manner ; when present, and when absent, their images and representations will have a quite different effect from what they had before.

WE often find that what pleases us at one time, will in another disposition of mind, prove grating and disgustful ; and that which sometimes gives us disturbance, shall at other times be received calmly and contentedly. It is easy to observe, how men are apt at some certain seasons, to be elated more than is fitting ; as at others, they will be unreasonably dejected ; sometimes viewing things only on the bright side, easy and delighted with the present,
and

and filled with pleasing hopes of the future ; while at other hours, the mind is in no condition to relish pleasure, but is prone to be disturbed with every trifle ; viewing all things on the dark side, and entertaining dismal apprehensions of evil to come.

OUR passions depend not only upon the action of objects, and their representations from *without*, but also upon the temper and disposition of the *mind* within ; if either of these be altered, our *affections* will vary ; yet these seem to have a great influence upon each other ; for any strong impression from without, producing either pleasure or disturbance, especially if they be of long duration, will cause an alteration in a man's humour : as on the contrary, if from any other cause his temper is changed, he will be differently affected with outward impressions, and it will occasion appearances to vary, and make him see things in a quite different light.

AFTER strong *sensations* of *pleasure* and delight, we do not only rejoice at the first occasion, but every thing that presents itself is agreeable ; and what at another time would have created great disturbance, makes little impression, but is taken patiently : whereas on the contrary, after any considerable *disturbance*, the mind is often ruffled and discomposed, requiring some time before it can settle ; and during that uneasy state, till the ill-humour wears off, and the man recovers his temper, he will not only grieve at that which first gave him vexation, but will be less disposed to be pleased with any good, and more inclined to be uneasy with

with every little trouble, which at another time would pass unregarded.

It is easy to observe how much more apt some persons are than others, to be disordered, and put out of temper. Some have naturally that happy constitution, which gives them a certain chearfulness and gaiety of spirit, that accompanies them in all circumstances of life, and disposes them to view things in a pleasing light; to be easy and contented with the present, and to entertain the best hopes of what is to come: while others are inclined to be sad and melancholy, to think the worst of the present state, and to entertain needless fears of the future. There are also many other singularities in the original cast of mens minds, which do cause that great diversity in the humours of mankind; and the same person at different seasons, will differ very much from himself, and his humour will insensibly change from pleasant and gay, to sad and serious; one day elevated, and in high courage, and the next perhaps timorous and dejected; sometimes kind and good-natured, and at other times captious and resenting.

Not only ill accidents which give us disturbance, but also an ill state of health, and even a clouded sky, with many other causes, will affect the mind, so as to produce an alteration in the temper; and some disorders of the body, which do particularly affect the brain and the nerves, those curious organs of thought and sense, will disturb the imagination so as to cause strange and unaccountable terrors to arise; the slightest representations from without, will conjure up the most frightful spectres within, and fill the

Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 49

the mind with imaginary dangers, which yet will occasion real and most exquisite misery.

HAPPY it is for those, who are possessed of that constancy, and firmness of spirit, as not to be easily thrown off from that just equality of temper, so necessary to our happiness; for every deviation from this, into either extreme, either too jovial and gay, or too serious and splenetic, too much elevated or too much dejected, but especially the latter of these, will lead us into errors; it will give us false relishes of things, and make us see all objects in a false light, and unite false ideas of good or evil with whatever comes before us.

It is not only when these ideas of good and evil are united through mistake to wrong objects, that we are led into errors, but also when they are *out of proportion*, greater or less than they ought to be; for we find by experience, that they are not always strictly just and agreeable to truth, but are frequently dressed up by fancy in false colours, whereby some things are rendered more alluring than they ought to be, as others will appear more dismal; the consequence of which must necessarily be, that we shall not only be sometimes drawn to pursue a lesser good, in the neglect of others more valuable, and fly from a slight evil, while we take no care to avoid such as are greater: but our affections will also be excessive and immoderate, our desires too eager, craving and impatient, our aversions and fears too violent, creating more disturbance than is requisite, and by this means the apprehension may far exceed the suffering when the evil comes

D

upon

upon us, and the enjoyment may fall short of the expectation, provided the good be obtained.

AND thus it appears, that if fancy and humour must be allowed to govern without controul, we shall often be led astray from our true happiness, and not only fail of obtaining the greatest pleasure we are capable of receiving, but may also become self-tormenters, and create to ourselves a greater share of misery than is necessary in our present condition.

PRESENT evil may by this means become more grievous and intolerable than it needs to be, and many things may be made the occasion of much trouble and vexation, which might have been endured without any necessary disturbance: also by viewing things in too gloomy and dismal a light we may banish hope from our breasts, which is the only comfort of the miserable, and abandon ourselves to despair, while there is a fair prospect of relief.

Good which is *lost*, so as not to be retrieved, may be retained in the *memory*, and presented to the imagination 'till it makes so lasting an impression that our sorrow shall scarce know any end: and *absent good*, supposed to be attainable, may by its *appearance* to the fancy raise desire, which shall be too eager and impatient, causing much greater *uneasiness* than is requisite to put us into motions greater perhaps than can be recompensed by the short-lived pleasure which results from the removal of a lasting torment, or by the enjoyment of the good, provided it shall be obtained; but when our

motion

Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 51

motion is so very hasty, we are less likely to meet with success than when it is more easy and deliberate.

IF we accustom ourselves to yield to every foremost opinion of good, fancy will soon gain the ascendant, and we may probably neglect the most important enjoyments of life, and amuse ourselves with shining toys and glittering trifles, which though we eagerly follow, we shall perhaps never obtain, or if we do, shall find they are not really our good; nor will they yield that satisfaction we imagined; and thus instead of being repaid for all our pains and anxiety in that pursuit, we shall gain nothing in the conclusion but vexation and disappointment.

THIS will be misery sufficient; but yet it is still fruitful of more, as it introduces continual fretfulness and ill-humour, and spoils the relish of those good things, which are in our power, and which might be sufficient to make us happy, if we could enjoy them with contentment. Hence the greatest troubles and distresses of life are commonly ascribed to restless and ungoverned desire, which makes us uneasy and dissatisfied with our present condition, always raving after some imagined good which we want; but the fear of future evil will also contribute its share to render us more unhappy than is necessary.

FOR though a prudent caution is requisite to make us shun approaching danger, yet if every first appearance or imagination of evil must be admitted, our fears may become most anxious and tormenting, driving us with greater terror than is

sitting, from things that we ought rather resolutely to meet, or at least which we shall be less likely to escape by so precipitate a flight.

WHEN the mind is clouded and overcast with melancholy, our ideas may be more black and dismal, than they ought to be, raising needless fears, and dreadful apprehensions of evils, which may perhaps never befall us, or (what is equally fruitless) which we must of necessity undergo, and cannot possibly escape; this may produce perpetual disturbance, so far as to make life miserable, though attended with all other circumstances which in appearance render it happy: for these dismal spectres will be continually presenting themselves, and haunt us in our securest hours, so as to destroy all delight, and poison every pleasure,

Thus it is not only when we pursue what is not our good, and fly from that which is not evil, that we run into errors; but also when our affections are immoderate and unrestrained, when our desires are too impatient, and our aversions too violent, our hopes too sanguine, or our apprehensions too dismal, all these are inconsistent with our happiness, and productive of nothing but trouble and disquiet. For even hope itself, how pleasing soever it may be, if it is unreasonable and ill-grounded, will be sure to end in grief and disappointment.

AND thus at last it will be found, that our greatest distresses may be owing to the extravagance of our humours and opinions, when unexamined fancy is allowed to govern; and what aggravates the misfortune is, that as these opinions are not founded upon truth, they will be always variable; and

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 53

the frequent turns and changes in our motion, often tracing back the false steps we had taken, and flying from that which we once eagerly pursued, will give us a mortifying view of our own *weakness* and *folly*; the consciousness of having acted so contrary to our interest, will occasion uneasiness; and every reflection we make on our own conduct, will be attended with *repentance* and *dissatisfaction*.

Sect. IV. *How these errors are to be prevented.*

TO prevent such delusion, God almighty has endowed us with *reason*, to be our guide and director; which for the sake of our own interest and advantage, we are obliged to consult on all occasions, and not to be hasty and precipitate in obeying every pressing desire or aversion; but sometimes to put a stop to our *motion*, till by a little consideration it may be ordered and directed for the best, so as to be most conducing to happiness which is the ultimate end of our lives.

In amidst the great variety of pleasures and pains, which we are capable of receiving, we should yield to the first *motion of sense*, and be carried away by every desire and aversion, we should be frequently *misled* from our true felicity, and as often create to ourselves grief and repentance.

BUT we are not *necessarily* determined by every *present* sensation, or first appearance of good and evil; because we have it in our power to bring into our view that which is *absent*, as well as that which is present; that which is past, as well as that which is to come; that which is distant and remote, as well as that which is near; by *comparing*

these together, to draw conclusions concerning the true value and importance of every thing that relates to our happiness and misery.

WE cannot always avoid *mistakes*, even when we use our utmost care; but the author of our beings has given us those *powers* and *faculties* to judge of what relates to ourselves, which will lead us so much the nearer to our happiness, as we carefully and diligently employ them; but whoever fails to improve these natural talents, is so far wanting in his duty, and when misery overtakes him, will have no just reason to complain of his hard lot, because the blame will rest principally on his *negligence* and *folly*.

AND here lies our main business and principal concern, sometimes to take a *review* of our past actions, and if we find any thing amiss, to search the *source* and *original* of all our *errors*; and to regulate our opinions, on which our motions do depend.

It is easy to observe how industriously men will employ their utmost abilities, and exert all their talents, to obtain what they are in pursuit of, and take to be their *chiefest good*: and should we not sometimes at least, bestow a little pains to discover what we ought to aim at, and what things are most *worthy* to be pursued, lest through a foolish admiration or false opinion, we should engage in a long laborious chace, and all the while make that the object of our *desire*, which is not worth our care.

It is this which demands our *first* and most *constant attention*; and here is laid the foundation of an act superior to all others of human practice and invention.

Se^t. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 55

invention. All that wisdom and philosophy can teach us, being only to know ourselves, and what relates to ourselves, and not to rest in bare speculation, but by working upon our own minds, to rectify our sentiments, and relishes of things, by which all our *affections*, and consequent *actions* are governed. To gain wisdom will far exceed all other acquisitions, and be more advantageous than to get riches, because these can only furnish us with outward things; but that will set all matters right within; it will teach us to regulate our passions, and to direct all our actions to their true scope and end.

AND though this is a *science* which for its dignity and utility far excels all others, yet its *precepts* are plain and simple, such as every one may learn if he will but heartily set about it: it requires no long *deductions*, nor intricate *conclusions*; nor is it built upon airy *speculations*; every man's own *sense* and *experience* will readily inform him, in most cases, if he will but consult it, and freely make use of his reason in an affair of so great concern; being at the same time always ready to receive information, and with all due modesty and submission to hearken to the advice of such as are wiser and better than himself. It is not so easy a work to reform the errors of our conduct, that a man can always perform it of himself, without the kind *assistance* of such as are able to advise and direct him; yet the best instruction will avail but little, unless he will resolve to do his part, to employ a little *care* and *attention*, and use all the necessary caution, which the mistakes we so often commit through

inadvertency should excite us to. The consciousness of this should induce us, if possible, to restrain all impetuous motions, and controul every forward inclination, till the ideas of pleasure and apprehensions of evil, which offer themselves to our view, are thoroughly *examined and corrected*.

As we cannot avoid reflecting upon our conduct, *experience* will convince us, that we are often imposed upon and deceived, when we are too easily moved by the first appearance, and *striking fancy* of good and evil: The more frequently and impartially any person reviews his own actions, the more lively impression of this truth will remain upon his mind, so as to excite a constant suspicion of judging amiss, and introduce an habitual care and caution in all his proceedings: It will make him watchful to restrain the fallies of too hasty passions, and will always bring to his remembrance, that every idea which presents itself should be obliged to wait a while, and be *carefully examined*, before it is allowed to pass.

WHENEVER we are struck with the appearance of any good, so as to raise in us a desire to obtain it, the fear of being drawn aside from our right aims, should induce us to *suspend our motion*, and stop the prosecution of that particular desire, till we have employed at least a few transient thoughts, in examining, whether that which has the *opinion of good* united with it, be *really and necessarily* so; or whether we may not be without it, and yet be easy and contented: And lastly, whether the obtaining that good may not deprive us of a greater good,

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 57

good, or bring upon us a greater evil; and therefore ought to be *forborn*.

AND in like manner, when the appearance of evil excites our aversion, we ought not to obey the *impulse*, till we have considered whether what we take to be evil, and would fly from as such, may not be sustained without any *necessary* aversion or abhorrence; or whether it may not be a means to procure us a greater good, or prevent a greater evil, and therefore ought to be *endured*.

It may also deserve a short enquiry, whether we shall be able to *escape* that which is the cause of our aversion and disturbance; and also whether it will be in our power to *obtain* that which we make the object of our desire; or, if it should be obtained, whether we can be assured of keeping it in our own *possession*, without any danger of its being lost or taken from us. When we come to arraign and question our opinions, and bring them to a fair *examination*, it will frequently happen, that what has united with it an appearance of good, will be found upon the whole to be really evil; and that which we might imagine to be evil, will prove in the main to be quite the reverse.

If *education* and common opinion have betrayed us into *wrong notions* of what relates to our happiness and misery; or if we are led into mistakes by short and partial views, all these in some measure may be rectified by a *fair enquiry*, and by a free and impartial use of the understanding, being always willing to lend a patient ear to instruction.

AND thus he will advance considerably towards happiness, who can truly distinguish betwixt good
and

and evil ; and it might be supposed that he would then feel no hindrance in following what his best judgment dictates to be right ; but experience will convince him that his work is but half accomplished, because he will find himself embarrassed with many *opposite inclinations*, which will thwart those motions his impartial reason may suggest.

THOUGH reason be convinced, yet the *fancy* may be otherwise engaged ; *evil habits* may have been contracted ; the taste may be vitiated, and by a long indulgence, some ideas may have gained so great an *ascendant*, as not easily to be reduced to obedience ; and though in our sedate and cooler hours, we can clearly discern what is truly good and evil, and resolve to regulate our conduct accordingly ; yet the main business will be to keep our opinions *steady* and invariable ; lest at other seasons the nearer approach of objects should cause a *change* in our resolutions, and raise appearances to strike upon the fancy in so powerful a manner, as to carry us with irresistible force into measures directly opposite to what our most deliberate judgment did approve.

IT ought to be the principal care of such as educate youth, to form their minds to wisdom, by infusing *right opinions* of good and evil, cherishing the *good affections*, so as by frequent use to render them *habitual* ; and suppressing all *wrong inclinations*, by *forbearance* and *restraint*. They should carefully watch each growing tendency, and suffer no ill habits to be contracted ; nor any affections to be indulged, in opposition to reason ; but should industriously withdraw the fancy and opinion both of
good

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 59

good and evil from that to which it does not properly appertain, and always direct it with the strongest encouragement to that with which it naturally agrees. But all are not so happy as to enter the first stage of life with such advantage: it may with too much truth be affirmed, that in many places, the *professed teachers* of mankind do instil *false notions*, and thereby encourage *wrong affections*; or else *bad example*, and the prevailing fashion, do lead men astray, and *custom* will introduce *ill habits*, so that whoever comes to years of discretion, and a capacity of reason and reflection, will scarce want occasion to make use of it; he will find many things amiss within, which will cut out for him some employment.

If he is desirous of obtaining the greatest good he is capable of enjoying, he must strive to rectify, as far as he is able, his opinions, and recal his sentiments, from the power of *fashion*, to that of *reason*; and if evil custom has prevailed, he should in obedience to the dictates of his understanding, strive by contrary practice to reform his taste, and by degrees to wean his fancy from inferior enjoyments, that so he may apply it with greater success to such as are of a higher nature, and will yield the greatest and most lasting pleasure.

THE first part of wisdom is to be free from *folly*; and the principal care in conducting our motion, is to avoid *error*, and forbear pursuing that which is not good, and flying from that which is not really evil. If a man can but once gain that command over himself, so as to be free from every false bias, and disengaged from every wrong inclination, he will

will then, and not before, be free and disencumbered in the pursuit of what reason dictates to be most conducing to his happiness.

Thus he who by long indulgence, is wholly devoted to the pleasures of *sense*, has perhaps but little relish for higher enjoyments, and is utterly disabled from pursuing them: but the most thoughtless and undesigning *rake* cannot avoid at some certain seasons being made sensible of his errors; and if he can be once brought to serious reflection, the voice of reason will be sounding in his ears, scorn these unmanly delights, which are at best but mean and unworthy, and are too dearly purchased by more lasting grief and sorrow. Just attention will set before his eyes a living image of those evils he brings upon himself, and of those sublimer joys he sacrifices for the sake of the lowest satisfactions. This he may retain in his mind, and never suffer it to be out of his thoughts, till it has made so strong an impression, as to efface all opposite appearances, and make that his aversion, as the cause of so much misery, which he once delighted in as his greatest good. And thus it is certain, when he is no longer diverted and drawn aside by irregular attractions, he will find less hindrance in pursuing steadily that path which celestial wisdom shall point out to him.

THOUGH our aim should be directed to the highest *felicity*, yet we shall scarce be able to make any progress towards it, till we cease from pursuing what is not our *good*, but shall be like the benighted traveller, who is drawn far out of his way by following some false blaze, or wandering meteor;
and

SECT. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 61

and therefore our first work must be to amend our faults, and correct our errors.

THIS we affirm is not impossible to be effected ; for it is not only when a man is too much addicted to the pleasures of sense, but if he is fired with ambition, or if he is proud and covetous, envious or superstitious, or whatever other irregular passion may lead him astray, there is a certain method to be observed, whereby he may hope to retrieve his wanderings, and find the way again.

WE do not presume to give advice or instruction, but only to consider how every man may advise himself, if he thinks it worth his time, and is willing to be at the pains ; neither will it be found altogether so ridiculous, as at first sight it may appear. To suppose a man to divide himself into two distinct parties, and to be at once both teacher and follower, is no absurdity ; for we know we are not only endowed with sense, or a power to feel pleasure and pain, which serves to put us into motion, but we have also a power of comparing, reasoning and judging ; that this latter was given us to restrain, and govern the former, and therefore may justly claim the supreme direction.

It is certainly every man's chief interest to exert this generous faculty, and raise within himself a counsellor and adviser, who will not only save him from going astray, but will be sure to bring him forward in the right way towards happiness. He will not only point out to us the errors of our conduct, but will shew us how they are to be corrected and reformed, and if the sole power is lodged in his

his hands, our motion will be guided to the best advantage.

WHOEVER will freely and impartially employ his reason, may discover what is *really* his good ; and though the *appearance* should be too faint to raise desire, yet keeping the object much in our view and contemplation, may excite a lively idea of pleasure to strike upon the imagination, and make us uneasy in the want of it ; repeated use and practice will increase our relish, till at last we come to like and admire, what at first we viewed with great *indifference*.

BUT as our greatest *hindrance* proceeds from wrong inclinations, which rise up in opposition to reason, and carry us into contrary pursuits, our first and principal business will be to work by the *weaning* rather than the *engaging passion* ; and when we are once fully convinced, that what we took to be good is upon the whole really evil, we should turn away our eyes from the dangerous ideas of pleasure which it may yield, and keep at a *distance* from the tempting object ; for in some cases there is no safety but in a speedy flight.

WE may then, for our further security, fix our attention on the greatest *mischief*s that will follow, so as to destroy the appearance of good, and thereby remove the *desire*, or rather make it our *aversion*, till by disuse and contrary custom all inclination towards it may be worn off.

THAT every fancy and appearance of good or evil should be made conformable to reason, and that our affections should be governed accordingly, is a thing of all things the most to be desired ; but

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 63

it must be acknowledged that it is not so easy an attainment, but that it will cost some pains, and the first step towards it must be in anguish and regret. It will require somewhat of self-denial, to be able to stop or suspend our motion, and controul every forward inclination, till reason can have time to examine appearances; and if upon a fair enquiry, what we aim at, is not found to be our good, we must wholly refrain the pursuit. All this cannot be done without some violence to the sensitive part of our nature; as we shall be obliged to sustain the uneasiness of many desires and aversions, which must not be gratified; and much must be suffered both from the presence of evil, which must be endured, and also from the absence of good, which must be forborn.

YET who would not strive to learn these lessons of *forbearance* and *endurance*, since the advantages accruing are so apparent, as that by the expence of a small venture, we shall be sure to gain a prize of inestimable value, and by forbearing some inferior gratifications, or perhaps enduring some pain and hardship for the present, we shall obtain the greatest and most exalted pleasure.

HAPPINESS itself must not be pursued too eagerly, lest by too hasty measures we meet with *disappointment*; nor must we be always averse to suffer a little pain, because he who is so very *impatient* as not to bear the least uneasiness, can never order his affections and govern his motions as he ought; nor can he have any steadiness or strength of mind; but will be driven aside by the smallest *impulse*, and made the sport of every weak and childish passion; but

but whoever is rightly apprized that there is no such thing as pure and unmixed felicity, and is therefore willing to undergo some trouble, and chuses to take the pains which is necessary to restrain and moderate his affections, and inure himself to the practice of *self-denial*, will be amply rewarded for all his sufferings, by the great advantage that will ensue.

For there is nothing excellent and worthy which he may not attain by such a regimen; whereas the contrary method of *yielding to every impulse*, and giving way to every prepossessing fancy, will carry us far from our true felicity, and in a short time bring upon us the greatest misery and distress.

It is but being content to bear some present evil, and also to suffer under the want of good, till by letting reason have fair play, all *false representations* may be removed, and then we shall scarce fail of obtaining the greatest happiness, and shall be delivered from numberless disquiets, which we shall otherwise bring upon ourselves. To be able to forbear what has united with it an idea of pleasure, but in the main is not our good, and to endure what is not really evil, though it may give us some present uneasiness, is one of those great ends that are to be obtained by a *free use of reason*, and by the *correction* of our *fancies* and opinions; but when by this or any other means the practice is become in any degree habitual, it will in its turn contribute very much to fix the empire of reason, and render it a more easy task to rectify all false appearances, and bring every passion into subjection.

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 65

THIS general habit of *self-denial*, call it *temperance*, *moderation*, *patience*, *government*, or *self-command*, for it seems to include all these, has by the greatest masters, in all ages, been esteemed the main principle of wisdom; and is what every one should strive to obtain as the greatest treasure, far exceeding all outward acquisitions, which are often precarious and uncertain, and as often the occasions of grief and vexation; but this will afford perpetual tranquillity, as it is in every one's power by this method to lay within himself the sure and lasting foundations of happiness, peace and contentment.

THOUGH it may appear somewhat hard, and like a force upon nature, *voluntarily to endure pain*, which we all naturally strive to avoid, as much as we are able, yet reason and reflection will inform us, that to bear a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater, and to forbear a lesser good, to obtain another more valuable, is no way inconsistent with our true interest; and that according to the present disposition of affairs, the greatest good is not to be acquired, nor can we escape the greatest evil, upon any other terms.

WHICH consideration, if it be kept in mind, may unite so great an appearance of advantage with this method of self-denial, as quite to over-balance all the hardships which must be undergone; and though the inclinations must be often curbed and restrained, and the affections frequently controlled, by bringing opposite appearances into play, which will occasion a conflict that at first may be a little irksome or even painful; yet *repeated use and practice*

THIS

E

will

will render it more easy, and upon every step we take in this great work, the mind will review with pleasure the conquest it has made, and rejoice to feel its own advancement and recovery.

HAPPY it is for those who from their *tender years*, while the inclination was yet flexible, and yielding, have been trained up in the use of *self-denial*, and frequently obliged to endure what they were averse to, and to forego what was the object of their desire, to refrain from pleasure, and to undergo some labour and hardship; for this will ever after contribute very much to health and strength both of their bodies and minds: and they who have effectually acquired this habit, will not be hurried away by their unruly passions, but having the reins in their own hands, will find no difficulty to stop in their full career, and divert their motions into another course, as reason shall direct.

BUT after a long course of *indulgence*, when persons have had their own wills, and their inclinations have rarely been crossed, the ideas and fancies of good and evil, having been so long accustomed to command, will grow too imperious to admit of any restraint; for if we give way to any single appearance upon its own authority, without bringing it to the test of reason, it will be sure to gain strength by indulgence, and we shall be less able to resist it afterwards; and as it is scarce possible to obey one wrong inclination without being enslaved to the rest, this will gradually lead us on to a general looseness and disorder, where every foremost fancy gains absolute dominion; and it will be no longer in our power to stop our motion, and govern it according

I. Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 67

ording as reason shall direct, but we shall be carried away by the unresisted force of every lawless passion.

YET even in this deplorable condition ought no man to *despair* of seeing an alteration for the better; though the advantages of a good education are wholly wanting, and not only many particular wrong affections have been strengthened by custom, but a habit of universal dissoluteness has been introduced, yet still there is a *possibility of amendment*.

THOUGH we have not been accustomed to practise self-denial out of *choice*, yet we must sometimes do it out of *necessity*; as we cannot always have our wills, but must often meet with disappointment: and thus a series of cross accidents and misfortunes may teach us those lessons of moderation which we had not learnt before: Or if by the kind admonitions of his friends, or the force of his own genius and good sense, or from any cause whatever, a man is brought to serious reflection, and has presented to his view a lively picture of the misery which results from the tyranny of indulged passion, this may raise in him a strong desire to take the government upon himself, and to endeavour to reduce his affections to some order and subjection.

THOUGH the task may seem difficult at first, and appearances may be stubborn and rebellious, yet whatever trouble it may cost, they must be encountered and reduced to obedience, otherwise they will grow more absolute, and the government will of course be theirs; and it will be some encouragement to proceed in this work, when we find, that

though these assuming fancies are most insolent and domineering, where they gain the ascendant, yet they are of so mean and servile a nature, that whenever they are opposed with vigour and resolution, they will be brought to submit ; and those *turbulent passions* may at last be taught to know their proper part, which is not to *govern*, but *obey*.

As we know by woful experience, that the more we *give way to any wrong inclination*, the more will the opinion of the false good be augmented and confirmed, and the more difficult it will be to oppose it afterwards : So on the other hand, it will be some consolation to know, that if we can but once gain the *victory* over any headstrong passion, it may be more easily dealt with another time, and the appearance of good or evil may be gradually weakened, till at last it be compleatly vanquished.

It is in every man's power, if he pleases, to resist the attacks of fancy, and suspend the gratification of his desires ; which will certainly be worth his pains to put in practice, upon many occasions, if it were only to learn somewhat of an habit of self-denial : He may begin this forbearance in matters of *less moment*, where the affections are not so *strongly attached*, and by continued use he may proceed at last to his most *favourite inclinations*, by which means he may insensibly gain the mastery over his passions, and not be carried away by every forward appearance, till it has been brought to undergo a fair examination.

ALL that is required, is only that a lively representation be impressed upon the mind, of the great advantages which will accrue from this method, sufficient

I. Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 69

sufficient to make us set about it with a most vigorous resolution, and to despise the trouble and difficulty of the attempt : and though we should advance but slowly, and perhaps be far from attaining to perfection, yet it will be some satisfaction to have made a small progress ; and the least step we take in this great work will be found no inconsiderable attainment. Ideas and fancies of all kinds will be continually presenting themselves, and playing upon the imagination ; and they do not always appear what they really are, but are frequently disguised and seen in a *false light* ; or else they afford us only a side glance or a *partial view* ; or some will approach too *near*, while others are thrown at too great a distance ; but reason will bring them into a clear light, and by viewing them on every side and at a just distance, will soon discover what they really are, and after an impartial scrutiny, some it will approve, others it will alter, many it will absolutely reject, and it will subdue and chasten all before they are allowed to pass.

WHEN the imaginations of pleasure, and apprehensions of evil, come to be fairly examined, and brought to the test of *reason* and *right sense*, they will in most cases appear *without disguise*, and the true ideas of good and evil will present themselves in their just proportion, united with their proper objects : which will move us to fly from that which is truly evil, and to pursue that which is really our good : and as all the false opinions, all the spectres, phantoms, and apparitions, which haunted us before, will vanish and disappear, the desires and aversions which they had raised will of conse-

quence cease; and we shall be determined to forbear the pursuit of that, which fancy represented to be good, but is found in the whole to be rather the contrary; and be content to endure that which appeared to be evil, but in the main is quite the reverse. And thus it appears, that by comparing the consequences of things, and ballancing the sum total of good and evil which they contain, withdrawing our attention from matters of less concern, and fixing it upon what is of the greatest moment, we have it in our power to correct appearances, and regulate our affections, by which means we may learn to despise present pleasure, which is fraught with future misery; and cheerfully to undergo any present hardship, which may hereafter procure us greater and more lasting pleasure: reason will recommend this as highly advantageous, and repeated use will render the practice of it easy.

THIS curbing and restraining of our motion, and the consequent *discipline*, and *castigation* of our fancies, and opinions, where it can be duly put in practice, will not only direct our *affections* to their proper objects, but also reduce them to a just proportion with the real good or evil that is before us. It will cast off all the false lustre and glaring colours either of the flattering or dismal kind, wherewith objects are arrayed; and thereby prevent all extravagant admiration on the one hand, as well as all unreasonable abhorrence on the other, and render our desires and aversions, our hopes and fears, more moderate and calm.

PRESENT evil will by stiffness and impatience be rendered more grievous than is necessary; but by looking

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 71

looking forward, hope will cheer us with a pleasing prospect of relief; or if it is an evil which cannot be avoided, the consideration of the common appointments of life, and how necessary it is that all men shall receive evil as well as good, will help us to bear it with patience and contentment.

WE shall not always be inconsolable for good which is lost, so as not to be recovered; but as the idea will be less brilliant, it will sooner wear out of the mind, and the sorrow it occasions will neither be excessive, nor of long duration; and we may at length attain to that constancy and firmness of spirit, as not to be much discomposed with either the smiles or frowns of fortune; but shall be enabled to meet all events with an equal temper.

By this method we shall also suffer less from *eager and immoderate desire*, and shall feel less uneasiness in the want of good, supposed to be attainable; because it will be no longer in the power of fancy to render objects so alluring, by dressing them up in false colours, and shewing them different from what they really are; and when we are in pursuit of good, our motion will be deliberate and steady, and we shall not through too great impatience be apt to take rash and hasty measures, so as to occasion disappointment.

As every forward imagination of good will not be allowed to pass unexamined, we shall not be drawn aside to follow mean and low entertainments, nor be dazzled with gay amusements and splendid trifles, which are precarious and uncertain, not at our own command; and if we should be so happy as to gain them, can yield us little satisfaction, but

are more likely to occasion a greater share of trouble and disquiet.

A DILIGENT enquiry will inform us that there are certain enjoyments which do yield the greatest, most exalted, and most durable pleasure, and yet they depend only upon ourselves, being always in *our power*; and *reason* will certainly direct us to enjoy contentedly the good we are possessed of, without pursuing with too much anxiety things of outward dependance, which perhaps we shall never obtain.

THIS will be so much *real felicity*, and it will still be productive of more, as it tends by preventing all occasions of disturbance, to preserve cheerfulness and good-humour, and maintain that natural calm and easiness of temper, so essential to our happiness: this will contribute still more to fill the mind with gladness, and render our *present condition* always pleasing and delightful; it will dispose us to receive all evil accidents meekly, and we shall not be so industrious to spoil the relish of present enjoyments by too craving desires after absent good, nor by anxious fears of future evil. It will suffer no dark and dismal terrors to take possession of our minds, but will brighten every prospect, and incline us more to *hope* than to *fear*, especially where hope is rational and well-grounded, and will never deceive us with vain and delusive expectations which are sure to be followed with grief and disappointment.

AND thus we see that the more we take from *fancy*, the more we shall add to our own quiet; and though this restraining practice may possibly diminish

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 73

diminish the velocity of our motion, it will very much increase the ease and tranquillity of our lives; it will free us from numberless pains and anxieties, which for want of this we may bring upon ourselves, and so far as it prevails, it will cure the mind of all eager and impatient expectations, of all gloomy and dreadful apprehensions, of all extravagant transports, when we meet with success, and of all immoderate sorrow for any loss and disappointment.

It will banish all anxious and distracting cares about what is to come, and all tormenting reflections on what is past; and if we can but once settle within ourselves just opinions of good and evil, we shall not be wavering and fickle in our conduct, nor disapprove and repent what we have done, and reproach ourselves with having acted contrary to our true interest; but our pursuits will be uniform and constant, and as to all our *affections and inclinations*, we shall be likely to continue the same persons, always aiming at our true scope and end, and steering a steady course to the same harbour.

Thus it should seem that there is a *certain method* to be pursued, whereby any man may bid fair of obtaining the *greatest pleasure* he is capable of receiving, intermixed with as little trouble as his condition will admit of, or in other words, he may be happy if he pleases: And it also most plainly appears, how great a share the powers of *reason and understanding* have in directing our conduct, how near we may approach to happiness if we will submit to their guidance, and how wide of our *true aim* we must be, if we neglect it: for human life may in some respects, though

though imperfectly, be compared to a vessel at sea, where the winds which swell the sails, and put the vessel into motion, are the affections and passions; and reason is the master, who presides at the helm, and gives orders when to crowd, and when to furl the sails; when to go right before, and when to work against the wind; and having always an eye to the compass, guides and directs the motion, so as to avoid all rocks and shoals, and bring the ship safe to the intended port. If there was no wind stirring, the ship would be perfectly becalmed and without motion; and when it blows a fresh gale, if there was no pilot to take care of the helm, but the vessel must be left to drive before the winds, she should never keep any certain course, nor reach the place for which she was bound, but would soon be dashed upon the rocks, or swallowed up by the merciless waves.

Sect. V. *How reason cannot always govern our motion; with some remarks concerning the imperfection of human nature.*

BUT though the pilot should use his utmost care, yet the winds may prove contrary, or storms may sometimes arise to drive the ship out of its course; which will be still more likely to happen if the pilot is negligent or unskilful: And just thus it is in life, many *wrong affections* and *inclinations*, altogether contrary to our true interest, will be contracted by *imitation*, and confirmed by *custom*;

I. Sect. V. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 75

or from *strong impressions*, the passions may be sometimes so impetuous as to admit of no restraint.

THAT all men should regulate their conduct so as to live as happily as their condition will allow, is not to be expected, because there are many who cannot stop and suspend their motion, so far, as to consider what is most for their happiness ; nor will they be at the pains to reflect on their own conduct, but rather chuse to follow every foremost inclination, and take up with every first appearance of good or evil. To take things at first view as they pass in our minds, and to yield to the *rising impulse* of every *desire* or *aversion*, seems most agreeable to a man's ease ; but to stop and resist his inclination, this is painful ; and to examine his opinions, to call other ideas into his view, and compare them with attention, this is toilsome and laborious : it is a four and ungrateful task, scarce consistent with gaiety of humour, and the delicacy of pleasure will hardly endure it ; as if common accidents and misfortunes did not make life sufficiently unhappy, but we must still render it more so, by refusing to enjoy those delights that are in our power, and by being so very studious to give ourselves trouble which might be avoided : and especially after a long use of indulgence, the aversion will still be greater to this method of *self-denial*.

BUT if we could suppose that men upon all occasions might command their passions, and take time to examine how they might live most free from pain, and enjoy the greatest pleasure, yet they could not always be secure from making *wrong judgments*.

How

How few are to be found who bestow the necessary care to cultivate and improve their reason, and to furnish their minds with useful knowledge? and even these cannot always avoid going astray, sometimes through *invincible ignorance*, and often through *inadvertency*: though we imploy our utmost care, yet we shall be betrayed into errors, by the *prejudices* and *prepossessions* of our early years, by the force of *imitation* and *evil custom*, which cannot always be easily conquered by the *narrow capacity* of our minds, and by the *undue position* of objects; for some will be set too near, and some too far, that we cannot view them from the true point of sight.

AND what makes the case still more deplorable is, that though by a careful use of reason it were possible for us to form right opinions, in our sedate and cooler hours, yet the *will* does not always follow the *dictates* of the *understanding*, nor can we always *steadily* pursue that which we know to be our greatest good. It is not a bare conviction of reason that can govern our motion; but if the taste is vitiated and depraved, and the appearances which strike upon the imagination are of the opposite side, the conduct will infallibly turn that way.

THOUGH the understanding may clearly discern what things are most worthy to be pursued, as tending most to our happiness; yet that will not always be sufficient to influence our behaviour, but there will still be required a further correction and a careful working upon our own minds, before we can rectify the depraved sense, and withdraw the fancy and appearance of good or evil, which custom has united with many things to which they do not properly

properly appertain; nay, so strong will be the *association*, that in many cases it will not be in our power, but we shall remain at variance with ourselves, and fancy will often recommend what reason condemns, and we shall upon some occasions follow that most which our deliberate judgment least approves.

AND thus it seems to be in a manner impossible to attain to *perfect happiness*, because we are exposed to innumerable errors; and the only guide which should lead us in the right path, is often not consulted, or if he is, may sometimes be at a loss, or unable to direct us; or when he is both able and ready to shew us the right way, yet so strange is the infatuation, he is not always followed.

BUT of so great importance is the right use of our nobler faculties, that where *reason* does not govern our motion, nay, where it has not the sole and absolute command, nothing can proceed as it ought, nor can we steadily pursue our true scope and aim; but in proportion as that loses its authority, all will be folly and madness, as it is most certain misery and slavery.

HE alone can be said to be *master of himself*, who can controul his inclination, and suspend his motion, till he has considered whither it will tend, and can afterwards continue or alter its direction, as he shall find most reasonable; it is this which denominates one a *rational* and *free agent*: and the more perfect we are in this practice, the nearer we shall approach towards being compleatly happy.

IT is this regimen which raises us to any degree of steadiness, and strength of mind, gives us the command over ourselves, and at the same time that it makes

makes us free, it makes us happy : Whereas the contrary method of yielding to every foremost opinion of good or evil, as it enslaves us to every imperious fancy, every mean and unworthy passion, it reduces us to the lowest and most abject state of servitude, and at the same time makes us in the last degree wretched and unhappy.

As he is by no means at his own command who cannot stop and govern his motion, but is carried away by the prevailing impulse of every hasty passion ; so neither can he be deemed happy or free, who has not a *capacity to judge* of good or evil, or, which is the same thing, who dares not make use of his reason, who cannot think at large, with a most free and impartial use of his understanding, but is curbed and restrained, and remains ignorant of his own true interest, for want of a right use of those natural powers he is endowed with.

As it is highly requisite, in order to be happy, that we imploy that natural talent of thinking, which God almighty has given us ; so it is no less necessary that we should think freely *without any restraint* ; for if once we stop short, and cannot or dare not freely examine into every thing which offers itself, and brings along with it the appearance of good or evil, we are so far liable to be deceived, and betrayed into error and misconduct.

How can we hope to surmount the prejudices of education, and the prepossessions of our early years, or to rectify those false notions that have been imbibed by imitation, or wrong instruction, if thought must be restrained, and the mind is debarred from the free censure, and examination of its own opinions?

or

I. Sect. V. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 79

or how can we avoid being deceived by the undue position of objects, or by short and partial views, if the understanding, which is at best but weak and scanty, must be still more confined, or if any thing whatever must take off from that largeness, and freedom of thought, on which our happiness as well as liberty depends?

BUT of all others he is surely the most wretched, and the most enslaved, who can plainly see his true happiness and good, but is chained down, and so fast bound in fetters, that it is not in his *power to pursue it*; or rather is carried away by a *contrary impulse*, which he cannot controul, from what he knows to be his good, and to pursue what his deliberate judgment confesses to be evil.

THE more such a person turns his eyes towards liberty and happiness, and those sublimer joys, which he can clearly discern, but must never hope to obtain, the more he will bewail his own captivity, and lament the wretched state of misery and subjection, to which he is reduced.

YET it is not to be supposed but that this will sometimes be the case, if we consider how easy it is for strong impressions of sense to prevail over reason, and what a bewitching force there is in custom, which is also confirmed by daily observation.

AND thus, though it were to be wished that our motion might always tend directly to its proper center, and though we ought to make it our constant endeavour, yet while men are fallible they will be subject to errors; and there will be great diversity of opinions, and relishes of what relates to happiness and misery, and various habits will
be

be contracted by imitation, and falling in with the prevailing fashion; all which will produce great variety of interfering motions in almost infinite directions, all of them deviating more or less from the true happiness, and the perfection of moral excellence.

ALL these *errors* and *deflections*, when seen in a limited view, do seem irregular and deformed, in which light they will and always ought to appear to us; and if we are guilty of such errors, we always blame and reproach ourselves for them, whenever we review our own actions; yet that which is relatively evil, may possibly be absolutely good, and all the several blemishes and imperfections of the parts, may contribute to the beauty and perfection of the whole. But of this we are very well assured, that whatever is acted contrary to our true interest and advantage, is so far ill to us; for happiness is our right state, and misery our wrong, the one is most industriously shunned, as the other is affectionately sought; and the sole design of this discourse is only to make it appear, that the more freely and sincerely we imploy our *reason*, the nearer it will guide us to our *chiefest good*, and the less apt we shall be to run into *errors*; That the main secret consists in not following pleasure *too eagerly*, but in being sometimes willing to forbear when it might be enjoyed, and in chusing sometimes to endure a little trouble, which for the present might be avoided.

If this be allowed, we would next endeavour to enquire where our *chief interest lies*, and to lay down a certain position of whose truth we have long been

Sect. V. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 81

been fully persuaded ; That whoever will be at the trouble of a little reflection, will soon discover, that there is a *certain rule*, according to which he ought to form his sentiments, and regulate his conduct : That a creature made for *society* will find his own *private* account best in working towards the *general good* ; and though none can attain to *perfection*, the nearer we approach the standard of *moral truth*, which consists in *virtue*, the more we shall advance our own *true happiness*, in the enjoyment of the greatest and most lasting pleasure.

A
T R E A T I S E
O N
V I R T U E and H A P P I N E S S.
P A R T II.

Sect. I. An enquiry into the various powers of affection we are endowed with; and first, Of the pleasures and pains of the external senses.

THAT we may trace out the various pleasures and pains we are capable of receiving, and discover amongst these, which pleasures are most suitable to the dignity of human nature, which are the most exquisite and refined, as well as the most constant and durable, and consequently do yield us the highest enjoyment; and which pains are most grievous and tormenting, as also most permanent and lasting, and therefore do occasion the greatest misery;

misery ; it will be necessary to enquire into the several *senses* or *powers of affection* wherewith we are furnished, and to consider the affections arising from them, first singly by themselves, and afterwards to compare them with one another.

SELF-PRESERVATION is the first principle of nature, and all sensitive beings have implanted in them a love of life, and an abhorrence of death, which they strive to escape by all the means within their power ; and nature is not only averse to what might totally destroy the frame of our bodies, but also to whatever might be hurtful in any degree, to whatever might injure or impair any particular parts, so as to hinder them from performing their proper actions, and thereby render life less perfect, and by degrees bring on a total dissolution.

To provide against which, it is absolutely necessary that the mind should be informed of the *various changes*, which happen in the several parts of our bodies, either from *internal causes*, or from the application of *outward agents* ; and also that we should be apprized which are *salutary* and agreeable to the constitution of the body, and which are *hurtful* and tending to its destruction.

THIS is performed in the most speedy and effectual manner by the *sensations of pleasure and pain*, which are annexed to the impressions made by objects on our senses ; for whatever by too violent action shall distend or disunite the fibres of our bodies, or disorder our organs, and render them unfit for performing their functions, excites a *sensation of pain*, and thereby moves us most powerfully to fly from and avoid it ; also when inwardly the

small tubes and canals are obstructed, and the vital motion of the fluids is disturbed, this causes uneasiness, and warns us to seek after proper remedies: a moderate degree of heat so necessary to life is pleasing and agreeable, but an excess of heat as well as that of cold, which are equally destructive to it, are both of them troublesome and painful.

WHEN the parts are in danger of being injured by too much *labour* and *toil*, the sense of weariness bids us to forbear, and invites us to betake ourselves to *rest*; and when fresh supplies of nourishment are wanted for the support of our bodies, this we are advertised of, and most effectually prompted to seek after, by the uneasy sensations of *hunger* and *thirst*: also the *amorous inclinations* betwixt the sexes are no less prevalent, without which the race of mankind would quickly perish.

THUS whatever leads towards death and destruction is painful and tormenting, is naturally regarded with dread and aversion; but that which tends to produce or preserve life, is pleasing and delightful; and we are not only made to desire it by the idea of absent good, presented to the mind, but we also feel a sort of indigence by painful and uneasy sensations in the body.

ALL these powers of affection are absolutely necessary for the *preservation* of every individual, and for the *propagation* of the kind; and therefore are far from being *superfluous*, much less are they *criminal*, when in a *just proportion*, and kept within due bounds: but as these private affections are not always of the greatest importance, it is necessary that the pains should sometimes be endured; and also

Sect. I. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 85

also that our appetites should be restrained, and these sensual pleasures frequently forborn, when they come in competition with others that are more valuable and worthy.

It is the part of fortitude and courage to be able to endure pain and hardship, and to despise danger and even death itself upon a fair and honourable occasion.

As *temperance* and *chastity* give persons the command over themselves, and enable them to refrain from sensual delights when it is expedient so to do; but too great a fear of danger and death, aversion to labour and hardship, is *cowardice*, *effeminacy*, *indolence* and *sloth*; as too great indulgence in these sensual pleasures, is *luxury*, *intemperance*, *voluptuousness*, *sensuality*, *lewdness* and *debauchery*; all which, when we come to compare these pleasures with others of a higher and more exalted nature, will be found inconsistent with our true happiness.

BUT without comparing these joys of sense with others, if we consider them only by themselves, and how they may be improved to the best advantage, we shall find that *abstinence* and *forbearance* do very much contribute to enhance these enjoyments, and that some pain and hardship must be endured, else we shall taste but little pleasure. After exercise and labour, rest is sweet and refreshing, and the natural uneasinesses of hunger and thirst do very much increase the pleasure of eating and drinking; and that not only as the removal of a pain enhances the pleasure, but principally because the pleasure itself is then more exquisite and intense. These satisfactions do above others require

due intervals of forbearance, after which we naturally feel the want of them by an uneasiness in our bodies, and the organs of sense being then in the best disposition to receive those impressions, the sensations thence arising are the most delightful.

WHEREAS when we do not wait the call of nature, but anticipate the sense, and raise *forced desires*, by ideas in the mind, though these may by ill habit and custom become more uneasy and impatient than those which proceed from the healthful constitution of the body; yet the pleasure of gratification will be *really less*; for when the keenness of the natural sense is wanting, there can but be small enjoyment, and it will be in vain to endeavour to supply it, by the most sumptuous table, or by all the arts of the most elegant and refined luxury.

THOUGH what is presented from without be never so apt to excite pleasure, yet if we are in no *disposition from within* to receive it, all that the most tempting objects of the kind can produce, will be only a sickly delight, intermixed with nauseating and distaste.

THUS it appears that nature has endowed us with these powers of affection for a certain purpose and end; which end is the preservation of our bodies, and of every particular part of them in a sound, vigorous and healthful state: but it is well known that the health and vigour of the body is best maintained by temperance and exercise, as it is most injured and impaired by sloth and excess.

WE have also found that a moderate forbearance of ease and pleasure, and endurance of labour and hardship

hardship do very much contribute to sweeten these sensual enjoyments, and that without such self-denial they can yield but little satisfaction, but will soon degenerate into disgust and diseases; from whence it follows, that whosoever can regulate and govern his appetites, so as to make them most subservient to that end for which nature designed them, will enjoy these delights in the greatest perfection; and he that is most addicted to pleasure, even in the lowest sense of the word, and pursues it as his chief good, will find his account best with regard to his immediate satisfaction, in avoiding too much indulgence, and in using abstinence and labour, so much at least as will be sufficient to preserve health uninjured and entire.

Sect. II. *Of sympathy and social affection.*

THE condition of human nature is such, as renders us utterly unable to live *single* and *independent*; but on the contrary, we stand in absolute need of *mutual assistance* and support. Other animals while young are hardy, sensible and vigorous, soon helpful to themselves, knowing how to shun danger, and seek after their good: but man in infancy is of all others the most helpless and infirm, and without a long-continued and most tender care could never be raised; and when come to full growth, his wants are so many, and his single ability to provide for them, so small, that he could never live with any tolerable convenience out of a social and confederate state: he would find it very difficult to provide himself with food and sustenance, or with ha-

bitations of defence against the inclemency of the seasons ; and his make is so tender, weak, and defenceless, that he would soon become a prey to other animals of superior strength and fierceness. Our union is our main support, and the species could no otherwise increase or subsist, than in social intercourse and company.

AND as mutual help and succour is so necessary to our present state and condition ; it is therefore requisite there should be something in our inward frame corresponding to our outward circumstances, something in the temper and disposition, inclining men to grant this help and assistance to each other, which all do so much stand in need of.

As society is the natural state of man, he is in some sort united with those of his kind, and to be considered as a part of the whole community, and therefore his affections should not be *confined within himself*, or lead him only towards his own private good, but there must also be something in his nature prompting him to *do good to others*.

THIS is most effectually answered by that principle of *sympathy* and *compassion*, so visibly implanted in the heart of man, whereby when no opposite passions do interfere, he feels the same affections of grief and joy, wherewith he perceives others to be touched : He naturally rejoices to see them pleased and happy, and it gives him grief and anguish, to view their misery and pain ; whereby the good of others becomes an immediate good to ourselves, as their misery is a real evil ; which must of necessity move us to use our endeavours to procure the one, and to avert and remove the other,

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 89

as much as any other good or evil whatsoever of the private or selfish kind.

It is most evident, that as man was made for *society*, out of which he could not long subsist, he has interwoven in his constitution those dispositions which do lead him to promote the *public welfare*, and the interest of society, as much as those that move him to take care of his own life, health, and private good.

THIS *sympathetic sense* or feeling has been thought so essential a part of human nature, that it has been always called by the name of *humanity*; and every action that betrays a want or absence of this sense is accounted barbarous and inhuman. The disposition itself is called *good-nature*, and the affections arising therefrom are natural affections, and whoever can be insensible to the good or evil of his fellow creatures, especially he who can behold their misery unmoved, is looked upon as unnatural and depraved, and to be as much deficient in his inward make, as if by some disease he had lost the use of his outward senses, or could not feel the natural appetites of hunger and thirst.

It can never surely be made a doubt of, but that this sympathy is implanted in our nature, and not acquired by *example* or *habitual practice*; else why *those sighs*, and *falling tears* which flow *involuntarily*, and all those marks of anguish, which shew themselves in the countenance, unknown to us, upon the sight of another's misery; and though we may strive to suppress all outward tokens of this passion, because the excess of it is accounted weakness, yet there are few who can forbear shewing
some

some indications of it, unless it be such as by long practice, have worn off all sense of pity, and acquired a hardness of heart, and insensibility, which has been always reckoned a manifest unnatural depravity.

OUR own happiness being thus bound up in that of others, we shall consequently desire their welfare, as a thing that is to us directly and immediately good; which is the foundation of those general affections of kindness and benevolence, charity and good-will, that we naturally bear to all mankind, or at least to that small part of them, with whom we have to do, or who fall within the compass of our notice and acquaintance.

THIS sympathy will not suffer us to confine our views to a narrow self-interest, but will give full scope and exercise to the *social passions*; it will teach us not to love ourselves only, but our neighbour as ourselves, and to take all opportunities to promote his happiness, because our own does in some measure depend upon it.

KINDNESS will suppress all pride and immoderate self-esteem, which leads us to prize ourselves too much, and others too little: It will incline us to entertain favourable opinions of those we converse with, not to dwell upon their *faults* and *imperfections*, so as to despise and think meanly of them, but rather to value them for what we see in them that is *excellent*; and when we make a comparison, it will dispose us to be modest and humble, and to think *others* more worthy of honour than *ourselves*; and consequently our behaviour will not be insolent and overbearing, but affable and courteous to
all,

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 91

all, testifying by all outward tokens of respect that sincere good-will which is implanted in the heart,

THIS *benevolence* is accompanied with a general love to the whole species. There is a *beauty* in the *human form* superior to any thing else in the whole creation, which makes us pleased and delighted with the appearance of our fellow creatures, especially when we behold them in *happy circumstances*, blessed with health, and ease, and contentment : but the pleasing affections never put us into motion, for the happy do not want our assistance, which is the reason that the joy we receive from the prosperity of others is less observed ; but the compassion excited in our breasts by the view of another's calamity, is sufficiently visible, and moves us most powerfully to help and relieve him.

THE wretched and miserable do before all others claim our notice and regard : and the first, as well as the most pleasing, office of *charity*, is to succour the distressed, to comfort the afflicted, and to supply the wants of the indigent, and, in one word, so far as we are able, to alleviate the sorrows of all who are oppressed with trouble, and misfortune of any kind.

THOUGH in the exercise of *kindness* we may suffer some loss and inconvenience, though we may sacrifice part of our own ease, forego some inferior satisfaction, and abate something in point of interest and fortune, yet *compassion* will over-rule all these considerations, and will lead us to seek out the necessitous, and friendless, the most dejected, destitute, and forlorn, who have not assurance to be impo-

fortunate,

portunate, and excepting a grateful acknowledge-
ment, are utterly unable to make any return.

CHARITY will single out these preferable to all others, as the most proper objects of her favour, because they are in the greatest want of it ; and when we relieve from misery, and at the same time bestow real happiness, this is the *greatest good* we can possibly do to another, and will consequently yield the highest delight.

EVERY *benevolent* and *generous spirit*, who sincerely delights in the good of others, will not fail to improve all opportunities to promote the positive happiness of all who come within his influence. There are none so compleatly prosperous, so perfectly free from all trouble and disturbance, as to stand in no need of the good offices of their fellow creatures ; but there are numberless occasions wherein without being injurious to ourselves, we may do another a pleasure, and contribute greatly to his satisfaction.

So far as *sympathy* can prevail, it will make us solicitous for the good of others as *our own*, because we have a real share in it ; and it will lead us to employ as much of our thought and care to promote their welfare, as we possibly can, without being too much wanting in what we owe to ourselves, or to those who standing in a nearer relation, do demand our more immediate concern.

FOR though this benevolence is extended to all mankind, even to perfect strangers, yet it will in the main operate more strongly towards those who are *near*, than to such as are *distant* and remote ; it is and ought to be more powerful to those of our

SECT. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 93

own nation and community than to foreigners, still more to our neighbours and acquaintance, and to our own family and posterity, most of all; such different degrees of affection being necessary for the general good.

THOUGH it may not always be in our power to do good to those about us, yet compassion however will restrain us from doing them any harm; it will induce us in the first place to remove or lessen their misery, and in the next to promote or increase their happiness, so far as we are able; but in no case will it allow us to lessen their happiness, or increase their misery. Where it is not over-ruled by other motives, it absolutely forbids every thing which is injurious and unkind. It is not in human nature to delight in the calamity of another, or to desire it for its own sake; but the natural sense of compassion may sometimes be overpowered, and in a manner totally suppressed for a time by other passions which are opposite and more prevailing.

WHERE the affections are not governed by reason, and kept within due bounds, some will grow excessive, while others are weakened and impaired: thus too great a kindness for one may move us to do an act of cruelty to another. Too strong a desire of private good, and above all a violent passion of resentment, as shall hereafter be shewn, may quite extinguish all tenderness and pity.

FOR this reason all civil governments have wisely annexed the severest penalties to all acts of cruelty and injustice, thereby to deter men from doing harm to each other, and to unite a strong appearance of evil, with such actions as they might otherwise be tempted

tempted to commit, by the prevalence of other passions, acting contrary to the common affections of humanity.

BUT surely none who can reason justly concerning his own happiness, and has any command over his affections, will ever stand in need of a prison, or a gallows, a gibbet, or a wheel, to be set before his eyes, in order to rectify his opinions, and regulate his actions.

THE principle of *benevolence* when duly cultivated, and maintained in full force, will dispose a man to be every way an useful member of society; it will kindle in his breast a sincere affection to his king and country, and make him a most dutiful loyal subject, always ready to do whatever he is able for the support of that government, which affords him security and protection, and has no other aim but the *general happiness*. As he will never fall in with such measures as tend to public misery and slavery; he will be as far from opposing a just and legal administration, from being factious and seditious, or ever once attempting to disturb the public peace, or hinder what might tend to the public good, to gratify his own private passions.

HE will most chearfully contribute whatever the law requires of him for the relief of such particular persons as are not able to provide for themselves; and charity will also lead him to find many opportunities of doing acts of kindness and compassion, which no law can require of him, and to which nothing but a kind and generous disposition can oblige him.

SUCH

SUCH an one will save the magistrate the regret of punishing him for any crimes, because the feeling of his own heart will sufficiently restrain him from whatever may be injurious, or hurtful to his neighbour, in any respect. He will no more attempt to wound his reputation or lessen his good name by vile slanders and aspersions, than he would be guilty of what might affect his fortune, or his life, either by open violence, or by the more secure and secret way of treachery and deceit. He will be as far from imposing upon, or over-reaching another, when he is in his power, or from working his harm by secret fraud and hypocrisy, as he will be from committing an open robbery or murder, both being equally contrary to the principle of humanity; and, consequently, where that prevails, and is seated in the heart, can never be admitted.

As that is called good or evil with respect to a particular person, which contributes to his private happiness, or misery; so those sentiments and affections, manners and behaviour, of rational agents, which make them useful and beneficial one to another, and lead them to promote the mutual happiness of the whole community, are called *morally good*; as, on the contrary, those inclinations and actions, which render men hurtful and pernicious to each other, and which are detrimental to the general good, are termed *morally evil*.

AND from hence he may justly be called morally good or virtuous, who has this sympathy or social passion, this kindness and benevolence, in due strength and vigour, always governed and directed by right reason, so as to be every way suited to the
general

general good; as on the contrary, he is termed morally bad or vicious, in whom this social disposition, this tenderness and humanity, is either wholly absent or else weak and deficient, or through wrong judgment so partial and misguided, as not to be conducing to the general good.

BUT there is something further commonly required to compleat a virtuous character, which never fails to accompany a kind and benevolent disposition, in creatures endowed with reason and reflection.

Sect. III. *Of the moral sense, which makes us pleased with every representation of virtue and offended with the contrary.*

FOR we are not only moved directly by this *sympathy* to promote the happiness of those of our own kind, but whenever these *social affections*, sentiments, and actions, come to be represented to the mind, and viewed in reflection, they appear *decent* and *handsome*, excite a pleasing approbation, and the consciousness of being possessed of such a disposition, and of having done such actions, fills the mind with inexpressible delight; whereas every thing which betrays a want of this kind affection, and especially every evidence of a contrary disposition, every symptom of malice and ill-nature, appears most *odious* and *deformed*; and the reflection upon having done such actions ourselves, gives us remorse, and is naturally attended with repentance and self-condemnation.

EVERY

EVERY man's own actions and behaviour must of necessity pass frequently under his inspection and review, and he will approve of whatever he has acted prudently for his best advantage; as the remembrance of what is done foolishly, in prejudice to his own interest and happiness, will give him uneasiness.

BUT besides this consciousness of what relates to our own private good or evil, we are evidently so formed by nature, as to perceive another difference in actions, respecting the *general good*, in which every particular has a share. Thus all those inclinations, which do apparently tend to the *public happiness*, and to render men mutually useful and beneficent to one another, are in themselves, abstracted from any view to private advantage, most *amiable* and *engaging*; but every contrary disposition, which leads men to be hurtful and injurious to each other, is most *odious* and *deformed*, and is always regarded with aversion and abhorrence.

THIS power of the mind to distinguish sentiments, dispositions and actions, and to be thus differently affected by them, is called a *moral sense*, or *sense of right and wrong*, which as it respects our own actions and behaviour, is commonly known by the name of *conscience*; and the approbation of a man's own mind, with the consciousness of his own integrity, in the best sense of the word, is termed *honour*; a possession which is justly valued above any thing else in the world.

IT is peculiar to benevolence and humanity, that they are not only pleasing in their immediate exercise, but they also yield us delight in *reflection* and

remembrance ; which no private or sensual pleasures can pretend to. All those enjoyments are of short duration, but the others are permanent and lasting ; for there is a power in the human mind, to perceive a beauty and a grace, in kind affection, when governed by reason ; and every action proceeding from thence, commands our constant approbation in review, and yields continual joy and satisfaction.

THUS a good disposition is always attended with a high approbation of whatever is acted from that generous principle, and is strongly supported by a love of right, and an abhorrence of wrong ; inso-much that when we are moved by kindness and benevolence, rather than by selfish motives, and do an action which is morally good, though greatly disadvantageous with respect to private interest, it may yet afford us greater pleasure in reflection, than will be sufficient to recompense the loss ; but whenever a man is guilty of treachery and injustice, or commits one dishonest action, though it may tend never so much to his private advantage, it will be sure to gall him in remembrance, and the regret may over-balance any advantage it can procure.

THIS consideration may tend to support moral goodness, and will help to withstand all opposite affections, and carry us through any difficulties we may meet with in the exercise of benevolence ; since that peace of mind, that inward satisfaction, which results from the consciousness of having done well, will prove a lasting reward to virtue ; while every action that is morally evil shall be punished with remorse, and the stings of an evil conscience, which are most grievous and tormenting.

THOUGH

Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 99

THOUGH every one has implanted in him that degree of *self-love*, as it is commonly called, which moves him to take care of his own private good; yet there can be no self-liking or self-esteem, but where a man, when he looks into himself, can find something in his character which is *morally excellent*, and can value himself upon something worthy and deserving.

It is a most commendable pride implanted in the breasts of all mankind, to desire so to behave themselves, as to merit their own approbation and esteem; and there is something in manners and behaviour, which is estimable and excellent, honest and becoming, which affords inexpressible delight whenever we perceive it in ourselves; but where this is wanting, and instead of honesty and worth, we meet with villany and baseness, the mind can never be at rest, but the odious deformity is so shocking, as to create continual *self-dislike*, which is attended with inevitable disturbance and confusion.

THIS inherent *love of right*, and the consciousness of a man's own worth, is both a natural and exquisite pleasure, yielding the true self-enjoyment, and upon many occasions supporting persons under all private evils, enabling them chearfully to undergo the greatest sufferings, and even death itself; whereas on the contrary, the reproaches of a man's own conscience, and the grievous sense of shame and guilt, destroys all inward peace, and sometimes raises so strong a self-abhorrence, as to make even life itself an insupportable burden.

IT is not only a man's own behaviour which comes under the inspection of his own mind, but the *affections* and *manners* of others will also fall under his censure; and though from a principle of humanity, we bear good-will to all mankind, without considering their moral qualities, supposing them to be all nearly the same, yet the *moral sense* makes a great distinction; and while the general benevolence is towards some increased to the highest degree, it will with regard to others be reduced to nothing, or even the contrary affections of hatred and ill-will be excited in its room.

WHEN we compare different characters, as to their moral conduct, one with another, there arises a new trial of the heart; and the sentiments, inclinations, and affections of others become the objects of our affections.

THEN all those dispositions, and actions, that render mankind generous and beneficent, and that evidently tend to the public good, and to the order and harmony of society, do always appear beautiful and amiable; they heighten and increase general benevolence, and do naturally win our love and esteem of the agent, even though we receive *no special advantage* by them; but if they are particularly beneficial to us, they excite a farther affection called *gratitude*.

WHEREAS on the contrary such actions as proceed from malice and ill-nature, or which shew the want or absence of natural affection, appear odious and deformed; they impair or extinguish good-will towards the agent, and excite our hatred, scorn, and indignation, even though we are not *immediate-*

ly

ly prejudiced by them ; but if they are hurtful to us, they raise in a particular manner the passion of anger and resentment.

WE are not only determined by nature to pursue our own private good, but we have also implanted in us that *sympathy* which leads us to desire the good of others, and consequently we shall highly approve of every thing which tends to promote either of these ends : we may in some sense be said to love that which gives us pleasure of any kind, or contributes to our private good in any respect ; and we are also said to hate whatever gives us pain and disturbance, when it comes into our thoughts, though it is not present to the sense : But these affections of love and hatred are properly applied to *moral agents*, according as they are good or evil with respect to others, in which case these passions are more exquisite than when our own private interest only is concerned.

BUT when both these are united, the affections arising therefrom will be more intense, than when they are single. As when that *moral goodness* and *virtue*, which makes a man useful in society, is immediately beneficial to us, when we are sharers of his kindness, and partake of his bounty and generosity ; this increases our love, and raises esteem into gratitude : and when those *morally evil qualities* which render a man pernicious to society in general, do make him injurious to us in particular, this increases our hatred, and heightens aversion into resentment.

YET it is most certain, that exclusive of any private advantage, whenever we perceive in any

character a strong sympathy and compassion, and consequently a delight in the *good of others*, and a desire to promote it, joined with a just sense of honour, and all those beautiful *moral graces* of honesty, faith, integrity, friendship and generosity, these can never be viewed with *indifference*; but though our own private interest is no way concerned, every representation of this kind will affect us with pleasure, and command our sincerest love and esteem.

BUT when we perceive in any person the *want* or *absence* of these dispositions, when we see plain symptoms of a hard heart, or an insensibility to the good or evil of his fellow-creatures, without any sense of honour, attended with treachery, cruelty, and ingratitude; these do at first sight excite our *hatred* and *abhorrence*, even though we are *wholly unconcerned* in their influence, and receive no prejudice with regard to our own private interest.

WHETHER we contemplate these different manners in real life, or see them represented in feigned characters upon the stage, or read them described in history or fable, there will always be found an apparent difference, a *beauty* on the one hand, and an odious *deformity* on the other, and we shall naturally applaud the one, and condemn the other.

AND this view of the delicate sentiments and affections of the human mind, the various emotions of the heart, and the subsequent behaviour and conduct in life, is of all others the most enchanting; nothing affects the mind like what proceeds from itself; and it is here that the harmonious, the beautiful and comely, as well as the dissonant, the odious, and deformed, by striking upon this *sense* do move us more powerfully than in *musical numbers*, or than
any

any outward forms, or representations of sensible things, raising our highest *admiration* and *esteem*, and also exciting our keenest *aversion* and *scorn*.

THIS is so great a truth, that it seems to be universally acknowledged; the politest part of mankind being so very sensible how amiable moral goodness is, and how odious the contrary, that they always endeavour to form their carriage so as to bear a *semblance* of benevolence and humanity. If these affections are not implanted in the heart, there must at least be a shew of them in their outward behaviour. If there is not *real good-nature*, there must be *good breeding*, and good manners; and every defect in point of kindness and good-will must be carefully *concealed*, if we would live in any tolerable repute amongst those we converse with. And for what reason? Because every appearance of *ill-nature* is by all mankind regarded with detestation.

Sect. IV *Of several abilities, which when joined with a good disposition, do also appear amiable.*

YET it is not *benevolence* alone which makes up an amiable character, but next to *good-nature*, what is commonly called *good sense*, (which consists in a clear understanding, a lively wit, and a penetrating judgment) renders a person admired and esteemed; as the want of this and every evidence of weakness and folly, makes him despised.

YET neither good-nature nor good sense can appear to any advantage, when *separated* from each

other : for when we love and esteem any person for having a kind and generous disposition, we always suppose him to be endowed with at least a common capacity of reason and judgment, otherwise those qualities will lose much of their beauty ; because the kindest intentions may become fruitless, if there is not prudence to chuse the most proper means to render them effectual ; and if the affections themselves are not governed by reason, but are partial and misguided, whilst they are beneficial to some, they may be injurious to others.

AND though the beauties of the understanding, such as a great capacity, and reach of thought, a bright genius, and a ready wit, do cause a person to be exceedingly valued and admired ; yet it is always presumed, at the same time, that he is not wanting in the common *affections* of *humanity* ; otherwise those great talents will be so far from making him more beloved, that they will rather help to make him more hated and more feared ; because a great share of policy and cunning, when joined with ill-nature, and employed to serve a wicked inclination, will be sure to prove most fatally mischievous.

But though these two principal beauties do lose all their splendor when they are separated, yet when they come *united* in an eminent degree, they cast an unspeakable lustre upon each other, and are then most worthy of our highest admiration and esteem.

FORTITUDE and courage as it teaches us to despise all private evils when we are pursuing what may tend to the public good, as it carries us with steadiness and vigour through any interprize which
reason

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 105

reason dictates to be right, without shrinking at any danger which may be in our way ; and as without this no great and worthy action can ever be performed, but the meanest and most abject conditions must be submitted to where this is wanting, it is undoubtedly a most useful and amiable quality, and always procures a man honour and esteem ; whereas on the contrary every imputation of cowardice is most infamous and disgraceful.

It is this which enables a man to look danger in the face, without being dismayed or discomposed, or losing that calmness and presence of mind, and that free use of reason, so necessary to find out the most proper measures to be taken on any sudden and dangerous occurrence, and to put those measures in execution : if it is an evil which may be avoided, or if it is what must be endured, this prompts him to meet it with cheerfulness and resolution, and to bear it with a firm temper, which very much weakens the force of any calamity, and renders the suffering more easy : so that it is exceeding useful with regard to private happiness, but it seems to shine out in the greatest brightness when employed in a common cause, as it enables a man to protect the weak, to succour the injured, and upon all occasions to serve his friends and country in the most effectual manner.

TEMPERANCE, or a power to forbear sensual pleasures, and to deny ourselves of private and selfish enjoyments, whenever it shall be requisite, is in itself always *handsome* and *becoming* ; as on the contrary, to have the appetites ungoverned, and to follow those satisfactions with too much greediness,

is

is *odious* and *indecent*, making up a contemptible character; and it is not only when these inclinations are excessive that they are indecent, but men are commonly ashamed of every thing which betrays *selfishness*, even in cases where it is innocent; and they study to conceal all private pleasure, when others do not partake with them; all indulgence is disapproved of, but forbearance is applauded.

NOR is it at all strange that this virtue should appear so amiable, and be so much praised and admired, if we consider its singular usefulness in life; for whoever is enslaved to those low desires, and immersed in sensual delights, is in a manner abandoned and lost, incapable of relishing higher enjoyments, and utterly disabled from pursuing them with success: and as too great a bent towards private pleasure in many cases acts in direct opposition to the public affections, it will not only render us incapable of doing good to others, but it insensibly leads us into such actions as may be highly injurious, and will consequently prove of infinite mischief to society.

BUT *temperance*, if we can once attain to it, disengages us from all these inferior attachments, and sets us at liberty to pursue what is most excellent and worthy. Whoever has this command over himself will find no hindrance in following such measures as his best judgment tells him is most conducing to his happiness. The *kind affections* being no longer opposed by more powerful passions, will then act in their full force, and there is nothing
great,

great, generous and beneficent, which a mind so cultivated will not produce.

WEALTH and power also are held in high veneration by the greatest part of mankind, and do cause the possessors of them to be exceedingly honoured and respected ; so prone are weak minds to be dazzled with riches and honours, that these are more regarded by the generality, than virtue or wisdom, or any other estimable quality whatsoever : as many persons are apt to make money their sovereign good, and fondly imagine happiness to consist in acquiring endless riches ; so they pay their highest esteem to the wealthy and the great, whilst poverty is the object of their scorn, and merit in rags is ridiculous and despised.

BUT though this proceeds entirely from a *wrong estimation* of things, yet it must be acknowledged that if wealth and power are not in themselves valuable, they are yet the *principal means* of procuring whatever is desirable and good ; and when those who are possessed of them, understand the art of enjoying them, they will not only be subservient to their own private pleasure, but will also enable them to contribute greatly to the good of others, and to do the most kind and generous actions.

WHOEVER considers the great usefulness of these things will industriously endeavour to obtain them by all the ways that are consistent with *justice, prudence* and *honour* ; and will also pay a greater degree of respect to those who have these abilities joined with a *benevolent inclination*, because they will then diffuse a more extensive beneficence, and
by

by communicating happiness to great numbers, render a character more illustrious.

NATURAL beauty of the outward form, and a becoming *carriage* and *behaviour*, do at first sight strike upon the mind of every beholder, so as to excite love and respect; and all the inward graces of the mind, how engaging soever they may be, when they are discovered in a beautiful person, do appear still more agreeable.

MODESTY and humility wherever they are found are always amiable; as on the contrary every instance of *pride*, or an overweening opinion of one's self, is odious and displeasing.

TRUTH and sincerity are also highly valued, whilst *treachery* and *falsehood* are treated with detestation, nothing being more pernicious to society; because a man may do that harm to another by secret fraud and dissimulation, which he could not compass by direct and open dealing; and under the semblance of friendship, may do him greater injury, than by declared enmity and violence.

THUS by enquiring what it is which wins the love and esteem of others, and gains a man the respect and good opinion of those he lives amongst, and what those qualities are that make up an amiable character, it will be found that natural beauty of the body, when united with the beauties of the mind, makes a person appear more lovely and agreeable; that in like manner the endowments of reason and understanding, a mind well stored with useful knowledge, a large compass of thought, a quick invention, and a penetrating judgment, when joined with great humanity and good-nature, are
worthy

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 109

worthy of our highest esteem. Temperance and courage are in themselves excellent, as they evidence a moderate degree of private affection, and shew the selfish passions to be under command, but especially when they are made use of to serve the purposes of benevolence, they appear exceeding amiable. Also wealth and power, when they are employed for the public good, render a man more extensively useful, and do therefore challenge a greater degree of veneration and respect.

THESE are the fair possessions and endowments for which we admire others, and upon which we are also apt to value ourselves; they command our approbation immediately, at first sight, and we have endeavoured to point out the reasons why they ought to do so. But if we impartially examine this matter, it will also be found that neither beauty nor wit, nor heroic bravery nor temperance, nor riches or power, without *benevolence*, will appear in the least agreeable. This is the main spring and motive to all worthy actions, and the rest are mostly abilities which render it more effectual; and though all these do add a greater lustre to benevolence, yet they seem to derive their own splendor wholly from it, because where this is wanting, outward beauty loses all its charms, and the greatest *natural abilities* are so far from appearing amiable, that they only render a man more odious and more dreadful; they will then be made use of to gratify other passions, and to serve wicked purposes, and if they are not employed to do good, they will be sure to do abundance of harm. The finest understanding will be so far from improving in wisdom, that

that it will rather degenerate into cunning ; valour will be brutal fierceness and cruelty, and power will be no better than tyranny and oppression.

So true it is that of all the *graces* which adorn human nature, a *kind and generous disposition governed by prudence*, and directed by right reason, is the most *engaging* ; and every action flowing from this principle, appears exceeding amiable ; but where this is wanting there can be nothing excellent and praise-worthy, nothing that can merit esteem or approbation ; but a mind so defective is instantly laid waste, and becomes a wild and frightful desert, every thing fair and handsome being removed, and nothing left but what is deformed.

Sect. V. *Of the sense of honour and reputation ; as also of mirth and ridicule.*

WHICH leads to the second grand support of moral goodness, *viz.* the *praise and approbation of others* ; for next to that peace and satisfaction which results from the testimony of a man's own conscience, this is a most pleasing reward to virtuous actions.

ALL men have naturally implanted in them a love of honour and reputation, and are apt to be very much delighted with every token of the esteem and good opinion of others, though they expect no farther advantage from them, and to be extremely disturbed and uneasy, when they are despised and ill thought of, though they dread no farther evil.

THIS

Sect. V. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. III

THIS *sense of honour and shame* discovers itself very early in *children*, who soon become sensible of praise; they feel a pleasure in being valued and commended, and are uneasy when they find themselves slighted and contemned, without considering any farther consequence.

THIS is undoubtedly a natural passion implanted in the very frame and constitution of human nature, and every sudden apprehension or consciousness of having done what will bring upon us shame, discovers itself in the countenance by blushing, which comes without our knowledge, and which is not in any man's power to prevent, unless in such as have lost all sense of shame, who by their ill conduct have forfeited the good opinion of others, and despairing ever to retrieve it, have by long practice acquired an habitual impudence.

THIS affection when duly cultivated, is a most powerful incentive to young minds, which if these rewards and punishments are rightly applied, may be insensibly led to the practice of what is morally good, and restrained from what is evil. The love of praise, and fear of shame, will have a great influence in that tender age, to prompt young persons to such actions as are praise-worthy, and also to curb many unruly passions which would not otherwise be controuled.

THOUGH this is not the true principle of virtue, which proceeds from a good disposition and a love of what is right; yet that principle is very much strengthened and encouraged, by the tribute of praise which all mankind do by general consent pay to virtuous and well-ordered actions.

ALL

ALL men do delight in *reputation*, and there is no way so sure to obtain it, as by the practice of *moral goodness*; because that which evidently tends to the general good, will never fail of being crowned with universal applause, the generality of mankind being so far true to the interest of society, that in the main they seldom bestow their approbation, but upon such actions as they apprehend to be conducing to the public happiness; nor do they often err very wide, unless they are depraved by wrong education, and by monstrous and absurd opinions instilled into their minds, when young.

THIS love of praise when kept within its due bounds, and when men strive to obtain it by real merit, as it is highly beneficial to society, so it is no way culpable in particular persons, but rather commendable; the most generous minds are most susceptible of this passion, and are thereby sometimes excited to perform the greatest and most heroic actions, surmounting all difficulties, through which other motives without this assistance, would have wanted force to have carried them; but as this is not a *social*, but a *selfish pleasure*, wherein others cannot always partake with us, but may rather think themselves robbed of what might justly have fallen to their share, therefore the wisest have always endeavoured to conceal it; they would have the world believe that they act from other and better motives, and are ashamed to receive openly commendation and applause; they rather seem to disclaim and renounce it, well knowing that *modesty* is an amiable quality, but an assuming disposition is odious and displeasing.

Too great an opinion of one's self, joined with too great a desire after honour, and laying claim to more than is our share, is *vanity* and *pride*, which when it is apparent, commonly disappoints its own purpose, and instead of gaining esteem, rather brings a man into contempt.

WHATEVER in human sentiment and action is discerned to be *right* and *just*, agreeable to *moral truth*, commands our admiration and applause; but whatever varies from this primary measure and rule of right, every thing immoral, foolish, and absurd, appears deformed, and tends to move our scorn and contempt.

THUS every thing of this kind which is injurious to ourselves or others, in any great degree, especially when we are in a *serious mood*, is apt to give us disturbance, and excite a mixture of hatred and resentment; but if it has no very bad influence, with respect to the happiness of ourselves or others, nor amounts to much more than error and folly, or some oddness and singularity, whim and extravagance, this, when it is viewed in *good-humour*, seldom gives us any disturbance, but rather affects us with a peculiar kind of pleasure, and raises our mirth and laughter.

THAT this power of affection is natural to mankind, will hardly be disputed, because it shews itself sufficiently by outward tokens, and seems to be implanted in all men, but in different degrees, according to the *natural temper*: some are more smitten with the silent admiration of what is *beautiful* and *just*, while others are prone to view every thing in a *ludicrous light*, and search out whatever is foolish

H

and

and absurd, and may consequently serve to raise a laugh. The giddy, frolicsome, and gay, are provoked to *laughter* by every *trifle*, frequently by matters which are not proper subjects of mirth; while others, more *grave* and *splenetic*, have but little relish for this kind of pleasure, and are perhaps scarce ever seen to *smile*; the same persons also at different seasons are more or less susceptible of this diversion. When a man is pleased and in good-humour he will make many things matter of merriment, and shew his disapprobation only by derision, which at other times would have been apt to move his displeasure. It is most certain that we are best disposed to relish this entertainment, when we are in chearfulness and good-humour; for when a man is uneasy, he will be but little inclined to merriment, and when he is out of humour, he will be more ready to resent every little incident, than to carry it off with an air of pleasantry.

YET it must be acknowledged, that this sense of *ridicule*, as it is the foundation of raillery and humour, gaiety and festivity, helps to furnish out a great part of the pleasures of life; it makes even the mistakes and imperfections, the faults and follies of our conduct, afford great matter of pleasantry and diversion, and the mirth which they create, helps to soften our cares, to temper our more serious thoughts, and serves as an antidote against spleen and melancholy; for this pleasing affection has a wonderful efficacy to banish sorrow, and inspire the mind with gladness; it exhilarates the drooping spirits, and in its turn, promotes chearfulness and good humour.

If it is rightly managed, it may also contribute very much to put vice out of countenance ; for in this method, even *lessons of wisdom* and *moral instruction* are often most effectually conveyed, since these errors and blemishes in mens conduct may by the elegance of wit, and the nice touches of a refined raillery, be so naturally drawn, and placed in so facetious a light, that we cannot help being diverted with the representation, and at the same time if we are conscious that any of these failings belong to our own character, a secret kind of shame will excite us to correct and amend them.

HENCE it is that *good company* and *polite conversation* tend so much to refine mens manners, and to work off whatever is *indecent* and *immoral* ; for such persons in the midst of gaiety and humour mutually give and take useful instructions, and do alternately hold the glass to each other, wherein every one may behold his own blemishes and imperfections. This will not fail to excite him most powerfully to reform, and so to adjust his behaviour, as to be no longer the mark of jest and ridicule ; for there is nothing which men covet more than *esteem*, nor any thing they dread more than being despised, and exposed to *scorn* and *derision*.

IT is no small advantage to this method of instruction, that it may be managed with *pleasantness* and *good-humour*, without any shew of *hatred* or *ill will*, and without any *sour aspects* or *magisterial airs*, to create offence, and render it disgustful. Any sudden transport of joy occasioned by some good fortune befalling our selves, or the view of any misfortune happening to another, will in some tempers be

apt to produce laughter; but surely nothing can be the proper *object* of *ridicule* but what is *immoral* or *absurd*, and consequently mean and contemptible; and even amongst these things, such only are to be selected as are of lesser moment and no serious nature; for what is exceeding wicked will rather cause resentment and indignation, and what is extremely weak and silly will be more apt to raise compassion.

Too great a degree of *selfishness* of any kind, call it sensuality, cowardice, or avarice, is the proper *object* of *satire*, and has been always ridiculed with success: but temperance, courage and generosity, will always appear beautiful, nor can they ever be made a jest of, or rendered contemptible; and as the best affections can be of no use, but will rather prove pernicious, if they are not directed by reason, therefore every instance of weakness or folly will be despicable and ridiculous, but wisdom and good sense will be always admired.

UPON the whole, it seems that in human affairs there is a certain end, which when rightly understood, will to every human creature appear extremely desirable. Whatever is apparently contrary to this end, is immoral and irrational, foolish and absurd, indecent and deformed, always regarded with scorn and contempt, and is unavoidably the subject of resentment or ridicule; as on the other hand, whatever tends to promote this great end, is right and true, most reasonable and fitting, beautiful and just, always regarded with honour and esteem, from which we cannot withhold our admiration and applause.

Sect. VI.

SECT. VI *Of the sense of beauty in natural subjects.*

IT is not in moral subjects only that we perceive a beauty and a charm, but also the *productions of nature and art*, when they come under our survey and contemplation, do many of them excite a pleasing admiration: They are no sooner brought into our view, but they affect us with pleasure *directly*, and *immediately*, without our reflecting on the reason why they do so, and without their being considered with *relation to ourselves*; or as advantageous in any other respect, even where there is no possession, no enjoyment or reward, but barely seeing and admiring.

THESE objects are therefore called *beautiful*, as others are termed *ugly and deformed*, which are not viewed with this satisfaction, but are rather apt to create disapprobation and distaste.

THESE pleasures being excited by the images of things received by the sight, from objects which are actually before our eyes, or else called up by the memory, and formed into agreeable pictures, are called the *pleasures of the imagination*; for though these ideas are originally received by the sight, yet the pleasures they afford are not allowed to belong to the outward sense, but are ascribed to another faculty. Of this however we are certain from experience, that there are several modifications of matter, which the mind, without any previous consideration, pronounces at first sight to be beautiful or de-

formed. All bodies which by nature or art, are fashioned into regular figures, are more pleasing than such as are irregular and confused; a pile of building rising according to just order and proportion strikes the eye more agreeably than a rude heap of mis-shapen rocks.

A spacious horizon and an azure sky, with the sun shining out in his full glory, especially when rising or setting, he gilds the mountain-tops, and paints the clouds with glorious colours, is a sight most pleasing and delightful; nor is it less entertaining when the sun has left our hemisphere, and the shades of night do cover the earth, to view the heavens adorned with such an infinity of sparkling stars, besides the neighbouring planets, and the pale moon, that shines with borrowed light.

If we take a survey of our planetary system, with that glorious luminary the sun in its center, the fountain of vital heat, and source of those continually emitted streams, which enlighten and invigorate the surrounding worlds; for around him all the planets with this our earth either single or with attendants, do perpetually move, and all partake the blessing of his light, and genial warmth, performing their revolutions in just proportion, and invariable measure: This is a speculation not only delightful, but amazing, and especially if we consider the almost infinite number of fixed stars, as so many suns, no less diffusive of vital treasure, nor less attended with their proper planets, who pay their circular homage, and partake of the same enlivening influence, this will present an idea of the grandeur and magnificence of nature, and the immensity

Sect. VI. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 119

mentsity of the material world, too vast for our narrow capacities to entertain.

THESE sublime contemplations may also fill our minds with worthy conceptions, and excite us to a grateful adoration of the guardian deity, and sovereign ruler of the world; the source and principle of all beauty and perfection, who holds in being the several parts of this stupendous frame, and moves them all from the least to the greatest, by sacred and inviolable laws, contrived by unerring wisdom and most consummate goodness, for the welfare of each particular being, so far as may suit with the order and perfection of the whole.

BUT not to launch too far into these boundless views of nature, if we return to this our globe, the various landships and rural scenes, which present themselves upon the surface of the earth, diversified into hills and vallies, woods and spacious plains, covered with refreshing verdure, and enlivened with such distinction of light and shade, in some parts adorned with pleasant seats and spiry cities, and watered with winding rivers; while in others the prospect varies to wilds and sandy desarts, craggy rocks and lofty mountains; all these together do form agreeable visions, and strike the imagination with an irresistable pleasure.

AND it is not only the survey of these larger scenes of the material world that is so entertaining, but if we descend to contemplate particular bodies, we shall find all the works of nature wrought up with the most *exquisite art*, exhibiting new scenes of wonder, and they will be more admired the better they are understood; but much will still remain mysteri-

ous, which the most discerning sense assisted by the acuteſt reaſon can never fully unfold.

THOSE who ſearch into the *bowels of the earth*, do there diſcover hidden wonders to gratify their curioſity, which though more ſimple in ſtructure, are no leſs exquisite in beauty, than other productions more compounded; *gems and precious ſtones*, though their ſubſtance is moſt homogenial, and beſides their hardneſs and incorruptibility, have little in them worthy of admiration, but their luſtre and beautiful colour, are yet moſt highly prized. *Metals* of the nobler kind are ſufficiently idolized by the generality of mankind, and even thoſe of the baſer fort, as well as many other mineral ſubſtances, are endowed with ſuch wonderful properties, and when tried through all the various methods of enquiry by fire, do yield ſuch ſurprizing appearances, as ſtrike upon the fancy, and furniſh out matter of employment for the buſy mind of man; ſo far that thoſe that turn their thoughts towards theſe ſubjects, can in theſe experiments ſpend their days with pleaſure.

IF we examine what paſſes upon the *ſurface* of this globe, we ſhall find it ever fruitful of an infinity of beautiful forms, which do all originally proceed from their parent earth, and having appeared for a ſhort time, do return to earth again; which brings forth more to undergo the ſame fate: they ſoon quit their borrowed forms, and by a quick circulation are reſolved into their primitive matter, and yield their elementary ſubſtances to new comers. But though theſe particular beings are thus tranſitory and ſhort-lived, yet by ſeminal powers they

they produce their like, and by succession live through endless ages.

THERE are multitudes of species of *plants*, which in all their various growths, from the silver moss, to the stately oak, are both in their inward fabric, and their outward form, exceedingly beautiful ; and by those who are curious in this way, are not beheld without admiration. How wonderful is the structure of the root which shoots downward, and of the stem which grows upwards ! how uniform the branches, how curiously figured are the leaves, and above all, how exquisitely beautiful are the flowers ! insomuch that this single production of the vegetable kingdom furnishes a most elegant entertainment to those who have a just knowledge of these beauties, and a refined taste for this kind of pleasure.

IF we ascend to *animals*, and survey only the *insect tribe*, yet even here will soon be found sufficient cause of admiration, the smallest works of nature being framed with no less consummate skill than the greatest ; as these are endowed with sense and self-motion, so all their limbs and instruments of action are adapted to their circumstances with the nicest art, to enable them to avoid their enemy, or to seize their prey, and to perform all the actions proper to their kind : many of them have the art of spinning with wonderful quickness ; others do also weave nets ; some build cities, and live in society under a regular government.

IT is also peculiar to these creatures, that after a certain season, they seem to be grown weary of life, and fashion to themselves sepulchres, wherein
they

they lie intombed, and are to all appearance dead; but after a short time they rise again with greater glory in a different form, having undergone a surprising change, and instead of creeping on the earth, they now expand their wings, and become inhabitants of the air.

It is most entertaining to behold these mean and contemptible insects, when accurately viewed, to be adorned with such a vast variety of glorious colours, and such great profusion of dress and attire, to which no borrowed magnificence, nor artificial embellishments are to be compared.

THE *birds* of the air may also be the subject of a most agreeable speculation, whether we attend to the great variety and harmony of their notes, or consider the beauty of their form, and the glory of their plumes; or if we examine the mechanism of their wings, which enables them to bear themselves up in so light and yielding a fluid, and cut the air with so much ease, in all the varieties of flight. There is also something entertaining in the structure of their nests, the form and various colours of their eggs, and especially in their care and sollicitude to provide, not only for the subsistence, but safety of their young.

As those fowls that are tame and domestic, or of the mild and harmless kind, are different in their tempers and inclinations; so they are also of a weaker make, unfurnished with those weapons which are allotted to such as are in their natures fierce and rapacious, and live by preying upon the weaker sort.

I. Sect. VI. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 123

It is observed that some are *birds of darkness*, which come abroad only in the night; testifying their joy by hideous screams; but before the rising of the sun, they withdraw themselves into dark corners or deep caves, where light has no access.

MANY of them are *birds of passage*, coming at a certain time, and after they have stayed their appointed season, they assemble together, and take their flight in the greatest order and discipline, to remote countries, over wide seas and tracts of land, without either chart or compass, in a manner too wonderful for us to understand.

THE *fishes* which inhabit the watry element, and the *terrestrial animals*, whether *wild* or *tame*, will be viewed with no less admiration and delight; and to crown all, the *human form* is of all other beauties the most enchanting, and where nature and art have not withheld their favours, the symmetry of features, the fine turn of shape, the blooming countenance, and the graceful mien, do strike every beholder with irresistible pleasure.

It is a large scene for delightful contemplation which the works of nature do afford; and not only these, but the *works of art*, and the symmetries of human invention, do also claim their share of beauty; and there are many who perhaps may overlook what is fair and handsome in other subjects, and yet are smitten with admiration of this order of beauties. The models of houses and buildings, in just proportions, with their accompanying ornaments and decorations; the plans of gardens, and their compartments, the ordering of walks, plantations

tations and avenues, are most elegant and delightful amusements.

THOSE who have attained a just knowlege in the *plastic* or designing arts, such as *sculpture* or *painting*, how are they charmed with a fine statue or a finished picture; and how are we all apt to be transported with the imagery, the descriptions of beautiful objects, which we meet with in *poetry*: for in these cases it is in the artist's power, to adorn and embellish, what he offers to our view, by heightning every grace, and concealing the defects which often accompany them; or by assembling a greater number of beauties, than are usually put together by nature.

It is this talent of affecting the imagination, by selecting such things as are most proper to strike upon the inward sense, and painting them in the most lively manner, that makes a *fine genius* in most kinds of writing, and renders not only poetry and fiction, but real *history* entertaining; and though what is drawn from life, and from the passions, is the principal part, nothing being so engaging as the beauty of sentiments, the turn of character, and the grace of actions, when set off with proper foils; yet the representing of natural beauties, intermixed with those of the moral kind, do render a work more agreeable.

If *harmony* and *proportion* is so taking in visible objects, it is no less enchanting in sounds, the power of music being sufficiently experienced, and the wonderful force it has to move the passions, to calm all anxious and tormenting agitations, and to fill the mind with rapture and delight. The pleasures
of

of the understanding which result from the discovery of truth, and the perception of the agreement of ideas, or their *relations* and *proportions* to each other, are thought to be still more exquisite and refined. We cannot help being pleased with the lively turns of wit, which by happy allusions, shew a surprizing agreement betwixt things, which were thought to be quite different. But these sudden flashes only strike upon the imagination, and are not always exactly just, nor will they bear a strict enquiry, but often tend to lead us astray. We are apt to rest satisfied with the agreeable vision, without farther examination, whereby we sometimes mistake one thing for another, or through a partial resemblance, imagine them to be in all respects alike.

BUT when by a careful use of reason through a long chain of intermediate proofs, we discover the relation of two ideas, which could not be immediately compared, how far they agree, and in what respects they differ, we are led to a true judgment, clear of all fallacy and delusion, and the mind is affected with a most exalted pleasure, making ample amends for the toilsome and laborious search.

Sect. VII. *How all these determinations are implanted in our nature, and others may be acquired by custom.*

AND thus it appears that we do not only receive pleasure and pain from our *outward senses*, but are also endowed with various powers of affection
which

which are *internal* and seated in the mind ; and so far as we can learn from observation, these are no less natural than the former, not gained by the accidental association of ideas, not learned by imitation, or acquired by habit, but interwoven in the frame and constitution of human nature ; all the race of mankind being evidently possessed of them, though in various proportions, and different degrees.

THERE is no human creature, that is not visibly defective in his make and temper, but besides the pleasures and pains he receives from his outward senses, will very early discover an internal sense of beauty, by being pleased with what is regular, orderly and uniform ; and when he comes to be tried by proper objects, will shew evident tokens of the *sympathetic affections*, such as kindness, compassion, gratitude and love ; and though it may be somewhat later before he comes to reason and judgment, yet as soon as he is capable of reflecting, he will be pleased with every shew and representation of the *social passion* ; think nothing more amiable than this, nor more odious than the contrary, and thereby clearly disclose a sense of *right and wrong*.

THE sense of *honour*, and *shame*, shews itself much sooner, and it is most reasonable and fitting, that before we arrive at a moral judgment of our own, our actions, and behaviour, should be governed by the sense and opinion of others. Though all these senses or dispositions seem to be implanted in the human nature, yet they do not shew themselves equally in all persons, and at all times ; nor are they in their nature fixed and invariable ; but may by several causes be increased and diminished,

nished, depraved and altered, and are frequently concealed, so as to seem almost totally extinguished and destroyed.

THE affections arising from different senses do frequently act contrary one to another, in which cases the stronger will for a time suppress the weaker. Thus resentment of injury is contrary to kindness and compassion, and will frequently overcome, not only the affection which we naturally bear to others, but even self-love, or the regard we have to our own safety. The sensual appetites, and what we call self-interest, do often act in opposition to social affection; so far as for the present to over-rule and subdue it. And yet notwithstanding this, these dispositions may still remain in the mind and temper, and will not fail to shew themselves, when those more prevailing passions are removed. But by wrong instruction, education, and example joined with long practice and custom, some of these powers may be very much impaired, and almost entirely lost and effaced; while others are strengthened and increased beyond their due proportion.

THUS a man may be drawn in to do a hard and injurious action, by the prevailing force of some opposite passion, which may suppress all the motions of humanity for the present, tho' the sense may yet remain entire; but by long use and custom he may be trained up to the exercise of cruelty, till at last he arrives to a total insensibility, and all tenderness and compassion shall be in a manner extinguished.

THE

THE powers and faculties of the mind, as well as the organs of the body, gain strength by action and exercise, as by the want of it, they grow weak and feeble; and custom, which is a second nature, will by degrees increase our relish or disposition, to be pleased with any enjoyments, that are frequently desired, and often repeated; while the sense of other pleasures with which these are inconsistent, shall through disuse be very much impaired and weakened.

It is in the power of *custom*, not only to augment and diminish these natural powers of affection; but we may also this way create to ourselves pleasures, or at least ideas of pleasures, which are purely *fantastical and unnatural*.

THERE are many things, which persons are brought to chuse, not for their own sake, or from any pleasure which they yield, but merely in compliance with the *fashion*, and to avoid being thought singular; yet by long use they become habitual amusements; and we begin to be uneasy in the want of them, to hanker after, and passionately to long for them, when the first inducement to chuse them is no longer thought of. And thus what was not pleasing in itself, but only chosen as a thing that was *mediately good*, proper to procure us some other pleasure, is by a sort of magic transformed into a thing that is *immediately good*, and becomes desirable in itself, as the want of it gives us so much uneasiness.

FROM hence, among many other irregular affections, we must account for that strange passion called the *love of money*, which is often begun by imitation,

tion, or from a just notion of the usefulness of riches, which, though not excellent in themselves, will yet procure us many conveniences and pleasures of life, and therefore we may reasonably desire them, and endeavour to obtain them, as a means of happiness, by all just and honest ways; but when men have been long accustomed to pursue them, they insensibly join with them an opinion of good in themselves, and strive to acquire them for their own sakes. The ultimate end which was at first proposed is no longer remembered, but all the appearance of excellence is transferred to the means.

Thus gold comes at last to be idolized, and men are so impious as to pay their adoration to bags or heaps of shining metal; and so wonderful is the fascination, that though riches are no ways valuable, but as they are subservient to our pleasures, yet they who are possessed with this frenzy do sacrifice their ease and pleasure, for the sake of money; they strive to obtain it with industry and toil; and study to preserve it with no less anxiety and care, denying themselves the chief enjoyments of life, rather than part with any share of their beloved treasure.

AND thus we see that we are not only liable to be betrayed into wrong judgments of good and evil at a distance, but the relish of it when present may be altered, and our taste by degrees be vitiated and depraved: and though men should not fail to pursue that most, which affects them with the greatest pleasure, yet even in this they may be subject to error: and we find many who place their highest sa-

tisfaction, in mean and contemptible enjoyments, while the more valuable are neglected and despised.

FOR all the various pleasures we are capable of receiving cannot be joined together in their full extent, but if we will strive to make the most we can of some, we must allow of some abatements with regard to others. If a man is resolved to indulge himself to the utmost in *sensual pleasure*, he must be content with a less share of the *pleasures of the mind*. He must not hope to improve in knowledge, nor can he expect to gain much honour and reputation, if he is wholly governed by selfish views, and determined upon any terms to advance his own *private interest*, he must bid adieu to all the joys of *friendship, kindness, and generosity*; nor must he ever taste that sincere delight, which results from the consciousness of having done such actions as are *decent and worthy*. If honesty is his greatest pleasure, he will not fail of having the testimony of a good conscience, and the applause of good men; but then he must abate something in point of interest, and often deny himself the gratification of his private passions.

IF he is desirous to excel in *science and learning*, this will require application and study, and may perhaps make him less polite in his behaviour, and give him a disagreeable mien in company. If he courts *military glory*, he must be willing to endure *hardship*, and despise danger and death; but if his choice is *indolence and ease*, these may be had on other terms; it is but to quench the love of fame, the thirst after gain, to conquer love and ambi-
on,

Sect. VIII. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 131

on, and every other restless passion; if this can be done, all will be easy.

AND thus we find, that what we gain on one hand, we must lose on another; every thing goes by exchange, and therefore it will behove us to enquire which are the most *profitable exchanges*; which way we may best afford to be losers, and where we ought to bend all our endeavours to be gainers: that so with a slight regard to such enjoyments as are of an *inferior nature*, and yield but a short and transient satisfaction, we may principally direct our aim to those that are more *exalted* and *refined*, and which afford a more durable and lively pleasure.

IF it is but once rightly understood which enjoyments are in themselves the most worthy, and also the least attended with pain and disquiet, and least subject to loss and disappointment; we may then be better able to deal with those false ideas of pleasure that will be soliciting us, and to discover whether they will not deprive us of greater pleasure, or bring upon us more trouble and disturbance, than will be ballanced by all the satisfaction thy can afford.

Sect. VIII. *A comparison of all these various affections, in order to discover which are of the greatest importance.*

THE pleasures of sense, in the vulgar acceptation of the word, are universally acknowledged to be inferior to those of the mind, as being only such

as we enjoy in common with other animals, to whom we reckon ourselves to be much superior; and therefore should place our happiness in the exercise of those higher and nobler powers, which are *peculiar* to ourselves, and wherein the dignity of human nature does principally consist.

THE objects of sense are too gross and material, to afford a suitable and refined entertainment to the mind; and as the pleasures of this sort are the lowest, they are also short and transient; they vanish in enjoyment, and yield no after-satisfaction in reflection and remembrance; and especially when the aversion to the pains, or the indulgence to the pleasures of sense, are beyond a just degree, they will be manifestly inconsistent with our true felicity, as they deprive us of much greater pleasures, and likewise bring upon us the greatest evils.

THUS an excessive love of ease, an aversion to labour and hardship, utterly disables us from obtaining the highest satisfactions; as an immoderate fear of danger, or of death itself, renders a man incapable of performing the common duties of life, or of being useful to his friends and country; and so deprives him of the most valuable pleasures, and is therefore justly reckoned a wretched and despicable character.

It is also sufficiently known how much an excessive indulgence to the pleasures of sense, either of the *luxurious* or the *amorous* kind, unfits us for all other delights; and how many evils and mischiefs it brings upon us, as it introduces a general looseness and disorder in the whole oeconomy, dethrones a man's reason, and enslaves him to every mean
and

Sect. VIII. OF VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 133

and abject passion; and especially as it deprives us of the two greatest blessings in life, *health* and *good-humour*, impairing by degrees the natural harmony and vigour of the constitution, and with an equal pace bringing on a sourness and uneasiness in the temper.

THE passion of *self-interest*, as it excites to the pursuit of wealth and riches, or at least a competency of the means of happiness, is in a *just proportion* very requisite. All are not born to a plentiful fortune, and therefore by their own care and industry, must provide a maintenance for themselves and family. The common mechanic can by his daily labour gain an honest livelihood, and if his desires are adapted to his circumstances, may live as happy and content, as others of a higher rank; and he that is blest with a superior genius, and a more liberal education, may in some higher profession prove eminently useful to society, and in return acquire to himself a plentiful estate; or if the love of money is not so prevalent in his temper, as to make him extremely successful that way, yet a moderate regard for it is highly necessary, because every man would wish not only to be easy in his body, and in his mind, but he must be also easy in his circumstances, and above the fear of want, or else his happiness will be very imperfect.

As despicable as riches may appear in some persons eyes, and as little worthy to be pursued for their own sakes, yet they serve to relieve us from the many wants and sufferings, to which human nature is exposed; they enable men to do acts of kindness and compassion to others, and by this

means make them taste the generous pleasure of relieving the needy and distressed; and in short, they are things without which very few satisfactions of any kind are to be obtained: but as they are not good in themselves, but only the means of procuring what is really good, and all the advantage lying in a right use and application of them; it follows, that to pursue and admire them, as *excellent in themselves*, without any view to their use, is altogether ridiculous and absurd: it is employing all our endeavours to obtain the means, and at the same time neglecting the end.

WHEN men once come to aim at getting money for its own sake, they seldom set any measure to their desires; but the more they have acquired, the more eager they are to increase their store; and as too strong a desire after riches, even though no injurious methods are made use of to obtain them, renders a man entirely selfish, and by degrees extinguishes all kind and generous affection, depriving him of the highest and best enjoyments, and affording nothing in their room, but the poor and low gratifications of a sordid and unnatural passion, which yet is in its nature ever insatiable; it has therefore always been justly accounted a wretched and miserable character.

THE pleasures of the mind, arising from the study and survey of *natural beauty*, in every object wherein it is to be found, is judged to be far superior to sensual enjoyments, and to yield a more noble and refined entertainment.

As in what relates to the *human species*, such dispositions, sentiments, and actions as tend to the
general

general good of the whole, do strike the inward sense, and appear exceeding amiable; so in all other creatures, those inclinations and affections, which make them useful to their kind; so far as they were designed to be sociable; as also those *shapes and proportions*, that are best adapted for the activity, vigour, and perfection of the particular animal, do strike the same inward sense, and affect the mind with pleasure.

It is the same with regard to that *harmony and order*, and those sacred general laws, which support *universal nature*, and make all the several parts subservient to the perfection of the whole; for all men are originally so formed, as to perceive a beauty and a charm in whatever is *harmonious and proportionable*; as the proportionate and regular state is the truly prosperous and natural one, in every subject, contrived by wisdom and design, for the greatest utility and advantage.

THIS is that consummate beauty of nature, with which some of the most celebrated writers, both ancient and modern, have been so transported, as to affirm it to be, in its full extent, the *highest* and the *chiefest good*; in the survey and contemplation of which the greatest pleasure did consist: for this contemplation of beauty is the delightful exercise and employment of the mind; and they thought it unworthy of their high rank, for men to place their happiness in the joys of sense, which brutes enjoy so much above them; but that we ought to place it in our minds, which were abused and cheated of their true felicity, when drawn to seek it in the objects of sense, or in any thing else

but the enjoyment of beauty, and of whatever is fair, decent and handsome.

BUT without entering far into such refined speculations, it is easy to observe that the charms of beauty are widely displayed : we find it in almost every thing we view, and every one courts a *Venus* of one kind or another, either in the works of nature or of art ; though different minds may be captivated with different beauties, and engaged in various pursuits. Thus in high life, a palace and apartments, in the utmost grandeur and magnificence, with avenues, vistas, spacious gardens, groves and woods ; within a sumptuous table, rich services, numerous attendants, equipage and dress, in the nicest order and beauty, universally please. Some are smitten with the love of painting, statuary, music or poetry ; while others are more enamoured with the beauties of nature, and even in shells and butterflies can discover something extremely pleasing to their fancies : some are delighted with animals, and to admire and even dote upon a horse, a hound or a hawk ; and others more mindful of their own kind, are transported with the charms of a fine shape, or a beautiful face, so far as to think all things else despicable and mean.

THOSE of a more exalted genius, and capacious mind, can slight all the allurements of inferior pleasures, and solely intent on the pursuit of knowledge, can labour night and day at the solution of a difficult problem, or the demonstration of a general theorem, and think themselves well rewarded for their pains.

THEY

THEY are curious to search into the secrets of nature, the virtues of plants, the formation and œconomy of animals, the union of the elements, and the structure of the universe ; can describe the order of the celestial bodies, and the courses of the planets, the force which retains them in their orbits, and the laws of motion which they universally obey ; all which do strike the mind with wonderful pleasure, and afford a most refined and elegant entertainment.

YET it must be allowed, that there is a pleasure in *action* as well as *speculation* ; and as the joys of the mind are preferable to those of sense, so of all those inward satisfactions which do properly appertain to the mind, the most valuable are those which flow from *sympathy*, and *social passion*. For how strange soever it may seem, and perhaps contrary to the general opinion ; yet whoever is a competent judge, will declare it as a truth, that the greatest pleasure is to *please another* ; and that the exercise of *benevolence* and *humanity* yields the most exquisite delight.

WE may safely appeal to any one of the human kind, who has experienced what condition the mind is in under a lively affection of *love* or *gratitude*, *kindness* and *compassion*, *bounty* and *generosity* : nay, it is most manifest, that whenever we are touched with any strong impression of a social and friendly kind, the eyes, the outward features and gestures, with other evident tokens, do plainly express a most piercing anguish, or else a most lively and transporting joy ; which silences and subdues every other motion, whenever it presents

sents itself: no affection of any other kind can be a match for it, as we may observe in numberless instances, that men will forego their ease and pleasure, endure all manner of hardship, and defy torments, and death itself, when animated with a strong desire to serve those they love, to defend them from injury, save them from impending harm, or even to revenge their wrongs; and what is still more, every action of this kind meets with universal approbation, and in the common sense of mankind, is judged to be right and good, as well as handsome and becoming.

AND though on the contrary there are many who prefer the joys of sense, to the satisfactions of the mind, and chuse private and selfish pleasure, before social enjoyments; yet this must be a manifest wrong judgment, arising from the tyranny of evil custom, which has vitiated the taste, or from ignorance, and inexperience of other pleasures; because we are apt to blame ourselves for such a choice, whenever we seriously reflect upon our own conduct; and every settled disposition of that sort is condemned by all mankind, and always treated with detestation and contempt.

It must also be allowed, in behalf of *social passion*, that every pleasure we have is doubled by being shared and communicated; and every joy, and contentment of others, by this kind sympathy, becomes our own. Which is so true, that even the joys of sense, both in *luxury*, and *amours*, do derive their principal charms from a mixture of something *kind* and *friendly*, without which they would be extremely insipid.

AND

AND though this disposition makes us sharers in the pain and misery of others, as well as in their happiness; yet by this mutual feeling we have it in our power to alleviate the anxiety of our friends, without increasing our own in the same proportion; because even that grief and sorrow, which is truly of a social nature, and flows from human sympathy and compassion, has a mixture of something pleasing and agreeable.

THE kind and tender affections, though intermixed with somewhat of horror and disturbance, do yet occasion a most pleasing emotion of soul; which is the reason, why men will often crowd to see a *spectacle of calamity*; and such representations as move our passions, even in this mournful way, do sometimes yield a more delightful entertainment, than the highest enjoyments of the sensual kind.

THESE pleasures will not grow dull and tasteless in the exercise, nor are they apt to be tiresome, but will be always repeated with increasing joy; neither is there any danger they should interfere with other pleasures, and deprive us of such as are more valuable. The *honest man* is no less capable than the *immoral one*, of enjoying all the pleasures of the understanding, and imagination; his head will be as clear, and his reason as well fitted for the most refined speculations; and his power of being pleased with the contemplation of beauty, either in the works of nature or of art, will be no ways impaired: he will also be no less disposed for mirth and gaiety, because he will be likely to share no less of cheerfulness and good-humour; and he will have this advantage, that so far as he is
virtuous

virtuous and good, the ridicule can never be turned upon himself: and even as to sensual delights, he will enjoy these in a greater perfection, because he will in all probability be more temperate and sparing, and especially as he will chuse it in a social and friendly way, not to regale himself all alone, but to have others partake with him, which will very much increase the pleasure.

THUS the exercise of *kind and social affections* will not deprive us of any other valuable satisfactions, but will rather dispose us to enjoy them with greater advantage; and it will be so far from bringing upon us any future evils, that its consequences and effects will be highly beneficial. For these pleasures are not only superior to all others in their immediate exercise, but they are of a permanent and durable nature, they do not perish in the using, nor do they take their flight the moment they are enjoyed, but will still remain a lasting treasure; because the remembrance of such actions is always sweet, and the consciousness and reflection ever affords a most pleasing and delightful entertainment.

THE exercise of *benevolence* is highly pleasing, as the end which is obtained is most desirable and good; and not only so, but even those inclinations and actions which lead to that end, are decent and handsome, yielding entire satisfaction in the review; so that here we find the most pleasing action united with the most delightful contemplation; for there is nothing so graceful as a *generous action*, nor any beauty so engaging as a *kind and friendly disposition*.

CONTINUAL

Sect. VIII. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 141

CONTINUAL peace and serenity of mind is the genuine product of a *virtuous life*; for a man may then look into himself without any disturbance, when he finds nothing there that is odious and ill-deserving; when he is not conscious of any injustice, or dishonesty, nor of having done any cruel, hard or injurious actions; and what is more, if his conscience can testify that in the main he has governed himself by the rules of virtue and honour, and the chief tenor of his conduct has been generous, kind, and beneficent, so far as his ability would extend; this will afford him continual joy, and may justly be a source of never-ceasing pleasure and delight.

It is this most pleasing review, which strikes the inward sense, in so lively a manner, as to excite a most exquisite and inexpressible satisfaction; insomuch that the approbation of a man's own breast, and the consciousness of his own virtue and merit, has been reckoned of all the blessings of life, to be the *dearest and most inestimable*; the best and noblest part of mankind having always valued it above any thing else in the world, sooner chusing to die than to violate their *honour*, or do one single action that is villainous and base; as well knowing, that even life itself, when this is gone, is but a wretched being, and hardly worth the keeping.

For he who has not the honest testimony of his own heart, but is conscious of something in himself, which is *morally evil*, odious, and shameful, can never have any real *self-esteem*, but must of necessity hate and detest himself; and the continual re-
proaches

proaches of his own mind will render his days extremely miserable, though attended with the highest degree of outward prosperity.

THIS natural principle is not easily suppressed, for though it may possibly be lulled asleep, and lye dormant for a while, yet it will at last awake with greater fury ; and the lashes of a guilty conscience may fill the mind with horror and remorse, sufficient to create a hell upon earth, and make even life itself an unsupportable burthen.

BUT if we could suppose this sense of right and wrong to be almost *totally effaced*, and that by long custom a man should be grown wholly insensible of moral good and evil, to whom villainy should be no ways odious, nor virtue amiable ; yet this must imply at the same time, an utter absence of all *sympathy*, and kind affection, whereby he must consequently lose all the most valuable pleasures of life, and be subject to the most unnatural and tormenting passions. And if the consciousness of the greatest inward deformity cannot move or affect him, so far as to make him out of love with himself, it will be sure to make him so much the more detestable to others, and render him the scorn and the jest, the hatred and aversion of all mankind.

FOR as all men have implanted in them this natural sense of right and wrong, whatever is immoral and ill-deserving, will to the generality appear odious and deformed ; and though they may sometimes be so partial, as to overlook the inward deformity of their own characters, they will be apt enough

nough to mark it in others, and most sincerely to hate and detest them for it.

As all persons do naturally delight in the esteem and good opinion of their fellow-creatures ; to be slighted and despised by all we converse with, must occasion a most grievous trouble and disturbance, which a haughty spirit will scarce know how to bear ; but whoever deviates from the paths of virtue, will be likely so far to incur the general censure and reproach ; whereas he who places his chief delight in the practice of moral goodness, will, besides other advantages, be sure to gain the love and esteem, the approbation and praise, of all good men, which to an honest mind is a most exquisite satisfaction.

THERE is no passion more strongly implanted in our breasts, than the love of *honour and applause*, which all men strive to obtain by various and sometimes unaccountable methods ; but when this affair is rightly understood, it will be found, that *virtue and real merit* will prove the surest way to honour and reputation ; because those actions which do manifestly tend to the general good will seldom fail of being crowned with universal applause.

It is no small recommendation of these moral pleasures, that they do not depend upon *fortune*, they can never be taken from us, nor can we be hindered in the enjoyment of them, unless by ourselves ; for every man may be honest if he pleases, and no one is necessitated to be wicked, but only from his own wrong choice.

WHENEVER

WHENEVER our desire is fixed upon a good that cannot be obtained, it must occasion constant uneasiness, while it continues; and as the loss of a pleasure does often produce a most exquisite pain, we shall continually be exposed to affliction and calamity, when we set our hearts upon that which at any time may be lost, or taken from us; and therefore our greatest wisdom will be to withdraw our desires from those goods that are precarious, not in our power to acquire or retain, and direct them to such as are fixed and constant, which we can at any time bestow upon ourselves; by which means we may be always sure to obtain what we desire, without any apprehension of loss or disappointment.

IF our fancy is struck with the lustre of things without, as *adventitious honours, estates, and preferments*, and we pursue them as our greatest good, we are necessarily exposed to grief and vexation; because these things are so fickle and unsteady, that though we are prosperous and successful at present, we know not how soon we may meet with crosses and misfortunes; may be rich to day, and to-morrow stript of all, and reduced to extream poverty: but he who has learned to set the highest value on the inward objects of worth and beauty, such as *honesty, faith, integrity, friendship, and honour*, and is but once possessed of these, will be rich beyond expression; as he will have obtained a treasure none can rob him of, nor can the utmost malice of fortune bereave him of it: because under the greatest sufferings, and even in the article of death, these will administer unspeakable comfort and delight.

AND

Sect. VIII. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 145

AND thus it seems to be most evident, that these *moral affections* are of the greatest importance, and that whoever is studious to obtain the greatest pleasure he is capable of receiving, intermixed with as little disturbance as is possible, will endeavour to form his taste to *kindness* and *humanity*: he will be obliged, for the sake of his own private happiness, to cultivate a benevolent disposition, and so to regulate his conduct, as may best tend to promote the general good.

FOR the interest of every particular is most certainly bound up in the public welfare, and whoever by working upon his own mind, can bring his passions and affections to that just harmony and proportion, as is most conducing to the *general good*, will thereby procure to himself the greatest and most durable satisfaction; as on the contrary, where the selfish affections exceed their due bounds, and men pursue a separate interest in opposition to the general happiness, they fondly aim at a lesser good which deprives them of a greater, and not only so, but they bring upon themselves the most tormenting anguish and distress.

THEREFORE this natural sympathy, this social passion, ought not to be rudely disposed, or industriously suppressed, as mere weakness and folly, but rather should be cherished and maintained in its just proportion; only so far it must be restrained, as to be under the command of reason, that it may best answer its own end; for if it is partial and misguided, not directed by prudence, it may prove most pernicious.

A
T R E A T I S E
O N
V I R T U E and H A P P I N E S S.
P A R T III.

Sect. I. *How our several passions ought to be managed; and first, in general, that all ought to be moderated and kept in subjection.*

AFTER having taken a survey of the various pleasures and pains we are capable of receiving, in order to discover which are of the greatest importance to our happiness and misery, it may be necessary to enquire how all these affections, and the various inclinations arising from them, are to be regulated, so as to be most conducing to our happiness, which is the point we ought to aim at in all our actions.

It

It has been already observed, that when our affections are excessive and immoderate, our aversions too violent, and our desires too eager and impatient, they are productive of nothing but trouble and disquiet; for when the uneasiness is greater than is necessary to put us into motion, this is so much immediate misery, more than was requisite; and not only so, but as they grow excessive, they grow headstrong and ungovernable, refusing to obey the dictates of reason. When our motion is more gentle, it is more easily managed, and may be made orderly and regular, always guided towards its proper end; but when it is impetuous, it is not at our own command, but is apt to occasion the wildest disorder and confusion. We can then neither direct our own aim aright, nor use the most proper means to attain any end, but are hurried into measures directly contrary to our own happiness, and also highly injurious to others.

THEREFORE it may be premised as a *general maxim*, that every passion ought to be *moderated and restrained*, requiring more the bridle than the spur; and though this may cost us some little trouble, before they can be broke to the bitt, and taught to obey the reins, yet upon the whole it will certainly be best not to give a loose to every forward inclination, nor to be always impatiently raving after new gratifications, but rather chuse to rest contented in our present condition.

WE shall but deceive ourselves with fond imaginations, if we expect a constant succession of the highest bliss, but must be sometimes willing to suffer a little pain, and often think ourselves sufficiently

ently happy in being relieved from trouble, and obtaining perfect ease and tranquillity; or however in the enjoyment of moderate satisfactions; because our condition is such as absolutely to require the endurance of some pain, else we shall never obtain the greatest pleasure; and also that we should forbear pursuing those satisfactions which fancy may present as the most eligible, else we shall bring upon ourselves more trouble and distress than is necessary.

WE should be studious how to lessen our cares, and provide for our ease and quiet, rather than aim at high and difficult attainments, or engage in pursuits which will be attended with certain anxiety and pain; but the real pleasure which they will yield is very dubious and uncertain.

THE first part of wisdom is to be *free from folly*; and the most essential part of happiness, which ought to be our first and principal care, is to *avoid misery*, so far as our present circumstances will allow: when this is guarded against, we may then be at liberty to seek after pleasure, though even here we ought to be temperate and modest; not aspiring after high enjoyments, nor captivated with gay and splendid amusements, nor ambitious of grandeur and distinction; but rather *choosing* privacy and retirement, and contenting ourselves with such satisfactions as are in our power, which though they may not have such a gaudy and glittering appearance to strike upon the fancy, yet will be found to be solid and lasting, as they give continual peace, and afford the sweetest and sincerest pleasure.

BUT

BUT whoever is ambitious of higher matters, and will set his heart upon things of outward dependance, such as *riches, honours, titles, precedencies, the favour of courts*, or the breath of *vulgar applause*, will find that he has neglected what is infinitely more valuable, and by eagerly pursuing objects whose possession is so uncertain, will be exposed to continual vexation and disappointment.

THOUGH greatness may appear most splendid and dazzling, yet happiness does not always attend it in equal proportion; but he who acts in an humbler sphere, even the honest artisan, who lives by his industry, enjoying what is sufficient to answer all his reasonable wants, and who is content and aspires after no more; who is generous, free, and kind-hearted, so far as he is able, and conscious of nothing criminal or ill-deserving, may vie for ease and tranquillity of mind with those in higher stations: yet the most exalted characters may be the most happy. If there is a prince, for instance, as *Great Britain* must with gratitude own there is, who though he has given the greatest proofs of heroic courage, can yet moderate his affections, and has no ambition but to make his subjects happy, and maintain the peace of *Europe*: how will such a king be honoured and revered; and how much more happy in the consciousness of such a god-like disposition than those who have been unjustly celebrated as the greatest heroes? He needs not envy his renown, who is recorded to have conquered eight hundred cities, subdued three hundred nations, fought in several engagements against more than three millions of enemies, one million of

which he destroyed, and took another million prisoners: who though he obtained the greatest honours that could be bestowed in a free government, yet could set no limits to his boundless ambition, but employing his fine talents and great abilities, not to serve, but to enslave his country; after a bloody civil war, in which he proved victorious, assumed to himself a tyrannic power, for which he soon met with his reward; falling by the hands of his best friends, and those upon whom he had conferred the greatest benefits.

BUT to return to common life. Whatever station we are placed in, it were certainly much to be wished that our desires and aversions should be moderated, and that we should procure to ourselves an equal mind; and this can only be effected by that discipline and castigation of our fancies and opinion before mentioned, and by taking a little time to consider the *real moment* of that pleasure or pain which they bring along with them; weighing the consequences they will draw after them, and balancing the sum total of good and evil which they contain. This will shew us the imperfection of all worldly enjoyments, that they are always dashed with some bitterness and distress, which will tend to lower those high and florid imaginations we are too apt to entertain, and thereby render our desires more temperate and calm; it will also convince us that many evils are not so dreadful, as at first sight they might appear; but may possibly contain a mixture of good; which will help to banish all black and dismal ideas, and render our fears and aversions less tormenting. By due consideration,
and

Sect. II. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 151

and withdrawing our attention from slighter matters, and fixing it upon that which is of the greatest concern, we may at last bring all our ideas of pleasure and apprehensions of evil to be *rational and just*. We shall then be no longer governed by fancy, nor will our affections be so eager and excessive, but we may by continued use gain a habit of patience, moderation, and self-command.

Sect. II. *How the sensual appetites are to be restrained; also of self-interest, or the love of money.*

THE joys of *sense*, in the vulgar acceptation of the word, are generally acknowledged to be the lowest, and therefore ought not to be pursued as the most worthy.

THOUGH we are far from asserting that pleasure is no good, nor pain no evil, yet as too great indulgence to the pleasures of sense, as well as too great aversion to the pains, will certainly deprive us of much greater pleasures, and bring upon us the greatest evils, we ought here to put in practice those lessons of *forbearance* and *endurance* before mentioned; and our appetites and desires of this kind ought ever to be restrained, and kept within bounds.

THIS we suppose will hardly be contested; but what puts the matter out of all possibility of dispute, is, that though we should allow these pleasures to be of the greatest moment, and that our chief care should be to enjoy them in the greatest perfection;

yet this can only be obtained by a *less frequent use* of them, and by intermixing somewhat of abstinence, and laborious exercise, which will give them a most rare and exquisite relish : whereas, if they are too long continued, or too often repeated, they grow nauseous and offensive, dull and heavy, and insupportable : So necessary is forbearance and self-denial, to the true enjoyment of even sensual delights, and so much does the alleviation of a pain, arising from the craving of a sound and natural appetite, when added to a pleasure, enhance the value of it. Thus *temperance* is eligible for its own sake, and still more so, as it is a preservative of health and good-humour ; for health is the sovereign balsam of life, and the main ingredient towards happiness : it is this which enables us to taste the sweets of every sense, and to perform every action with ease and pleasure ; but when health is impaired, and the curious organs are out of order, every impression is grating and disagreeable, and every motion uneasy.

It is health also which greatly tends to promote cheerfulness and good-humour, prevents all peevishness, spleen, and melancholy, and keeps the mind clear and serene ; nor suffering it to be clouded with fullness and discontent, nor overcast with dark fears and dismal apprehensions, which though purely imaginary, yet in some cases are observed to be more tormenting than any sense of present evil.

SELF-INTEREST, or the love of money, should not be suffered to grow excessive, and exceed its due proportion ; but prudence should teach us to moderate

moderate these desires, so as to keep in the *golden mean*, bewixt negligence and extravagance, on the one hand, and sordid avarice, on the other. Every man should be diligent and industrious to acquire a competency of the means of happiness, and if he is possessed of it, he ought not profusely to lavish it away upon every wanton appetite, or forward fancy: he ought certainly to forbear unnecessary gratifications, rather than bring himself to want what is necessary; but to deny ourselves the chief enjoyments of life, even those which are most essential to our happiness, purely to gratify a fantastical desire of heaping up riches, without either measure or end, will surely be no wise man's choice. It is not a small sacrifice that must be made to this insatiable passion, when it once gains the ascendant: we must not only forego all ease and pleasure, but must forfeit the love and esteem of all our friends, and which is still more, we must lose the secret approbation of our own minds. And what are we to gain in lieu of all these? only the bare satisfaction of being possessed of wealth which we dare not use. Or if we should suppose it employed to the best advantage, yet riches cannot always make or preserve us happy; they cannot cure a fever, nor remove the racking pain of the gout, or stone; much less can they ease the mind of care, or heal that remorse of conscience, which the hard and injurious methods men take to acquire them too often create.

WHETHER a *good name*, and the fair esteem of our acquaintance, be not preferable to a *large estate*, may possibly admit of some dispute; but we may surely venture to affirm, that a man's own innocence

cence and honour, and the peace and quiet of his mind, are far more precious than gold; and whoever parts with these, though it were in exchange for all the wealth of the *Indies*, will find that he has made a foolish bargain.

YET are we far from derogating from the usefulness of riches, when they are rightly applied; for he who is blessed with a plentiful fortune, and has also the art of enjoying it, may live much more happy than he could without it: yet even in this favourable circumstance, there will be required a stricter government and self-command; else where persons have it in their power to gratify every inclination to the full, they may be tempted to run into excess.

A rich man must in many respects live like a poor man, else his riches will be no advantage, but a snare to him: he must use exercise, which is voluntary labour, and he must often practise forbearance out of choice, which the poor are forced to do out of necessity; and after all, he cannot taste the pleasures of sense in much greater perfection than others, because they are best enjoyed with temperance and at small expence; but he may purchase a greater share of the pleasures of the mind; he may adorn the scene wherein he lives, and will have leisure to contemplate the beauties of nature and of art. He may have all the advantage of education, and good instruction, and opportunity to improve his mind by travel, and the best conversation: but his main privilege will be, the having it in his power to do acts of kindness and generosity, to raise drooping merit, to relieve the unfortunate
and

and distressed, and to befriend all about him in the most effectual manner: Here he should bend all his endeavours to excel, and make this his principal care, as it is indeed the most glorious use of riches, and will certainly turn to the best account.

It is this which yields the most exquisite pleasure and hereby he will gain honour and esteem from all mankind, and also lay up for himself a more inestimable treasure, which can never be lost or taken from him.

BUT surely he must be lost to all sense of shame, and wholly ignorant of his own true happiness, who suffers all his views to center in a narrow self-interest; who can see a worthy object in want, while he is able to relieve him, or is ever backward to serve his friends and country, who ought to be as dear to him as himself.

Sect. III. *How the pleasures of the understanding and of the imagination are to be regulated.*

THE pleasures of the *understanding* and *imagination* are highly valuable, as they yield a more refined entertainment than the joys of sense, or the low gratification of the love of money; yet even these may be pursued too far, as is generally acknowledged to be the case, when mens thoughts are wholly turned this way, to the neglect of the more important and necessary cares of life. The *Virtuoso*, the *Chymist*, the *Mathematician*, and the *Poet*, are all of them sometimes so transported, each

each in his own way, with the several objects they have in view, as to be entirely regardless of every thing else. So enchanting is *beauty*, that whoever enters into a deep contemplation of any branch of it, is sure to be smitten; and though the pleasure he receives is never so great, yet as the busy part of mankind will scarce allow any thing to be a real good, or of any use, unless it tends to increase a man's fortune; they are apt to look on these men of deep speculation with some sort of pity, judging them to be a little touched in their brain, and under a degree of madness.

BUT this elegance of fancy will be most apt to draw us to inconvenience, when we are not content with seeing and admiring, but must be aiming at the *property* and *possession*; for by this means, a person of a most ample fortune, having his imagination too strongly turned for such things as stately buildings, gardens, statues, pictures, equipages, and such-like exhibitions of grandeur, may run out so far, till the year's income will not answer the expence; and he will find that he has lavished away that wealth upon superfluous amusements, which ought to have been reserved for more important and necessary occasions.

BUT whoever has leisure to apply himself to the study of beauty, and would improve it to the best advantage, should endeavour principally to form his taste according to the best judgment, and the true standard and rule of reason; for though this sense is naturally implanted in all men, yet by imitation, and evil habit, it may be vitiated and depraved, and we may be led to overlook the higher orders of
beauty,

beauty, and to fix our attention on such as are of an inferior sort; and even amongst those of the same kind, we may fancy and admire such as are mean and trivial, containing but a small share of real beauty, and consequently can afford no true or lasting pleasure.

A MAN must cultivate his reason, and improve his natural genius, ere he can clearly discern what is *truly agreeable* and entertaining, what is preferable and principal in these subjects of estimation; and it will require some use and practice, ere he can form his relish accordingly. *Harmony* and *proportion*, on which beauty depends, are founded in nature; nor will they be as we fancy them, or be governed by humour or the prevailing opinion.

THEREFORE whoever would attain to a true taste of beauty, must endeavour to frame it according to the *just standard of nature*; and it will cost him some pains to call in question his early prejudices, and reclaim his fancy from the power of fashion and education, to commit it to the guidance of reason.

WHERE this is not done we shall certainly be betrayed into wrong judgments, and by degrees the sense will be altered, and the taste will be depraved. It is this way that men are brought to prefer artifice to honesty, pleasure to virtue, and can sometimes part with their honour, and barter inward worth and beauty for splendid trifles without.

IF we regard only the study of nature, and the politer arts, how apt are we to run into a false relish? Many are delighted with what is gothic and irregular in *architecture*, with a false stile in *painting*

painting, with grotesque and monstrous figures, glossy paint, and glaring colours; and in *music*, that does not always please the most which is according to the best manner, and truest harmony.

WITH some we behold *insects* and *cockle-shells* surveyed with the deepest attention; being constantly busied in framing hypotheses and imaginary systems, whereby the various operations of nature are accounted for, and whimsically explained: not content in silent observation to admire that harmony and order, that reigns through the whole creation, they seem to be more delighted with the fictions of their own brains; can censure and find fault with the contrivance of infinite wisdom, and deform the beautiful order of things, with their vain imaginations and fond conceits.

It is also owing to a manifest wrong fancy, when persons are so fond of *novelty*, as to neglect what is truly beautiful and agreeable, and can be pleased with nothing but what is strange and uncommon, wonderful and surprizing. For though it is the frailty of our nature, that we cannot be pleased with any thing long, but must be relieved with something new, yet that novelty which adds fresh charms to beauty has nothing pleasing in itself. But they who are far gone in this taste, fall in love with any thing for the sake of its rareness, and despising that beautiful simplicity which is plainly to be discerned in the most common subjects, come at last to delight in what is mysterious and miraculous, monstrous and prodigious.

It is owing to this vitiated relish, that *historians* are not satisfied with such narrations and descriptions,

Sect. III. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 159

ons, as would be both instructive and entertaining; but they must often be inventing something strange and astonishing to embellish their works, and deal so much in *omens*, *prodigies* and *apparitions*. The writers of *voyages*, and *travels*, love to stretch beyond the bounds of truth, and relate something marvellous and incredible; and even the most *celebrated poets* do abound in descriptions of things quite out of nature, which are certainly more fit to excite laughter than any other passion; for even fiction itself should bear some resemblance to truth, and appear with an air of probability, else, however it may please the ignorant and the vulgar, it will hardly pass with men of just discernment. There is indeed in all men a natural propensity to wonder at what they do not understand, delighting to be amused with fabulous narrations and idle dreams, which lays a foundation for the wildest enthusiasm, and makes the weak and ignorant become the dupes of artful men, who know how to manage this foible of the human nature to their own advantage.

YET the study and survey of these sorts of beauties, when duly regulated, is in many branches of it, besides the immediate pleasure which it yields, attended with very great advantage. That strict attention to mathematical demonstrations which the pleasing speculation insensibly leads us to, gives young minds a quickness of perception, and a habit of clear and conclusive reasoning, which will lead them to the discovery of truth in every subject; and as it prevents them from being imposed on by weak and superficial arguments, it will tend to banish

nish all errors and prejudice, credulity and superstition.

THE improvements in *natural knowlege*, besides many useful inventions for the ease and convenience of life, will lead us into most exalted and entertaining speculations, and make the face of nature appear most fair. Here every inquisitive mind may be convinced, that in the main, all things are ordered for the best, by the most consummate wisdom. That in this universal system, all the several parts have a mutual relation and subserviency to each other; and while the various orders of beings are endowed with those powers and inclinations, which lead them (though not unerringly) to their particular good, we have cause to believe that all are over-ruled so, as to conspire to the general advantage.

THIS conclusion is most reasonable, because so far as our knowlege does extend, all is disposed according to perfect order; and if some things do appear irregular and confused, that must be owing to the shortness of our sight, and our want of capacity to comprehend the whole system, and discover all the various relations as they regard particulars: though there is apparently in all things a mixture of evil, yet that may be productive of much greater good; the most perfect harmony arises from a composition of jarring and opposite principles. The resignation of inferior kinds is the preservation of the superior; and even the errors and imperfections of the several parts do probably contribute to the order and perfection of the whole.

THIS

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 161

THIS consideration may help to inspire worthy conceptions of the *divine being*, and correct all false and injurious representations; shewing most clearly, that the *sovereign ruler* of the world is not influenced by weak passions like ourselves; nor does he act in a partial and capricious manner, but governs by general, steady, and inviolable laws; which are as just, as they are unalterable: that he is not favourable to some of his creatures, and cruel to the rest; nor is one part of the creation the object of his peculiar care; but he is good to all, and all do equally partake of his bounty and munificence, enjoying as great a share of good as is suited to their condition; that there are no flaws, nor mistakes, no disorder, nor confusion in this amiable administration, where all is conducted by infinite wisdom and goodness.

Sect. IV. *Of the management of the social affections.*

THAT the practice of *moral goodness* and *virtue* yields the greatest pleasure, and that we ought therefore principally to cultivate such a disposition, has been already shewn; but even here will be required great circumspection, and a careful use of reason, else the very best affections, not being governed by reason, may prove hurtful to ourselves, and injurious to others.

NATURE has implanted in our breasts this *sympathy*, as a secret charm, to draw us to the performance of all social duties, making it the interest

L

of

of every particular, to work towards the general good ; and therefore we should make that the constant rule of our conduct, and so far as a most free and impartial reason can direct us, endeavour to avoid being deceived with false appearances ; and not suffer a *partial* and *mistaken benevolence* to usurp the place of that which ought to be *rational* and *just*, and consequently *universal and entire*.

As we ought upon all occasions carefully to examine, whether what we take to be our good, may not in the main prove the reverse of it ; so especially in that chief part of good, which consists in giving way to sympathy, and in doing good to others, we should proceed with all due care and deliberation : Here we ought to suspend even the motions of benevolence, till we have well considered, whether what we are prompted to from a principle of kindness, will really be conducing to the *general good* ; or whether what we design as a benefit to one, may not prove an injury to another : for we ought so to regulate this very best and noblest disposition, as that it may not be partial and narrow, and limited to a few, but entire and universal, extended in a just proportion to all mankind.

For whatever is acted contrary to the general principle of humanity, through a partial, though ever so kind and generous affection, is in itself an *inconsistency*, far from yielding any true and lasting satisfaction ; it is only a false and deceitful good, and the pleasure it affords, deprives us of much greater pleasure, and will be sure, sooner or latter, to bring upon us sorrow and remorse.

BE-

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 163

BENEVOLENCE should indispensibly oblige us to *do justice* to all, in the first place, and not to wrong or injure any; when this is secured, it will give full scope to the exercise of *kindness and compassion*, bounty and generosity, towards *proper objects*, so far as our *ability* will extend; but to do good to others, by bringing a *greater evil* upon ourselves, is what no rational benevolence will require; neither is it consistent with the *general good*, to which a just degree of self-love, in every particular, and a due regard to self-interest is absolutely necessary.

BENEVOLENCE itself may exceed its *due bounds*, when it runs into *mad profusion* and extravagance; and besides that, good-nature and kindness, to an excess, has in it something too cheap and easy; so far from being valued as it ought to be, it is rather apt to be despised, so that it seems to require sometimes a *mixture of asperity*, opposition, and resentment; for there is no man, how great soever his benevolence may be, who can live in the constant exercise of kindness to all about him, but he will sometimes be provoked to anger, and meet with just occasions of resentment and displeasure. We are not always led to do good to others, but are sometimes moved strongly the contrary way, to their hurt and prejudice, by other incitements; which indeed mens jarring interests, and the principles implanted in their nature are apt enough to produce.

It is this mixture of the *mild and fierce*, which helps to invigorate and enliven human affairs, without which they would soon grow dull, and our motion, if it was not quickened by opposition, would in a manner stand quite still; and it also

helps to raise the value of any character. For in common estimation, it is not sufficient that a man is *beloved as a friend*, and known to be generous, bountiful, and kind, but he must also upon some occasions exert himself vigorously, in the vindictive way, so as to be *dreaded as an enemy*, else he will not be so much regarded.

WE should not only study to do acts of kindness and beneficence, but every one ought also to employ some part of his care, to guard against the *ill designs* of such as would impose upon and injure him. As there are many who through some fault in their temper, or else through wrong practice, are brought to love themselves too much, and others too little; these will not scruple (when interests do interfere, as will often happen) to seek their own advantage at another's expence. This they will not stick to do by open *violence and injustice*, when they have the power, or else they will chuse to work by the more secret way of *artifice and deceit*. Therefore whoever has but a small share of experience in the world, will be cautious how he trusts to *fair pretences*, and will also defend himself, as well as he is able, against manifest *outrages and abuse*.

YET with all his precaution, he will sometimes be deceived, and as he will often meet with open injuries and affronts, this will not fail to move his indignation, and sometimes call out loudly for revenge; resentment of injuries being *as natural* to mankind, as gratitude to a benefactor, or as benevolence is at first view towards those, whose moral qualities we are strangers to, and from whom

we

Sect. IV. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 165

we never received either good or harm, and is perhaps a no less *necessary ingredient* in their composition: but it is most certain, that love and friendship, harmony and peace, will always appear to us to be the *right state of society*, as hatred and anger, contention and war, is the *wrong state*; and though, according to the present constitution of things, both these must unavoidably be blended together, as in the private system pleasure is mixed with pain; yet we always wish there may be as much of the one, and as little of the other as possible; and every man would strive to form his temper to the amiable and agreeable part, rather than to the odious and perverse.

SYMPATHY and kind affection, under just restrictions, ought certainly to be cherished; and though it should grow greater by indulgence, there will be no great harm; it is but to grow better natured, and to enjoy more and more the highest and the noblest pleasure, which will not surely be contrary to our true interest.

IF all immoderate self-love could be restrained, and we could learn to love our neighbour as ourselves, and do unto others even as we could wish they should do unto us, this would be the perfection of charity and benevolence. And if we could suppress the rising motions of resentment, so far as to forgive those who do us wrong; return good for evil, and even to love our enemies, or at least not to hate them for any particular harm done to ourselves; this is no more than what *Christianity* does absolutely require of us. The commands

of our *holy religion* will from their own just authority sure claim an implicit obedience: yet if we will also hearken to the voice of reason, it will convince us, that all these precepts are righteous and good, perfectly adapted to our present, as well as future happiness. And though notwithstanding our great professions of christianity, experience shews us, that humility, meekness, and charity, are not very fashionable qualities, and this practice of forgiveness is contrary to the way of the world; yet if we could attain to it, though it were but in part, it would not perhaps be found such egregious folly as is generally imagined; because it would prevent abundance of vexation and disturbance, and contribute not a little to the ease and tranquillity of our lives. It would render a man superior to those storms of passion, that wrath and provocation, which involve the lower world in strife and variance, and create so much more uneasiness than is necessary to the generality of mankind.

THOUGH the wisdom of the world lays it down as an established maxim, that every man should be *active to defend his right, and vindicate his honour*, and therefore ought highly to resent an *indignity or abuse*; yet it must be allowed, that in some cases at least, a generous *forgiveness of injury* is more *honourable than revenge*; and is also in common prudence much more eligible, not only as it helps to keep the mind calm and easy, but also as it tends to create peace, and make our enemies our friends; for such a conduct may sometimes put a period to that

that animosity, which the retorting of abuses, and retaliating ill offices, might have rendered perpetual.

AND thus it appears, that this *social passion*, if it is not partial and misguided, if it does not exceed its due bounds, and is careful not to render itself despised by being too forward and easy; and lastly, if it is so managed, as not to trespass too much upon private interest, it cannot be too much indulged: because it is the exercise of kindness and benevolence which yields the truest happiness, and some of its most difficult and self-denying duties, which seem to be most contrary to self-love, are found in the main, to tend much to our private advantage.

BUT if self-interest and benevolence were ever so much opposed to each other, yet in many cases, the former may decently yield to the force of the latter; as for instance, if any person is willing to suffer any hardship, or even death itself, to save his friend whom he highly values, from the same evils which he chuses to undergo; this is no harm to the public: the moment of good or evil to the whole, being equal in both cases, neither is such an action blameable, but on the contrary will be always admired and applauded.

ALSO were a man to lay down his life in defence of his country, though the advantage accruing to particular persons will not equal the evil that he suffers, yet as great numbers are likely to be gainers by what he voluntarily throws away, it is no loss to the public, but on the contrary, is esteemed highly useful and beneficial. And as no government or community can long subsist, nor be se-

cure from being injured, and oppressed by their neighbours, unless the members thereof be resolute to hazard their lives in its defence; therefore a *contempt of death*, in so good a cause, will always appear *amiable* and *eligible*, notwithstanding all partial and selfish estimations of happiness.

IN these cases, the generous passion will not bear to be controlled; disdaining that self-interest should be brought in competition, or even so much as thought of. So ravishing is the pleasure, that men regard not the suffering, and their memory is treated with universal honour and esteem: *dulce et decorum* will crown every action of that kind, even though it should prove unsuccessful, and fail of obtaining the end for which it was designed.

Sect. V. *Of the sense of right and wrong, how it ought to be governed.*

THOUGH from a principle of benevolence, we bear good-will to mankind, yet the *moral sense* makes a great distinction; increasing very much this general benevolence towards some, while it quite destroys it with regard to others, and substitutes the contrary passions of *hatred*, and *ill will*, in its room. It is this which inspires the highest respect and esteem, and also excites the strongest aversion and scorn, driving men to the utmost extremes of loving and hating.

AND as those affections which influence men in their behaviour towards each other, do principally take their rise from *this original*, therefore it is of
the

the last importance, that this natural sense of right and wrong should be directed by reason; and that the passions of love and hatred should not be misapplied.

WHENEVER that happens, which indeed is but too often, it must of necessity create infinite mischiefs and disorders in society; good men will be injuriously treated, while the bad shall be applauded and caressed; nay so far may people be deluded, that the best and most deserving of mankind, may sometimes be pursued with the most cruel hatred, and made to suffer the greatest wrongs; while the worthless and insignificant, or even the wicked and immoral, shall be advanced to the highest dignities and honours.

BUT as every affection is governed by opinion, this irregularity in these moral passions, must proceed from some *false and mistaken opinions*; as when we suppose that men have in them those morally good or evil qualities which they have not, and when we take that to be morally good, or evil, and consequently amiable or odious, which is not truly such.

THAT love and esteem which naturally rises in our minds towards any person of eminent *moral goodness*, is certainly a most pleasing affection, and the exercise of virtuous friendship yields the most exalted delight; but here our chief care should be to form right opinions of persons, and not to be imposed upon by specious pretences, and false representations; and much more should we be cautious not to impose upon ourselves, by unjust and partial determinations, where self-interest is some way

way concerned; no little services done to ourselves, nor flattery, though ever skilfully applied; no agreement in sentiments, nor similitude of manners, should bias men so far, as to lead them into wrong judgments, and possess them with too favourable an opinion of any persons, so as to believe them to have that moral excellence, which they really want. And especially we ought to call in all the powers of reason to our aid, to distinguish carefully what is sound and right, in human sentiment and affection, from what is vicious and wrong; that so we may admire only what is praise-worthy, and not to suffer our natural notions of what is amiable and excellent, to be perverted.

In order to assign the just value of every thing in life, the sole measure and standard should be taken from *moral rectitude*, or the apparent tendency of mens dispositions and actions to the general good. By this rule we may readily distinguish betwixt the good and the bad; and as the former will always claim our respect and esteem, the latter will be treated with scorn and contempt. But to form any other distinctions amongst men, and to mark them out for our love or hatred upon any other foundation, is both injurious and unreasonable: friendship so ill grounded can yield no true nor natural satisfaction, but will be sure to create disturbance and regret, whenever men come to discover their mistake.

THE degree of love and esteem, due to any character, seems to be in a great measure proportionable to the moral goodness and virtue which it contains; for benevolence, when conducted by reason,

reason, is always amiable, though the ability to do good be never so small, or though the attempts towards it should prove unsuccessful. There are also many things, which though not morally excellent in themselves, yet when joined with virtue, do render it more illustrious and beneficial; but as it has been already shewn, that these great abilities, if they are not united with a kind disposition, will be so far from being useful to society, that they will prove most dangerous and destructive; therefore to set a high value upon these things, apart from what can only make them truly valuable, and to treat them with admiration and applause, must certainly be very absurd. And yet from a *false taste* of what is *worthy and estimable*, we may observe that many are honoured and adored, for being placed in *high stations*, or being possessed of *great power, titles, and preferments*, without any thing else to recommend them; and others are admired for their *policy and cunning*, to out-wit and deceive those they have to do with; or for a *superior understanding and capacious mind*, unaccompanied with an *honest heart*: *great wealth and riches* bestow on some all excellence and perfection; while others for their *courage and military exploits*, not in defence of their country, but to serve their own ambition, have been celebrated and renowned for heroes, who in reality were no better than *robbers and destroyers*.

By *education and wrong instruction*, early inculcated, false opinions may be imbibed, and a false reverence impressed upon the mind, whereby many things of no *real use*, nor in the least tending to the happiness of mankind, are looked upon as *ven-
erable*

rable and sacred: and thus we are drawn in to honour and admire some persons, for what is not *morally good*, and to hate and despise others, for that which is no way *evil*. Hence it is that distinctions are formed, and divisions made as to *sects in religion*; and thence proceeds the most *malignant spirit of party*, of such infinite mischief to the public, as well as destructive of private happiness, wherever it obtains.

BUT where reason has its due influence, and the moral sense is not wofully depraved, this incense of praise will never be offered to any thing but *real merit*.

THAT sincere respect and esteem, which is of so sweet a savour, and of such inestimable value, is in its nature most nice and delicate; it will not be commanded by *power*, nor is it to be purchased with *gold*; it will never be given to *wit* without *humanity*, nor to *valour* without *justice*: it is not to be won by *glittering ornaments*, nor awed by *solemn airs*, and *reverential robes*; but it will always wait upon the *worthy* and *deserving*, even when they do not court it, but rather seem to decline it.

THOSE actions and dispositions, which are *kind*, *generous*, and *beneficent*, and do evidently tend to the general good, will always appear amiable, and win our love and esteem of the agent, even though we receive no advantage from them; but if they are beneficial to us, they excite a farther affection, called *gratitude*.

THIS is the highest improvement of benevolence; for nature has determined us most eminently to respect those moral good qualities of others, which

which affect ourselves, and has given us the strongest impressions of good-will towards those who are kind and friendly to us. Hence will arise no small encouragement to do acts of kindness and beneficence, when the benefactor is sure to gain, one time or other, an addition to his happiness, by a suitable return from the persons obliged: or if that is not in their power, by a constant grateful acknowledgement, and the sincerest expressions of love and gratitude, which from the meanest of mankind is always pleasing.

It is also of no small moment, that as our ability to do good is limited to a narrow compass, lest our benevolence should be lost or become useless, by being equally extended to multitudes at a great distance, whose interests we could not be able to promote; nature has ordered that it shall be more powerfully attracted by objects that are *near*, than by such as are *distant* and *remote*. Thus the general good-will, which we bear to all mankind, is heightened into esteem for those of our *acquaintance*, whose moral qualities are known to be good; and it is still farther improved into *gratitude*, towards those who have obliged us with *kindnesses* and *favours*; and thus a foundation is laid for the strictest ties of *friendship*, amongst *relations*, *neighbours*, and *acquaintance*, by the endearing intercourse of mutual good offices.

AND whoever is wanting in this disposition, or fails to shew a grateful sense of a benefit received, and a *strong benevolence* towards his *benefactor*, is looked upon as the *worst of mankind*, and always treated with the utmost detestation. The absence
of

of this sense, being always marked as the greatest *depravity of human nature*, scarce consistent with any degree of *moral virtue*.

YET this affection, as well as all others, should be under the command of reason ; and it will require some care and caution, lest our obligations to some *particular persons* should interfere with that *general benevolence* we owe to all, and we should be drawn to engage in such measures, as may be *injurious to others*, and inconsistent with the *general good*. The *ties of gratitude*, how binding soever they may be, should never lead us to do any thing contrary to the *rules of justice* and honour ; for whenever that happens, we shall not fail to blame, and reproach ourselves afterwards.

THE same *moral sense*, which determines us to approve of some sort of sentiments, dispositions and actions, does as naturally lead us to be *offended with others*. For as all the kind and social affections, and whatever is morally good, do make a character appear exceeding amiable, and always give us pleasure and delight, whenever they are presented to our view ; so on the other hand, the want or absence of these, and much more, every contrary disposition, renders a character odious and deformed, and always gives us disturbance in the view and representation.

AND thus we if we compare these opposite passions with each other, without considering the happy consequences and effects of the one, and the mischiefs produced in society by the other, it appears that every affection of kindness and gratitude, every motion of friendship, and good-will, is a
real

real pleasure; while every impression of hatred and anger is a *displeasure*: it is a real pain and disturbance, and therefore, whoever has any regard to his own immediate ease and satisfaction, would chuse the one, and avoid the other as much as possible, or at least he would not create to himself more occasions of uneasiness than are necessary.

It is true indeed, that whenever the social affections appear to be weak and deficient, and overpowered by the selfish appetites, this so defaces the *beauty of a character*, that we can no longer view it with pleasure and approbation; and if it was possible for this *sympathy*, or love to those of our own kind, to be wholly wanting in the constitution of any human creature, so that he should be entirely governed by *selfishness* or *malice*, it is hard to conceive how such a one could be treated otherwise, than with the utmost *hatred* and detestation.

BUT as all depends upon opinion, we ought here to use our utmost care, not to entertain *worse opinions* of any persons than they deserve, by supposing them to have morally ill qualities, which they are free from. As we cannot see into the hearts of others, but must judge of their dispositions, by their actions, we ought never to be hasty in forming disadvantageous opinions of any persons; but rather suspend our judgments till we have *carefully examined* every circumstance, and when we have done, we should put the *best construction* upon every action that it will admit of.

A MODERATE knowledge of the world will make a man cautious, how he trusts to *fair pretences*, and
warn

warn him to be upon his guard, against the wiles of crafty and self-interested persons ; yet in the main, when we form our judgments of others, an error on the *favourable side* will be most pardonable ; and the general benevolence we bear to all men, should make us presume that they are not wanting in the common affections of humanity, till we have *evident proofs* of the contrary.

THERE are many actions, which may appear to be *morally evil*, which yet ought to undergo a milder censure, when they do not proceed from an *ill principle*, but from *kind affection*, though partial, and misguided, so as to produce more harm than good ; and this in some cases merits compassion, rather than hatred, and should excite our endeavours to rectify the mistake.

WHEN there is some share of humanity in the temper, and the fault is not in the heart, but proceeds entirely from a *short and partial view*, and from a *false judgment* of things, it is thought to be more excuseable, because there is a possibility of amendment ; and it may shew how necessary it is, that every passion should be restrained, and governed by reason ; because through too great kindness and friendship to some particular persons, or an excess of gratitude to their benefactors, many have been drawn in to do actions inconsistent with the general good, and brought to suffer by the hand of justice, for notorious crimes.

As the very best affections may be misguided, so they may also sometimes be overcome by *sudden starts*, and fallies of *contrary passions*, which yet
may

may be excused, if the main tenor of a man's conduct is right and good.

Too great a propensity to entertain odious opinions of others, and to hate and despise them upon slight grounds, must proceed from a great want of *humanity*, or from a *false judgment* of ourselves and others: for whoever understands the frame and constitution of his own species, and considers well the great variety and strength of their passions, and the weakness of their reason, will make *great allowances* for human frailty; and if he is not guilty of self-deceit, but can look into himself with an impartial eye, he may see enough there to make him less forward to censure others.

THERE is a mixture of good and ill in *all characters*; the most excellent endowments are often attended with great *blemishes and imperfections*; and if we search for the most shining qualities, we shall often find them obscured by remarkable defects. But still where the moral goodness is sufficient to *outweigh* the evil in any persons, they ought so far to be the objects of our love and esteem, and the worst ought not to share a greater degree of hatred, than is *proportional to the excess* of their ill qualities above the good.

WE ought therefore to suppress as much as possible all the motions of pride, or immoderate self-esteem, which makes us *delight to pry* into other people's faults, and beware of hearkening to any *false suggestions*, or unfair representations, which may lead us into injurious opinions of any persons. It is easy for those who take upon them to *draw characters*, to throw some things into the *strongest light*,

and to *shade and obscure others*, so as scarce to be perceived; whereby they may fix our attention so much upon mens faults as to make us over-look virtues, and bring us to entertain odious conceptions of them; as if they were wholly evil, or at least destitute of every thing amiable and praise-worthy.

BUT as every good man will scorn to be imposed upon by such vile misrepresentations, so he will be cautious not to impose upon himself, by judging partially in cases where self is concerned; he will not confine his esteem to his own party, or to his friends, and such as have done him little services; nor on the other hand, will he entertain an ill opinion of such as are in a different way of thinking, who may have accidentally injured him, or by reason of interfering interests may be his enemies. He will not through envy detract from another's worth, but he will always do justice to merit, even in his adversary, and embrace a generous enemy, on the first offer of reconciliation.

As we ought not to wrong any persons so far, as to suppose they have in them that moral evil which they are clear of, so neither ought we to hate and despise them, for that which is not *morally ill*; *poverty, meanness of birth, slowness of understanding*, with all *natural defects*, blemishes and imperfections, should move our compassion, rather than our scorn; and we ought never to hate one another for *different opinions concerning religious matters*, or *different methods of religious worship*; though as the passions of mankind are commonly managed, this occasions an *aversion immortal and irreconcilable*;
and

Sect. V. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 179

and the greatest depravity of the moral sense springs from *superstition*.

A LOVER of mankind would willingly draw a veil over this human frailty, if the fatal mischiefs it occasions were less apparent; but it is easy to observe, how by playing upon the natural fears of mankind, and the dread they have of an *unknown cause*, whose power is not to be resisted, and that sometimes brings upon them great calamities; the generality, in all ages, have been led to believe, that the world was governed by an *arbitrary, angry, and vindictive being*; subject to be highly provoked, and unfortunately, in his wrath, avenging himself upon others, rather than those who gave the provocation, and making innocent persons suffer with those that are criminal.

HE is said to shake the mountains with his thunder, darting his lightening at the heads of guilty mortals. He sometimes sends unkindly seasons, and blasts the fruits of the earth, producing a famine; or else he fills the air with pestilential steams, and sweeps away great numbers by untimely death. And when we find that he is offended, he must be appeased by sacrifices, and supplications. He has also been represented as vain-glorious, desirous in praise, and like some *eastern monarch*, pleased with flattery, cringing, and mean prostration; partial to a few of his creatures, for slight causes, and cruel to the rest, for no cause at all. So prone are we to imagine the *divine being* like what he is farthest from resembling, I mean *ourselves*, that we cast upon him the highest dishonour, while we ascribe those weak passions to divini-

ty, which are the frailties and blemishes of human nature.

As nothing can be so great a support to moral goodness, as *true religion*; so nothing is so destructive of it, as *false and unworthy conceptions* of the deity. The firm and steady belief of a God, who is ever represented as a true model, and example of the *highest goodness* and *most exact justice*; who orders all thing for the best, and consults the happiness of every particular, so far as is consistent with the general good; such a view of divine providence and bounty, extended to all, and constantly employed for the good of the whole, must contribute very much to fix a true judgment, or sense of what is amiable and excellent; engage us to imitate so illustrious a pattern, and to act in our narrow sphere by the same principle, so far as our small ability will extend, which is indeed our main duty, and most acceptable service.

BUT if the deity is represented under an *immoral character*; if we take him to be cruel and unjust, partial and revengeful, this can have no other tendency, than to sap the foundation of all *moral virtue*, and reverse the natural sense of right and wrong, by making those qualities amiable and adorable, which are really odious and detestable.

THIS will gradually produce a partial, narrow, and unsociable spirit; and the most unjust and cruel actions will be no longer viewed with abhorrence, but by the force of this example may come to be considered as *divine, and worthy of imitation*.

ALSO when men are so *irreligious* as to imagine the deity to be *immoral*, his example will not only have

have a bad influence, but his favour and resentment will be *injuriously and wantonly* applied, and his rewards and punishments *unequally distributed*. Thus he is often represented as being highly offended with his creatures, for making a *free and impartial use* of those natural powers he has given them, to judge of what is true or false, right or wrong; and to regulate their conduct accordingly, though this is certainly no more than every *man's duty*.

YET in consequence of this *false opinion* of the *divine being*, those who cannot resign their understanding to our direction, but shall presume to differ from us in their *religious belief*, and perhaps to worship God in a different manner; all these shall be pointed out as the *objects of his wrath*, drawing down his vengeance on the whole community. And as others may with equal reason pass the same censure upon us, this with the assistance of *odious appellations*, and *reproachful names*, may sometimes, amongst different persuasions, *occasion a mutual hatred and bitter antipathy*, more implacable than could arise from any temporal interest whatsoever.

BUT surely such opinions and practices as are hurtful to none, nor directly inconsistent with the *public peace*, though they may possibly be sometimes *foolish and absurd*, and consequently the proper subjects for *mirth and ridicule*; yet they ought by no means to be treated with *rage and fury*.

FOR whatever is so far destructive of natural affection and humanity, as to give us injurious opinions of others, and create in us aversion and ill-will towards them, without just cause, or beyond a just

degree, from whatever notion or principle it may be advanced, it is utterly *inconsistent with the happiness of society*; and as it is a hindrance to the practice of virtue, it is so far repugnant to the welfare of every particular: It destroys that peace and tranquillity of mind, that ease and good-humour, so essential to our felicity; is productive of nothing but continual rancour, and in its consequence will be sure to bring upon us sorrow and remorse.

WHEN the moral qualities of any persons appear to be *wholly evil*, and their actions extremely hurtful to others, they raise in us not only hatred and aversion, but also indignation, suspending for a time, that kindness and good-will which we naturally bear to all, moving us forcibly the contrary way, and inciting us to their harm and destruction, as creatures that are pernicious to the rest of their kind.

BUT this passion of anger and resentment is most frequently and most powerfully kindled by injuries done to *ourselves*, because we are apt to be very sensibly affected with that moral evil in others, by which we ourselves come to be sufferers; and this in a just degree, is very requisite, as it fortifies us to repel injury, and resist violence when offered.

IF any creature was wholly void of this passion, and could be so tame, as patiently to bear all indignities, such a one must not expect to be very free from *insults and abuses*; for it is of no small efficacy to restrain men from ill actions, when they know that they shall incur not only the hatred and ill-will of all observers, but also the vengeance of the injured parties; and one person intending violence

olence and harm to another, is often deterred from the execution, when he perceives by the rising motions of this passion, that it will not pass *unpunished*. But certainly we ought here to practise *forbearance and restraint*, because too much indulgence to resentment is scarce consistent with our happiness. All the satisfaction we can receive in gratifying revenge, is only a short-lived joy, that results from the removal of a most grievous and tormenting anguish; and which is often followed by heavy and lasting remorse. We ought therefore to avoid it as much as possible, and especially to guard against the excess of this passion, so destructive of humanity, and of every kind and social affection.

For it ruffles and discomposes the mind, destroys good-humour and easiness of temper, hindering the exercise of benevolence towards others, as well as to those that gave the provocation, and introducing by degrees a habit of *perverseness and ill-nature*. This may at last also degenerate into *cruelty, barbarity, and inhumanity*, the most horrid and unnatural of all passions, and attended with the greatest misery; as they imply a state of almost continual bitterness and torment, with but little mixture of any real and natural joy, accompanied with a consciousness of the deserved hatred and ill-will, the hostility and vengeance of all mankind.

This passion whenever it prevails, is of all others the *most raging and impetuous*; it beats down reason, and every opposite affection like a tempest, hurrying men into actions, contrary to all honour and justice, as well as to their own interest and

safety. It would therefore be the greatest prudence to stifle and suppress as much as possible the first motions of anger, and give ourselves liberty to examine, whether what we take to be an injury, may not be an accidental harm, without any malicious intention. It is but a weakness to be put out of temper by every little accident, which happens to incommode us; nor is any thing the proper object of resentment, but what proceeds from an *evil disposition*; and many actions which do so, and are real injuries, had yet better be despised and overlooked, or turned off with an air of pleasantry, than seriously and stiffly resented.

WEAK and feeble minds are most prone to *anger*, and by their exceeding fierceness generally disappoint their own purposes; but the *greatest*, and the *bravest of men*, are always *calm* and *sedate*; they are above being disturbed with little injuries, and can generously pardon the greatest; taking more delight in mercy and forgiveness, than in prosecuting revenge when it is in their power.

Sect. VI. *How the sense of honour and reputation ought to be moderated.*
Recapitulation and conclusion.

AS the practice of moral goodness yields the greatest pleasure, so the reflection on such a conduct, and the consciousness of having done what is decent and right, affords a real and natural joy; and next to this, we are so formed by nature, as to delight in the esteem and approbation of others,

thers, which to an honest mind, is an exquisite satisfaction.

BUT here it will be found very necessary for every man to form within himself a true judgment, and a proportionate taste in life and manners, that he may not foolishly applaud himself, nor expect the approbation of others, for that which is not *excellent and worthy*.

IF this sense of honour and reputation is directed by reason, so as to regard only the judgment of the *wise and good*, obtained by real merit, it will prove a most powerful incentive to virtue; but if it is an *undistinguished desire* to gain the good opinion of those we converse with promiscuously, it may frequently lead us astray. For in many persons, the moral sense is very much depraved, and they are taught to measure right and wrong, not by the standard of moral excellence, but from false and partial rules, contrived for other purposes than to promote the happiness of mankind, and thereby are accustomed to admire and esteem many things which are not *morally good*, and to condemn others that are no *way evil*.

No wise man will ever set any great value upon so low a thing as the *ignorant commendation* of such as know so little what is *truly laudable*. He will steadily pursue what he takes to be right; and as he will not be much elated with the praise of such as are no *competent judges*, so neither will he be much dejected, when he is hated and evil spoke of by them, but will rather count it an honour.

WHOEVER is so fond of *popular applause*, as to make the vulgar opinion always the rule of his conduct, cannot

cannot fail of being often led into errors ; and though he may, by partial and immoral actions, gain the applause of *his associates*, or of a *party*, whose interest is contrary to the general good, he will at the same time most deservedly be detested by others ; nor can any one attain to true and lasting honour, but by real merit, and such a behaviour, as is adapted to the welfare of the *whole community*.

It will be the part of wisdom to moderate this love of reputation, so far as never to aim at it by *indirect methods*, or strive to obtain it, by such actions as will, sooner or later, destroy the *approbation of our own minds*, and that peace of conscience which of all worldly possessions is the most invaluable. All the honour we can gain by such means, is only a false and deceitful good, which deprives us of one much greater ; and as it is built upon a wrong foundation, can never be found and lasting, but will rather end in infamy and disgrace.

THE love and esteem of others, when obtained by actions *truly honourable*, yields a pleasure not only natural and just, but also exquisitely delightful ; and the best and noblest minds are most susceptible of this passion, which yet ought to be restrained and kept within due bounds. It should always be our principal care to form just opinions of *ourselves* ; and to guard against *flattery and false praise* from without, and an ignorant *self-esteem* from within, that we be not betrayed into vain and conceited imaginations of our own worth, so as to expect a greater share of deference than we *really deserve*.

THERE are many who expect to be admired for the *beauty of their person*, or the *elegance of their dress*,

dress, or else may claim it by a shew of *grandeur and magnificence*, in a *stately palace*, a *sumptuous table*, and a *splendid equipage*: Some demand honour and respect, by *stuffs, ribbons, titles*, and such like glittering ware; while others build their fame up, on the sole foundation of *courage and military achievements*, or of *temperance and austeriety, wealth and power, wit and prudence*, all which are worthy of esteem, when *rightly applied*. All the misfortune is, we are often so partial, as to set too high a value upon those endowments we are possessed of, or else we imagine ourselves possessed of more than others can discover: this will naturally lead us to arrogate to ourselves a greater degree of respect than is our due; than which nothing can more expose a man to ridicule and contempt.

He that would gain true honour, must not *openly* lay claim to it, but rather renounce all pretensions, and appear to act from a better and a nobler motive. And indeed whoever sincerely aims at virtue and happiness, will industriously strive to keep this love of fame under subjection: he will be modest and humble, contenting himself with the testimony of his own conscience, and the approbation of those few good men, to whom he has the happiness to be intimately known; without being solicitous about the rest; since an immoderate desire after honour and applause, which exceeds the bounds of an honest emulation, and arises into pride and ambition, is so vain and foolish a thing.

Who would ever engage in such a pursuit, who considers with what difficulty a *general reputation* is

is to be obtained ; how often it is sullied by *misrepresentation*, and how easily it is blasted by *calumny*, *slander* and *detraction*.

THE most *distinguished excellence* is commonly the mark of *envy and ill-nature* ; for it is the fault of all proud and ambitious spirits, that they judge *too partially* of their own worth, and raising their expectations too high, are apt to think themselves injured when others are advanced above them, and obtain more honour than themselves : and this moves them to hate others, for those very qualities, that ought to win their admiration and esteem, and to use all base and unworthy methods to lessen and defame them.

AND thus we see that this sort of honour which depends on the opinion of others, is but an *uncertain good*, difficult to obtain, and hazardous to preserve ; and besides that, too eager a pursuit of it is attended with numberless disquiets ; nor is any thing more destructive of private happiness, and of the peace and harmony of society, than this passion when it is immoderate and unrestrained.

IT is easy to observe, in common life, that many persons of tolerable good-nature, and no ways touched with pride, yet through too tender a *sense of honour and reputation*, are more disturbed than is necessary, with every little mark of disrespect ; and from the same cause, are also apt to be too quick-sighted to discern an affront, and look upon that as a slight, which was never intended as such ; this will often occasion needless uneasiness and resentment, and disturb the mutual agreement be-

twixt

Sect. VI. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 189

twixt friends, who might otherwise live together in uninterrupted quiet.

WHERE there is less good-nature, and a greater degree of pride, the disorders it produces will be so much *the greater*; and especially where the *love of glory* is very intense, and comes united in persons of an high rank, with a *genius interpreting and fiery*, it displays itself in a more sensible manner, setting nations together at war, and sacrificing many thousands to the vanity of a single person. But if we may be allowed upon a fair enquiry to ballance the whole amount of what such a person can possibly gain, with regard to real happiness and contentment, it will be found to be very inconsiderable. It is only an empty bubble, a fantastical good, incapable of yielding any true and solid satisfaction; but what he will be likely to lose, is very apparent; for this affection when it is so headstrong and impatient, will be sure to fill the hearts of ambitious and aspiring men with constant *anxiety, jealousy, and mistrust*; and the cruel shocks of disappointment, the workings of envy, and the bitter stings of affront, will be perpetually tormenting those, whose desires after honour and applause are so excessive.

WHEREAS they who act from a *virtuous inclination*, without any such *ardent thirst* after fame, and can rather slight, and despise the opinion of the vulgar, will not fail, sooner or later, to obtain the largest share of it; and if their station in the world has been such, as to enable them to be beneficial to a considerable part of mankind, their names will be made immortal, and they will be for ever remembered with esteem and honour.

BUT

BUT to draw towards a conclusion. The sum of what has been advanced is only this. That as GOD ALMIGHTY has endowed men with various *senses, or powers of affection*, and thereby made them susceptible of happiness and misery, he has also given them the active powers of *thought and motion*; which enable them to pursue the one, and to fly from the other: All persons being necessarily determined, by all the means within their power, to shun or get quit of every painful and uneasy sensation; as well as to retain that which is pleasing and delightful.

ALL *present good* affects us with pleasure, which never puts us into motion, nor gives us any inclination, but to continue in our *present state*; but *present or approaching evil* gives us pain and disturbance, and by exciting our aversion, moves us powerfully to fly from and avoid it: also the idea of absent good makes us uneasy in the want of it, and by exciting our desire, moves us strongly to seek after and obtain it.

If our motion could be always directed to our best and chiefest good, this would be perfectly right; but whenever we pursue that which upon the whole is not our good; as also when we fly from that which is not necessarily and absolutely evil, these must be manifest errors in our conduct, as they do not lead us towards happiness, which is the center to which all our motions are to tend.

YET we are unavoidably exposed to such errors, because we are put into motion by desire or aversion, which though excited by the objects of good and evil, yet they are not always *proportionable to*
their

their true and intrinsic value, but to their *appearance*, and the impression they make upon the mind, and the fancy or opinion we have of them ; and it may frequently happen, from many causes, that the *apparent* good or evil may be different from the *real*.

BUT here a main question will arise, whether we ought to leave all things to *chance*, take up with every prepossessing fancy, and suffer ourselves to be carried, where every foremost inclination would lead us ; or whether we ought not rather to use our *thinking faculty*, and employ some industry and care, to order and direct our motion for the best, that we may, so far as in us lies, shun and avoid all evil, and obtain the best and greatest good.

THIS latter seems to be most eligible, and if we have any regard to happiness, is certainly our duty, because the author of our beings has not only made us liable to passions, which serve to put us into motion, but has also given us reason, to govern and direct these passions ; which will not fail to guide us so much the nearer to our happiness, as we obey its dictates, and follow its direction : whereas if we take up with the suggestions of fancy, without further examination, and yield to the impulse of every desire and aversion, we shall be led astray, and wander far from our true felicity.

WE are not necessarily determined by every *first impression*, but may have it in our power, as it is no impossible attainment, upon any occasion to curb our passions, and thereby stop and suspend our motion, till we have fairly examined whether

ther it will tend ; whether what we pursue as good, may not in its consequence bring upon us greater inconvenience ; and what we fly from as evil, may not hereafter procure us greater advantage ; and afterwards to continue or alter its direction, as reason shall give the word of command.

WHOEVER can do this, may be said to be *free*, and master of himself ; but he who is hurried away by the violence of every headstrong affection, which he is not able to controul, is no longer free, but miserably *captivated and enslaved*.

As this power of *reasoning, comparing, and judging*, is thought to be the highest and noblest faculty of human nature, it ought certainly to have the supreme and absolute command, else our conduct will have a mixture of folly and madness. We shall often run headlong into such measures as are contrary to our happiness, and even the very best affections, if they are partial and misguided, may prove most pernicious.

THEREFORE it ought to be every one's main concern, to endeavour to bring his passions into subjection, and by the frequent use of forbearance and endurance, to gain somewhat of an habit of *self-denial*, which is the grand principle of wisdom.

It is not by indulging, and giving a loose to every forward inclination, that we can hope to attain to happiness ; but by curbing and restraining, which must unavoidably cost some present pain and trouble, nor can it be done without some violence to the *sensitive* part of our nature : Yet *repeated use* will render the practice of it more easy, and reason will certainly recommend it as highly

highly requisite, because whatever we may suffer in this conflict, will be amply repaid by the great advantages which will ensue.

FOR by this means a man will gain an opportunity to search the source and original of all his errors ; and by weighing and considering every circumstance, to rectify those false opinions, which lead him astray, and are the occasions of so much vexation and calamity. This will not fail of having a happy influence upon his conduct ; for when all undue appearances are corrected, he will then forbear all wrong pursuits, and feel no hindrance in following steadily that path which his most deliberate judgment shall point out to him. And thus at last he will come to know his true scope and end, and upon all occasions, take the most proper measures to avoid what might give him disquiet, and to obtain the greatest and most lasting pleasure.

THE first and most essential part of happiness is to be *free from misery*, so far as our condition will allow ; and this is thought to be best secured by a continued course of *health*, a *competent estate*, and a *temper equal and composed*. The first will prevent all racking pains in the body, as the second will render a man easy in his outward circumstances, and the third, which is of the greatest moment, will make him easy in his mind.

THE two first are not always in our power ; yet temperance and forbearance of all excess, in sensual pleasures, joined with a moderate use of exercise and labour, will contribute very much to preserve health, and promote cheerfulness and good-humour ; as industry, and a due application to busi-

ness, will in most cases acquire a competent fortune, sufficient not only to set a man above the fear of want, but enable him to be kind and helpful to others; yet whatever his success may be in these affairs, if he is desirous to pass through the world with as little trouble as is possible, he should principally endeavour to procure to himself an equal mind, and by rectifying his opinions, to moderate his affections, so as not to aim at high and difficult attainments, but to rest satisfied with such as are within his power; never vexing and tormenting himself with impatient desires, nor with dreadful aversions or fears, with cruel reflections on what is past, nor with anxious cares about what is to come, but in every circumstance of life to be easy and contented.

AFTER guarding against unnecessary pain and trouble, our next care should be, to obtain the *greatest pleasure our condition* will allow of; always setting a *just value* upon every enjoyment, and making those which are of an *inferior nature* yield to such as are more *exalted and refined*. Yet as all these powers of affection, were given us for a good purpose, they may and ought to be employed under *just restrictions*.

No wise man will, with an affected austerity, renounce all *sensual pleasures*; but he will manage them so, as not to *interfere* with nobler pleasures, and will always use them with temperance and moderation, whereby he will enjoy them in the greatest perfection. He should not be afraid of intermixing a little pain, which will give a greater relish to these gratifications. Abstinence and hunger will
make

Sect. VI. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 195

make his food more delicious, as exercise and labour will render his rest more sweet; and after having spent the day in business, he may better devote the evening to innocent mirth and chearful company; for gaiety and pleasantness in their proper seasons are exceeding useful, as they help to maintain good-humour, and serve as a specific antidote against serious extravagance, and melancholy delusion.

THE pleasures of the understanding, or of the imagination, which result from the discovery of truth, or the survey of beauty, which we meet with in the pursuit of natural knowledge, and every branch of polite learning, are as *entertaining to the mind*, as the proper objects are to our *outward senses*, and are by general consent allowed to be more excellent and worthy. Therefore whoever has leisure and opportunity for it, should strive to enrich his mind, with the treasures of knowledge, to enlarge his understanding, and improve his reason, which will be of great advantage in his conduct, besides the immediate pleasure these speculations do afford; which is of no small value, since even the meanest subjects of this kind may furnish a most elegant, as well as innocent entertainment, and supply a great variety of amusements, to pass away that time with pleasure, which might otherwise lye heavy on our hands, or perhaps be worse employed.

BUT of all the delights which human nature is capable of enjoying, the most lively and transporting are those which flow from *sympathy and social passion*; which consist in the exercise of kindness

and humanity, gratitude and love. For the sovereign Ruler of the world has made these affections the most exquisitely moving, and most conducing to the private happiness of every particular, which at the same time tend most to promote the general good.

AND they are not only the most pleasing in their immediate exercise, but also in contemplation and reflection ; for every mind or thinking principle is so formed by nature, as to perceive a beauty and a grace in every thing that is harmonious and proportionable, regular and good, contrived by wisdom and design for the greatest advantage, and especially in that harmony of the sentiments and affections in the human mind, which are adapted to the happiness of every particular, and also to the general good of the whole system.

THIS *moral beauty* which appears in real life, is of all others the most engaging, and adorned with the most powerful charms ; yielding the highest delight whenever we view it in others, and much more when we are conscious of it in ourselves. This affords continual joy, supporting men under the greatest sufferings, and even in the article of death ; whereas the contrary is most odious and detestable, exciting our highest aversion and detestation. And whatever is acted in violation of this *natural conscience*, destroys all inward peace, and sets us at continual variance with ourselves ; because that which pleases in the action, will displease in reflection, and create perpetual repentance and self-disapprobation.

It

It is also of no small moment, that whenever we vary from this *primary measure* of honesty and worth, we shall not only be self-condemned, but shall also undergo the censure of others, and incur the hatred and resentment of all about us : as on the contrary, whoever can regulate his actions according to the rules of virtue and honour, will not only have the inward testimony of his own heart, but will gain the love and esteem, the approbation and praise, of all mankind, or at least of all whose opinion is worth regarding.

WHICH leads to the main conclusion we have endeavoured to establish ; for we do presume to affirm, how contrary soever it may be to the prevailing opinion, that VIRTUE is something more than an empty sound ; that it is not only the support and ornament of society, and beneficial to mankind in general, but also to every particular person. It is the truest and most substantial happiness, as it yields the greatest pleasure, both in its immediate exercise, and in its consequences and effects. It is this which gives a relish to all other pleasures, and where it is wholly wanting, there can be no true nor lasting pleasure, but all will be bitterness, horror and remorse, without the least mixture of any thing gentle and agreeable.

THEREFORE whoever is desirous to obtain the greatest pleasure he is capable of receiving, after having first settled right notions of what is worthy and valuable in life, should endeavour by the patient use of forbearance to wean his fancy from *inferior enjoyments* ; as by due consideration he may raise desire, and by habitual practice encrease his
relish

relish of those that are his highest good, and by working upon his own mind, he may bring all his dispositions and affections to that just harmony, so essential to virtue and happiness, which are found to be one and the same.

HE ought principally to strive to cultivate a *virtuous disposition*, and form his temper to *kindness and humanity*: whatever else he may have, he will be sure to preserve his honour inviolate, suppressing every base and selfish inclination, and cherishing as much as possible a generous public spirit. This he should make the ruling passion of his life, and his chief ambition ought to be to do good to all, so far as his ability will extend. All his other pleasures will then be brought to correspond, and be friends with this, and no affection will be indulged that is in the least inconsistent with it; and that for this plain reason, because the nearer we approach the standard of *moral excellence*, the more we shall advance our own *true happiness*, which is the *ultimate end* of all our actions.

YET after all, with our utmost efforts, we shall not be able to attain to be *perfectly virtuous*, or *completely happy*, but virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, happiness and misery, will be differently shared, and variously mixed and compounded in the several characters of mankind: and so it must of necessity be, unless we could be *omniscient*, and *infallible*, endowed with other faculties than our CREATOR has been pleased to give us. The supreme wisdom best knows how to compose the disorders of the intelligent world, to reconcile the jarring motions, and make all the seeming discords
contribute

SECT. VI. on VIRTUE and HAPPINESS. 199

contribute to a most perfect harmony. But that is perhaps above the reach of our understandings; we can distinguish what is apparently good or evil, with relation to ourselves and to those of our own kind, and have the natural sense of right and wrong to direct us in our conduct, and to which we should always pay the greatest regard; but what is absolutely good or evil we can form no judgment of, because we cannot see the whole, nor any part of it fully; and we are lost in mazes, whenever we presume to reason about things that are placed beyond our view, and of which we can form no ideas, but what are very *inadequate* and *imperfect*.

BUT as we know that in the universe all things are governed and regulated for the best by a being infinitely wise and good, we have reason to believe that not only those motions that we now perceive to be regular and just, but those also which appear to be most irregular; all the various *errors and imperfections* of the several parts, are guided by a superior hand, so as to conspire to the *beauty, order, and perfection*, of the *whole*.

F I N I S.



31717

[illegible]